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  Abstract 
 Deindustrialization and the globalization of labor processes fundamentally altered the 
lives of working-class Americans, both at work and in their communities, in the second half of 
the twentieth century.  As a result, unions and especially the industrial workers belonging to 
them existed in a far different, less certain, and less optimistic world than their counterparts at 
the end of World War Two.  America’s economic and industrial hegemony after the war buckled 
under the assault from within, especially with the proliferation of global manufacturing systems, 
and without through intensified foreign competition.  Plant closings and technological changes 
such as computerization and automation jeopardized working-class prospects for upward 
mobility through manual labor.  Once-dominant labor unions in manufacturing industries such as 
earthmoving equipment, steel, auto, electronics, and textiles suffered steep and, thus far, 
irreversible losses in numbers and strength.  The consequences have been deep and largely 
deleterious, with workers facing heightened competition for good paying but increasingly scarce 
industrial jobs, the drastic decline and political influence of organized labor, and a radically 
recalibrated balance of power in labor relations in favor of employers.  
 This dissertation examines the globalization of work processes, the destructive forces and 
consequences of deindustrialization, and their impact on labor relations between Caterpillar Inc. 
and the United Auto Workers from 1948 to 2000. It analyzes the ways in which workers as 
laboring consumers experienced, understood, and responded to the increasingly interconnected 
and unstable global economy in the postwar period. In the process, the dissertation proffers a 
critique of labor relations in the US, the bureaucratic unionism that has become entrenched 
within it, and the struggles within unions and local communities. 
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 Incorporating social, labor, and business history, this study contributes to the literature on 
globalization and the decline of the labor movement by connecting myriad sites such as the shop 
floor, local communities, federal policies, and transnational trade and labor-relations strategies. 
Utilizing myriad archival sources such as corporate and union newspapers, grievance and 
arbitration cases, and internal union documents, as well as oral histories with current and former 
Caterpillar workers and UAW officials, the dissertation illustrates the complex and often 
constraining nexus of social, economic, political, and nationalistic forces facing workers in a 
declining industrial landscape. 
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Introduction 
“Will Globalization Play in Peoria? Class, Nation, and Race in the Global Economy, 
1948-2000,” examines the impact of global production and international economic competition 
on Caterpillar workers in Peoria, Illinois.  It traces the formation and renegotiation of workers’ 
class, national, racial, and gender identities at work and in their communities, the evolving and 
often contentious labor relations between the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the company, 
and the shifting topography of the workplace stemming from automation, outsourcing and the 
reorganization of job processes.  It argues that the globalization of work fundamentally altered 
working-class identities, undermining both the nation’s postwar economic dominance and 
unionized workers’ position as America’s “blue-collar elite.”   
Intense competition with ascendant Japanese companies also revealed deep divisions 
within the union, local communities, and the workplace about how to compete and survive in a 
period of economic decline. It contends that the UAW’s embrace of joint labor-management 
programs in the 1980s eroded its militant traditions by reorienting its largely conservative 
members in Peoria toward a more business-friendly unionism, and submerging class 
consciousness under heightened nationalist fervor. This fatally undermined workers’ capacity to 
resist Caterpillar’s push for deep concessions in wage structures and work rules that it eventually 
won after strikes and shop-floor strife throughout the 1990s. As a result, the union’s defeat 
accelerated employers’ concessionary demands from other workers across the country, splitting 
the working class and its fortunes across generational lines and undoing important remnants of 
the New Deal order.  
Caterpillar and the UAW, and their relationship, represent an excellent opportunity 
through which to analyze the impact of global production on workers. The company was at the 
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forefront of key business trends during and after World War Two—the centralization of 
economic and political power among large, monopolistic corporations; the expansion of big 
business across the globe for market domination and cheaper supplies of labor; and the honing of 
mass communication techniques to rationalize these two developments to communities, 
consumers, and employees. It was an early, aggressive force in the acceleration of globalization, 
emerging with other American businesses as dominant transnational corporations by the early 
1960s. For its part, the UAW played an important role among the burgeoning US union 
movement in touting what it termed “free trade unionism” around the world, an amalgam of anti-
communist policies, support for unions and governments supportive of America’s Cold War 
objectives, a proponent of trade expansion and, as corporations began to relocate abroad in the 
1960s, an advocate for closer ties with industrial unions around the world. Both, that is, thought 
and operated consistently but to different degrees on an international scale in this period. 
This dissertation contributes to the scholarship of postwar labor history on several fronts. 
It engages a small but growing historiography on the strikes at Caterpillar while confronting its 
fairly exclusive focus on the centrality of the strikes themselves.  Although these authors and 
labor relations scholars have delved deeply into the strikes’ tactics, mistakes, outcomes and 
implications for the labor movement, they have done little to analyze and historicize working-
class life at work and in Peoria. As a result, their preoccupation with what Victor Devinatz has 
termed the “heroic defeat” of the UAW has omitted serious analysis of antecedent events and 
trends that may elucidate why those strikes were defensive and, ultimately unsuccessful.
1
 This 
                                                          
1
 Stephen Franklin, Three Strikes: Labor’s Heartland Losses and What They Mean for Working Americans (NY: 
The Guilford Press, 2001); Isaac Cohen, “The Caterpillar Labor Dispute and the UAW, 1991-1998,” Labor Studies 
Journal, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Winter 2003), 77-99; Victor G. Devinatz, “A Heroic Defeat: The Caterpillar Labor Dispute 
and the UAW, 1991-1998,” Labor Studies Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Summer 2005), 1-18; Phil McCall, “’We Had to 
Stick Together:’ Individual Preferences, Collective Struggle, and the Formation of Social Consciousness,” Science 
and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2008, 147-181.   
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study argues that the development of Caterpillar workers’ class, racial, gender, and national 
identities is central to understanding how they encountered and responded to changing political 
and economic conditions in the postwar era. As the U.S. languished in a serious recession, 
unemployment rates rose dramatically, and a wave of factory closings swept across the nation, 
the UAW and its members jettisoned their historically adversarial relationship with Caterpillar in 
favor of joint labor-management programs which entailed extensive labor-management 
collaboration. “Jointness” was more than a strategy to retain good jobs, which appealed to the 
primarily male workforce of “breadwinners,” but appealed to them and was presented to them as 
an avenue to national resurgence, a chance for the company remain competitive, and as a better 
and more “mature” approach to labor relations. This proved unsuccessful, and strengthened 
Caterpillar’s hand in the coming years as it wrung contractual concessions from the union, and 
downsized its unionized factories by shifting production to nonunion facilities in the South, and 
moving others overseas. 
The way in which deindustrialization unfolded at Caterpillar offers an important 
contribution to the vast scholarship on plant closings, and their impact upon workers and unions. 
For the most part, the stories in these important works offer readers finality—the factories close, 
companies relocate, unions lose members, and quality of life in the communities suffers.
2
 The 
process of deindustrialization in Peoria, through Caterpillar, proceeded rather differently and 
more gradually than elsewhere, with crucial ramifications for their employees, and insights into 
understanding deindustrialization as not just a process, but a persistent condition. Watching 
deindustrialization unfold and linger, as much as witnessing and enduring factories closing, 
                                                          
2
 See for example Charles Craypo and Bruce Nissen eds., Grand Designs: The Impact of Corporate Strategies on 
Workers, Unions, and Communities (Ithaca: Cornell ILR Press, 1993); Steven P. Dandeneau, A Town Abandoned: 
Flint, Michigan, Confronts Deindustrialization (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1996); Steven High, 
Industrial Sunset: The Making of North America’s Rust Belt, 1969-1984 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2003); John Portz, The Politics of Plant Closings (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1990).  
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shaped the strategies, responses, and perspectives of the community, workers, and the UAW in 
their attempts to salvage jobs, and develop new economic opportunities.  
This study also complements and confronts the prevailing historiography on the UAW in 
the postwar period.  Nelson Lichtenstein’s early work on the UAW established shop floor 
politics and sociology as vital arenas for investigating the union’s growth and the concomitant 
ossification of its ruling bureaucracy.  By strictly regulating the grievance system, and by 
stamping out non-contractual shop floor militancy such as wildcat strikes, Walter Reuther and 
the union’s leadership solidified its control over the union and its membership. At the same time, 
it reflected a convergence of interests with auto manufacturers who had sought, since the advent 
of the UAW, to eradicate militant unionism. The result, according to Lichtenstein, was the 
demise of postwar unionism’s potential for social democratic change.3  Revisionists of postwar 
labor history and industrial relations have argued that Lichtenstein’s early work erred by placing 
too much blame on the UAW and unions for contributing to their own decline, and devoting too 
little attention to the narrow sociopolitical parameters in which unions operated after World War 
Two.  Critical of the implication that a “postwar labor accord” existed between labor and 
management, revisionists reemphasized the pivotal and persistent role the state has played in 
curtailing the power of organized labor in the postwar period. Even as unions grew stronger, they 
faced a resurgent, reorganized business community that developed innovative methods to 
communicate with the public at large, and persuade American employees and consumers to 
                                                          
3 See for example Nelson Lichtenstein, “Conflict Over Workers Control: The Automobile Industry in World War 
II,” in Michael H. Frisch and Daniel J. Walkowitz eds., Working-Class America: Essays on Labor, Community, and 
American Society (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 284-311; “Great Expectations: The Promise of 
Industrial Jurisprudence and Its Demise, 1930-1960,” in Nelson Lichtenstein and Howell John Harris eds., Industrial 
Democracy in America: The Ambiguous Promise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 113-141. 
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accept its “right to manage.”4  Historians have reminded us that despite the growing influence of 
organized labor within the Democratic Party, labor has often seen its legislative agendas 
defeated, shunted aside for broader objectives, or watered down in the name of compromise. 
This has led critics of organized labor’s political ties to denounce the “barren marriage” between 
unions and the Democratic Party, and to stress the defeats labor progressives such as Reuther 
suffered trying expand liberalism’s potential for social democratic political change across racial 
and gender lines.
5
 Additionally, scholarship has amply illustrated that the postwar period, well 
before the resurgence of the business-friendly political right sounded the attack on organized 
labor, was rife with conflict. The 1950s, often popularly portrayed as a staid period of political 
consensus, was as Jack Metzgar reminds one of the most strike-laden periods of the era. Later, 
Lichtenstein’s own work more fully articulated his critique and rejection of the notion of a 
“postwar labor accord.” 6 
 This dissertation asserts that while revisionists have accurately recast our understanding 
of the limitations under which organized labor functioned, they have not completely refuted 
Lichtenstein’s characterization that labor and business interests at times converged. Crucially, 
this dissertation contends that nationalism, especially economic nationalism, served as an area of 
convergence between unions and companies. While they defined national interests and priorities 
quite differently, and fought fiercely over the spoils of the nation’s economic success, they 
                                                          
4
 Howell John Harris, The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in the 1940s 
(Madison, WI:  University of Wisconsin Press, 1982); Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise: The Business 
Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945-1960 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994). 
5
 Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the US Working Class 
(NY: Verso, 1986); Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism 1945-1968 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1995). 
6
 Ronald L. Filipelli, “The Historical Context of Postwar Industrial Relations,” in Bruce Nissen ed., US Labor 
Relations, 1945-1989; Accommodation and Conflict (NY: Garland Publishing, 1990), 137-171; Bruce Nissen, “A 
Post-World War II ‘Social Accord?’ in Nissen ed., US Labor Relations, 1945-1989, 173-205; Jack Metzgar, Striking 
Steel: Solidarity Remembered (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000); Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A 
Century of American Labor (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
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expressed a common allegiance to the nation and importantly did so using similar themes, 
language, and images. Defined by John Fousek as a “’style of thought’ through which 
individuals identify themselves as members,” and including “a specific set of widely shared 
ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes, and images,” postwar American nationalism afforded ample 
room for unions and businesses to coexist, if not always peacefully.
7
 They shared values of 
American economic and political preeminence, the need for American businesses’ success, anti-
communism and, for the UAW and Caterpillar, support for free trade policies. This study posits 
that the workplace was a pivotal site for the formation and renegotiation of nationalist identity. 
 In critical and innovative ways, this work illuminates the growth of union bureaucracies 
that proliferated in the era of business unionism. Local 974 provides an ideal lens into the power 
and pitfalls of union bureaucracy, for it represented at its height about 20,000 workers from 
several Caterpillar factories in and around Peoria. Studying the function, bargaining strategies, 
and in-fighting of this large local, which was far larger than any other in the company, reveals 
that fragmentation between workers, between union locals and with the International, and on the 
factory floor was an important and ultimately corrosive element within the union. Although the 
union was often successful in marshalling support for bargaining objectives that yielded steady 
financial gains and job protections for its members, its diffuse, unwieldy structure, and at times 
its indifference to regularly informing and educating its membership alienated many. 
Additionally, local 974’s turbulent early history with the UAW International fostered a 
relationship in which the International was for the most part a distant dues-collecting entity, but 
also on occasion a heavy-handed presence when it and local leaders clashed. All this had 
deleterious ramifications for the local, especially when the company implemented widespread 
                                                          
7
 John Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 
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changes in how it organized work routines, and how it communicated with employees. The 
union’s lack of internal cohesion left ample space for Caterpillar to inculcate company objectives 
such as efficiency and cost cutting that won over many union members. The effort here is thus to 
synthesize the emphasis on continued labor-management conflict and corporate anti-unionism 
that revisionists have rightly recognized, with Lichtenstein’s focus on the shop floor and toward 
unions to better understand how unions and their members may have also contributed to their 
own declining power. 
In order to examine the impact of global production on working-class Americans in the 
postwar period, this dissertation is organized both chronologically and thematically. Chapter 1, 
Cat and Community: A Multinational Corporation in an ‘All-American City’ examines the 
social, economic, and spatial development of Peoria and its surrounding communities, as well as 
the growth of Caterpillar into an important multinational corporation, until 1970. It contends that 
the growth of the company and region were intertwined, fundamentally shaping the opportunities 
and identities of the Peoria region as a new form of “company town” due its position as Peoria’s 
largest employer. Its expansion ordered social relations through its preferential hiring policies, 
and its development of modified corporate welfare programs played a significant role in 
garnering community and employee support.  
Chapter 2, Grappling with Globalization: Labor Relations and the Limits of Solidarity 
and Community in the Era of Global Production, centralizes life on the shop floor of 
Caterpillar’s factories. Tracing the rise of the UAW to its rivalry with and the ultimate demise of 
the left-wing Farm Equipment Workers (FE), it analyzes the growth of the union’s largest local 
outside the automobile industry. Everyday labor relations between company and union, employer 
and employee, revealed shifting power dynamics that profoundly shaped social relations. The 
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workplace emerges as a complex nexus of conflict not only between the union and management, 
but also importantly within Local 974 itself. 
Chapter 3, The Death of Contractualism: Labor Relations, Nationalism, and Race In the 
Era of Deindustrialization, studies the various crises confronting the American working class and 
organized labor, beginning in the 1970s generally and befalling Caterpillar and its employees by 
the early 1980s. The shop floor served as an incubator for nationalism and racial identity. 
Heightened international competition between American companies and their resurgent 
counterparts particularly in Japan intensified nationalist sentiments, resulting in the racial 
‘othering’ of the Japanese. This transpired in urban and work spaces in which the dominant white 
racial group enjoyed sufficient distance from the ‘other,’ paralleling the more localized but still 
largely segregated residential spaces between whites and the smaller African American 
population in Peoria. Deindustrialization, local plant closures, and changes in the UAW 
International and Local 974 leadership converged to usher in a period of jointness. 
The last two chapters directly engage the struggles at work, on picket lines, and in factory 
towns between the UAW and Caterpillar. Chapter 4, ’Peoria Is Still a Company Town:’ 
Parameters of Class, Community, and Nation, 1991-1995, covers Caterpillar’s about-face turn 
from jointness as it demanded concessions from a weakened, more compliant UAW. This 
prompted the first of two unsuccessful strikes by the union, which the company broke when its 
threats to permanently replace workers led to unprecedented defections from the union ranks. 
The bitterness led to resurgent workplace militancy for the first time since the 1960s, fueling an 
innovative in-plant campaign that Caterpillar aggressively resisted. Chapter 5, ‘Not Gracious 
Victors:’ Defeat, Deindustrialization, and the Declining Fortunes of the American Working 
Class, 1995-2005, critically assesses the union’s errant decision to forgo its in-plant campaign 
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and risk its fate on a picket line that proved more porous in 1994 than two years before. Racial 
conflicts in these heated disputes occurred within a wider context of resurgent racist incidents, 
exposing tensions in black-white relations that had been steadily improving.  
Ultimately, this study suggests that any examination of working-class life and the broad, 
sweeping forces that affect it must at its core be a human story. This story, fraught with a range 
of emotions and perspectives—anger and betrayal, satisfaction and humiliation, fear and 
bravery—locates everyday people and their voices at the center of a protracted, brutal class 
struggle with profound implications for America’s working class. It is central to understanding 
how the positions of organized labor and American workers have so dramatically declined as the 
“American century” drew to a close. 
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Chapter 1: Cat and Community: A Multinational Corporation in an ‘All-
American City’ 
 
 Like its place in the earthmoving industry, Caterpillar dominates the urban landscape of 
Peoria, Illinois. It is difficult to miss its imprint in and around the mid-size city. Dealerships, 
billboard advertisements, and the massive parts facility just outside the city in Morton boldly 
announce the company’s presence. As one approaches the city from the east on Interstate 74, 
Caterpillar’s presence looms large over the city, for its multi-story corporate headquarters, facing 
east, rests on the west side of the Illinois River. As cars cross the Murray Bridge into Peoria, 
“CATERPILLAR” in large letters, resting atop the square gray structure of the corporate office, 
greets the eye. This is Caterpillar’s city.  
 This chapter examines the growth of the company into a powerful multinational 
corporation, and its relationship to Peoria and the surrounding region from its founding in the 
early twentieth century until 1970. It also investigates the city’s history and development into an 
important manufacturing hub in central Illinois. With a particular focus on race relations, this 
chapter seeks to answer three questions. How did race structure life at work and in the 
community? What impact did Peoria’s rise as an industrial center have on the community? How 
did Caterpillar’s expansion into a multinational company affect the consciousness and identity 
among Peorians? Examining these issues reveals the tensions between broad and often rapid 
social changes, and the persistent perceptions and realities of social difference that intersect the 
region.  
The Growth of Peoria from a Frontier Town into a Backwater City 
 Nestled into the banks on the west side of the Illinois River, Peoria traces its origins to 
various Native American tribes who passed through the area, and French settlers who established 
a Catholic mission there in the early eighteenth century. With the establishment of a permanent 
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fort in 1778, Peoria became a small but important site for the lucrative fur trade with Native 
Americans, and also served as a milling station for farmers’ produce in the Illinois River valley. 
During the War of 1812, the village of Peoria was plundered and burned by Captain Thomas E. 
Craig and his soldiers, under the pretense that the French inhabitants were Indian sympathizers. 
Rebuilt in 1813 as Fort Clark (named for Revolutionary War commander George Rogers Clark, 
who passed through the area in 1778), Peoria soon gained a more solid foothold with Illinois’s 
achievement of statehood in 1818 and the establishment of Peoria County in 1825, and grew 
rapidly in the 1830s and 1840s as settlers moved in and cleared land to farm the rich soil. Several 
foundries were formed in the 1840s, and Peoria became a center for the manufacture of 
agricultural equipment in the early 1840s, presaging Caterpillar’s arrival nearly a century later.1  
 The Illinois River proved vital to the region’s economic growth, assuring easy 
transportation to Chicago to the northeast and St. Louis to the Southwest. With the completion of 
the Erie Canal in 1825, Peorians had access for their agricultural produce and industrial goods to 
large markets in the eastern half of the U.S. via the Great Loop of interconnected waterways. As 
a result, manufacturing became the area’s primary source of revenue and employment from the 
Civil War through the post-World War Two era. In addition to numerous, primarily small 
agricultural implement manufacturers, Peoria was an important location for iron works, 
foundries, and later steel fabrication in the late nineteenth century, with Keystone Woven Wire 
and Fence (later Keystone Wire) establishing operations in Peoria in 1889. By the 1880s, it 
became an important railroad hub between Chicago, St. Louis, and the Quad Cities region of 
Illinois and Iowa.
2
 
                                                          
1
 The History of Peoria County Illinois (Chicago: Johnson and Company, 1880), 106; George W. May, Students’ 
History of Peoria County, Illinois (Galesburg, IL: Wagoner Printing Company, 1968), 47-53, 63-64, 69-76.  
2
 May, Students’ History of Peoria County, 180-181. 
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Beginning in the late 1830s, the city developed as a center for brewing and distilling. By 
1878, the city was home to fourteen distilleries, including Monarch which was, at this time, one 
of the largest distilleries in the world. By the 1930s, other nationally renowned producers of 
spirits established operations in Peoria. Armour established one of its largest meatpacking 
facilities there. Immediately after the repeal of Prohibition, Hiram Walker made the city its 
headquarters in 1933. Drawn to the abundance of water and grain in the region, and its proximity 
to river transportation for regional distribution, Hiram Walker constructed a large, $12 million 
waterfront distillery that at that time was the largest in the world. At its postwar peak, it 
employed over 1,700 workers. Enhancing Peoria’s reputation as a center for alcohol production, 
Pabst opened one of its largest breweries in the city’s waterfront district in 1934.3  
 Several groups of migrants were essential to the growth of Peoria as central Illinois’s 
largest urban center between Chicago to the northeast, and St. Louis to the southwest. According 
to Daniel Elazar, German immigrant craftsmen and small businessmen were the “first true 
urbanites” in the Midwest, helping to establish Peoria as an important site for agriculture and 
industry. Its proximity to the Mississippi River brought a steady stream of Southerners into the 
area, while the opening of the Erie Canal in 1825 funneled Mid-Atlantic settlers westward. 
Combined with European immigrants, they cultivated what Milton Derber dubbed a “rugged 
individualism” that shaped much of Peoria’s later conservative politics and development. 
Especially after the Civil War, Irish immigrants helped to push Peoria County’s population to 
over 88,000 by 1900, with 12,409 of them foreign-born, primarily of German and Irish descent.
4
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 As Peoria’s population and industries grew, so too did its cultural and social life which 
became renowned and notorious. Its place along major railroad lines brought opera performers 
and actors to its halls and theater houses. Theater and the rise of vaudeville in the late nineteenth 
century proved particularly important for the city and its reputation. A frequent stop for 
entertainers heading west on long show stints, Peoria became known as a stand-in for everyday 
people and, purportedly, representative of their tastes and preferences. Starting in the 1920s, and 
enhanced in popular parlance by entertainers such as Groucho Marx, the phrase “will it play in 
Peoria?” conveyed the notion that, if a vaudeville show, play, or consumer products did not 
appeal to Peorians, they would not appeal to the average American.
5
 Yet there was a duality with 
which the phrase was used.  While for some Peoria stood for “Every Town, USA,” others used it 
as a less flattering depiction, both nationally and locally. For them, it was a “bland and boring 
backwater,” a center of low-brow popular culture. Betty Friedan, author of The Feminine 
Mystique, recalled in a 1978 interview, “It used to embarrass me even to admit that I came from 
Peoria. It was a vaudeville joke, the epitome of a hick town.”6 
 It may have been “hick town” to Freidan, whose background and experiences in Peoria 
discussed below certainly shaped her perceptions of her native city. Yet an examination of the 
city’s social life and economic development do much to belie its image as “bland and boring.” 
Indeed, Peoria had a long-standing reputation as a rowdy, anything-goes town, stemming from 
the rapid growth of its waterfront district. Home to brothels, bars, boozing, and brawling, the 
waterfront was well known as a rough and dangerous section of the city for nearly a century, 
beginning in the 1850s. Combined with the Washington Street section just east of downtown, 
also close to the Illinois River and which included most of the African American residents, 
                                                          
5
 Greg Wahl and Charles Bobbitt, It Didn’t Play in Peoria: Missed Chances of a Middle American Town (Chicago, 
IL: Arcadia Publishing, 2009), 10. 
6
 Quoted in ibid., 108. 
14 
 
Peoria had two disreputable “red light” districts in and around downtown that, until the mid-
twentieth century, were glaring centers of vice. Throughout the city, gambling was illegal yet out 
in the open, with many restaurants including the Main Street Steak ‘N Shake lined with slot 
machines. In the early 1940s, as many as eighty brothels operated in the city. Many public 
officials at best looked the other way and, at worst, profited from organized crime syndicates that 
gladly paid fines, known as “vice fees” that were even published in area newspapers, in 
exchange for staying open. This included Ed “Boss” Woodruff who served as mayor for a total 
of twenty-four years, including in the raucous early 1940s and who, when prodded to uphold the 
law against gambling, reportedly complained, “What’s next? Outlawing checkers?”7 
 A relatively small but stable African-American population resided in Peoria, comprising 
two to three percent of the city’s population in the early twentieth century. (See Table 1.1) Stark, 
persistent racial lines have permeated Peoria and the region throughout most of its history, with 
African Americans experiencing discrimination and, at times, overt acts of racism at work and in 
local communities. Historians of Peoria’s development have focused on the lack of racial strife 
and relatively harmonious relationship between its white and black residents. George W. May’s 
1968 Students’ History of Peoria County, Illinois, asserts significant strides blacks have made 
and that “Peoria had no ‘race problem’” even as he briefly discussed civil rights initiatives and 
protests to desegregate the city’s housing, schools, and jobs in the private and public sectors.8 In 
his more thorough analysis of the history of African Americans in Peoria, Bradley University 
sociologist Romeo Garrett nonetheless portrayed the arc of race relations in Peoria in similarly 
Whiggish fashion. While noting examples of racism in Peoria’s pre-1945 history, Garrett 
accentuated the positive developments in Peoria, arguing that a combination of civil rights 
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protests and city government initiatives fostered the integration of neighborhoods and schools by 
the early 1960s, and created avenues to better jobs for black workers.
9
  
 It is worth pausing briefly to consider the particular contexts that informed the narratives 
of May and Garrett. Intended to be accessible to students and familiarize them with local history, 
May’s work echoes the boosterish pronouncements of Peoria’s political and business leaders, 
who consciously sought to improve the city’s image in the 1950s and 1960s.10 This was also 
before the onset of deindustrialization that soon thereafter occurred, with many industries still 
operating successfully and, subsequently, generating sufficient employment to keep 
unemployment rates low. Garrett’s more balanced account of race relations rightly notes gains 
that African Americans made, and without the prevalence of violence that other, often larger 
urban centers experienced in the postwar period.
11
  Yet both fail to explain why, after years of 
racial segregation, whites in and around Peoria would have accepted its gradual erosion by the 
1960s. Nor do they speculate on the degree to which whites did.  Also worth considering is the 
fact that Garrett, while exhibiting a keen eye toward the history of discrimination and improved 
postwar conditions that the area’s African American community experienced, himself benefited 
from more liberal racial policies. In 1947, Garrett was one of the first three African Americans to 
receive a Master of Arts degree from Bradley University, which immediately hired him as its 
first African American faculty member that summer.
12
   
                                                          
9
 Romeo B. Garrett, The Negro in Peoria (Peoria, IL: Romeo B. Garrett, 1973), 95-124. 
10
 See for examples Leo Adde, Nine Cities: The Anatomy of Downtown Renewal (Washington, D.C.: Urban Land 
Institute, 1969), 101-119. 
11
 The literature on urban uprisings and racial conflict in the postwar period is vast. See for example Thomas J. 
Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996); Arnold Hirsch, The Making of the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998); Guian A. McKee, The Problem of Jobs: Liberalism, Race, and 
Deindustrialization in Philadelphia, 1945-1973 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
12
 Garrett, Negro in Peoria, 38. 
16 
 
A closer examination of black-white race relations in and around Peoria reveals not just a 
history of residential and occupational exclusion but also, on occasion, percolating racial 
tensions that help explain the enforcement, and therefore the persistence, of the region’s racial 
boundaries. As chapter two will further discuss, nearly all blacks lived within the city and were 
confined to two small neighborhoods, with the larger of the two just northeast of the city’s 
downtown.
13
 Class as well as racial distinctions divided Peoria’s neighborhoods from the Civil 
War through the 1960s. Historically, the southwest corner of the city, below downtown, was 
home to many white blue-collar workers. The North Side, stretching east of downtown and also 
known as The Valley, was where many Southern migrants settled and remained. Most middle 
and upper-class whites, especially prominent business people, resided in the north and west 
sections collectively termed “the Bluffs.”14  
The smaller towns in the surrounding rural communities of Peoria, Tazewell, and 
Woodford Counties, however, remained practically all white for decades. Pekin, a medium-sized 
city resting on the east side of the Illinois River south of Peoria, was all white and was, as James 
Loewen characterized it, a sundown town in which blacks were either by law or by custom 
excluded from residing.  As late as 1970, Pekin had zero African American residents among its 
31,375 residents, and was also a center of Ku Klux Klan activity in Illinois. The Klan owned the 
Pekin Times during the 1920s, and published Klan philosophy in editorials. According to Garrett, 
it was one of four Illinois cities that, as late as 1970, had a population over 10,000 but no black 
citizens. There had been one black person in Pekin in 1935, Walter Lee, who was arrested for the 
alleged theft of a car. His status as the lone African American in an all-white city was not lost on 
the Peoria Journal, whose headline noted his arrest with apparently intentional irony, “Entire 
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Negro Population of Pekin in Peoria Jail.” After the charges were dropped, he did not return to 
Pekin.
15
 
Peoria’s early history reveals why Lee may have chosen to leave town. While Garrett 
found no lynchings that resulted in the murder of African Americans, he did uncover two “near” 
lynchings. One occurred in 1887 and involved a black man allegedly assaulting a young white 
woman. It was thwarted when Mayor S.A. Kinsey—who was apparently shot at—dispersed a 
mob brandishing a noose by ordering an officer to open a fire house on the mob. In 1903, when 
African American John McCrea killed Peoria detective William Murphy, a mob of 4,000 
assembled at the city jail to demand that chief of police William Rhodes release McCrea to be 
lynched. Rhodes refused, and devised a ruse to deliver McCrea to the county jail by sending out 
two carriages—one toward the county jail, and another toward Pekin. Most of the mob followed 
the carriage to prevent its entry into Pekin, allowing the police to successfully deliver a 
“trembling” McCrea to the county jail. Whether or not it helped agitate for these “near 
lynchings,” the Ku Klux Klan operated both clandestinely and openly in Peoria, with an office 
on the north side near one of the two black enclaves in the city, until the office was closed down 
after the state of Illinois revoked the Klan’s charter in 1924. Derogatory portrayals of the black 
population abounded in the local press into the early twentieth century, buttressing the menace of 
violence against blacks with racist epithets that deepened the racial divide.
16
 In words and the 
threat of violent deeds, whites in the Peoria area left no doubt about the subordinate status of 
blacks, or their willingness to enforce it.  
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Well into the postwar period, segregation was the norm for African Americans in Peoria. 
Housing segregation stemmed from a combination of steep income disparities between white and 
black Peorians, and formal and informal restrictions on the sale of homes to African Americans.   
The Civil Liberties Committee, a sub-committee of the Peoria Advisory Committee of the 
Illinois State Commission on urban conditions for blacks in Illinois, conducted an extensive 
survey of Peoria’s African American community in 1940. Having distributed 500 surveys to the 
approximately 800 black families living in the city, the Advisory Committee found that blacks 
experienced the type of harsh, segregated living conditions and lack of occupational 
opportunities common to African Americans living in the South. About forty percent were 
unemployed in 1940, with “another thirty-two percent responding that they either worked part-
time or held jobs through the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Ninety percent believed 
that they were denied employment or advancement based upon their race.”17  
 Racial segregation was as much a fact of life for African Americans in the workplace as it 
was in public spaces. African Americans struggled to gain opportunities in both the public and 
private sectors in Peoria’s economy.  Civil Rights activist C.T. Vivian claimed that when he 
arrived in Peoria in 1947, he had little opportunity to apply his talent for journalism at area 
newspapers. “I had won an award at college in journalism as a sports editor,” Vivian 
recounted.  “I couldn't even apply at the Journal Star.  It was understood.”18  Most blacks were 
even less fortunate than Vivian. A study by Bradley University’s Sociology Department in 1947 
indicated that roughly ninety percent of Peoria’s blacks were employed in unskilled manual labor 
occupations such as janitors, domestics, porters, factory workers, garbage collectors, and 
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meatpacking.
19
  The police department was one area in which blacks made minor advancements, 
with Peoria hiring a black police officer as early as 1887, and two black detectives in September 
1925. These gains were circumscribed, for the detectives were relegated to duties strictly within 
the predominately African American sections of town which, until around 1970, remained either 
the south side near the riverfront, or on the north side.   
The fire department, on the other hand, remained completely off limits for blacks until 
1957, when the city appointed Edward Gains as the first African American firefighter. This was 
the result of decades of lobbying by black civic leaders, particularly pastors of predominately 
black churches. When the city proposed to build a new hook and ladder house on the west side in 
1911, Dr. Jameson of the Ward Chapel A.M.E. Church urged the city to hire African American 
firefighters by touting the fearlessness of black firefighters around the country, contending that 
“the negro fire fighter forges his way to the very hottest and most dangerous points.” The 
fulfillment of long-denied opportunities, as well as their heroism, further justified hiring blacks 
as fire fighters in Jameson’s eyes, for he asserted that black workers were “entitled to something 
more than janitorships.” Despite Jameson’s appeals, the city refused to hire a black fire fighter 
for near a half-century, with some white citizens arguing against hiring blacks by proffering the 
stereotype of African-American laziness by contending that “the Negro would be to slow to 
reach a burning house.” [Sic.]20 
 Most restaurants in the downtown business district refused to serve African Americans 
until the late 1940s, as did all hotels. Movies theaters were also segregated, either refusing 
entrance to blacks outright or relegating them to rear or balcony seats. City swimming pools 
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admitted blacks but one day per week, thus limiting recreational opportunities for blacks to the 
then-dilapidated Negro (later Carver) Community Center.
21
  
In the absence of diverse racial groups, and the subordination of those who were present, 
white racism and exclusionary practices had a long shelf life. For much of its history, the Peoria 
area maintained particularly rigid racial boundaries in its public spaces and institutions, 
demarcating many of the best jobs in the public and private sector as white and male. Only later, 
in the postwar period, began to erode after years of activism. Even after African Americans 
moved into better housing in historically white neighborhoods and, as chapter 2 discusses, 
received more jobs in the public sector and at the region’s largest employer in Caterpillar, Peoria 
was still a place whose people, in their quotidian lives and personal experiences, were attuned to 
strictly enforced racial boundaries.  
“An Industry They Can be Proud of:” Caterpillar and Peoria’s Economic Development 
 Although secondary to manufacturing in terms of the number of people employed and the 
revenue it generated, agriculture was central to both the region’s economic growth, and to the 
development of what became Peoria’s primary manufacturing industry—earthmoving 
equipment. Corn had been the area’s main cash crop since the mid-nineteenth century, and by the 
1920s soybeans became another vital agricultural staple. The success of the corn and soybean 
markets nationally and, later, internationally boosted the average value per farm throughout 
central Illinois in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. At the same time, the growth of 
the region’s agricultural implements industry and improvements in the quality of farming 
equipment accelerated the mechanization of farming. Tractors with easily adjustable plows for 
row planting, and power lifts that made tractors more maneuverable, helped to make farm work 
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easier and faster.  In addition to various small local manufacturers, International Harvester (IH) 
had large operations in Chicago and, later Rock Island Illinois, John Deere in Moline, Illinois 
near the Mississippi River, and J.I. Case in Racine, Wisconsin sixty miles north of Chicago 
producing machinery for flourishing Midwestern markets such as Peoria’s.22 The readily 
availability of better equipment brought significant increases in tractor ownership. In Illinois, the 
number of farms with tractors rose from 18 to 31 percent from 1925 to 1930, with ownership 
rates higher on more prosperous farms such as those in the Peoria area.
23
 This also resulted in the 
expansion of both the size and the value of farms from 1880 to 1954, while the profitability of 
agriculture kept the number of farms in this period fairly stable, with the notable exception of the 
Depression years. The immediate postwar years saw a concentration in the number of farms as 
the process of mechanization proceeded, with the farm size and value increasing as the number 
of farms decreased. (See Table 1.2)  
 California-based Holt Manufacturing Company arrived in 1909 when it purchased the 
vacated Colean Manufacturing building in East Peoria, just across the Illinois River. Like other 
businesses, Holt was drawn to the region’s proximity to waterways, and the vast agricultural 
market in the center of the nation. Local agricultural implements dealer Murray Baker, aware 
that Colean had closed, contacted Pliny Holt, the company’s owner and invited him to tour the 
area and vacant facility. Impressed with the location, the city, and its potential for growth, Holt 
quickly purchased the building, ebulliently expressing his optimism in a letter to Baker. “I am 
sure that this…marks the beginning of one of the largest enterprises in the Middle West,” Holt 
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proclaimed, “and assures the City of Peoria of an industry that they will be proud of in the 
future.”24  
 Yet the company’s first two decades of operations in the region were uneven ones, at 
best. World War I was a boon to the company’s fortunes, steering government contracts to the 
fledgling company. Yet the end of the war brought a quick reversal of fortune for Holt, with 
sales plummeting from $23 million in 1918 to $8.9 million in 1921. Further complicating matters 
was the arrival in the tractor business of rival C.L. Best, whose Best Gas Tractor Company 
designed and produced superior tractors. Holt and Best eventually merged in 1925, forming 
Caterpillar Tractor Company in 1925.
25
  
 Like most businesses, Caterpillar struggled during the Great Depression, but rebounded 
and quickly ascended in the industry because of three key elements of Caterpillar’s early 
operations. First, it manufactured tractors and construction equipment such as graders that gained 
a reputation for both high quality and durability. Also, few major competitors within the industry 
made the same products that Caterpillar did, with the largest companies such as IH, Deere, and 
Case making farming and harvesting equipment that Caterpillar eschewed. Lastly, in the 1930s 
Caterpillar became one of the leading manufacturers of diesel engines, which were heavier and, 
initially, costlier. However, diesel fuel burns more slowly and steadily than gasoline, allowing 
diesel engines to provide both greater torque, aided by the heavier diesel engine, and steadier 
performance than gasoline-fueled engines in low gears. The gas engine had a propensity for 
stalling in tough conditions that required operators to frequently shift loads and shift gears, while 
the diesel engine allowed operators to move earth or grade roads more smoothly and steadily.  
This revolutionized the industry by pushing out most gasoline-powered products, save for 
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smaller ones, by the end of World War Two. For Caterpillar, manufacturing diesel engines had 
the ancillary benefit of greatly expanding the company’s access to, and profitability from, the 
earthmoving and construction industries by selling diesel engines to companies making 
equipment Caterpillar did not, such as power shovels, rock crushers, and military equipment such 
as ships and tanks.
26
  
Caterpillar’s innovations in diesel engine technology powered the company’s rise to the 
top of the industry. Company chairman Louis Neumiller reflected upon this innovation, “It was 
one of the wisest decisions we ever made. It may have even saved us from going under.” With 
tractor sales lagging during the depths of the Great Depression—just $13.3 million in 1932, 
scarcely half its 1918 figures—diesel engine production helped to spike Caterpillar’s sales over 
500% by 1940, to $73.1 million. In addition to engine sales to other companies, government 
contracts even before World War Two bolstered the company’s balance sheet, especially through 
New Deal-sponsored public works projects.
27
  
Caterpillar’s long-standing international orientation complemented its resurgence in the 
late 1930s, with its gaze fixed on controlling foreign markets to solidify its preeminent status 
among the world’s earth-moving equipment manufacturing companies.  Caterpillar quickly 
became competitive abroad by selling its products through its extensive worldwide network of 
privately-owned independent dealers—something that other companies in the industry lacked.  
This allowed Caterpillar to establish and expand overseas markets, increasing its foreign sales by 
twenty-five percent from 1939 to 1940.
28
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More than technological innovation and creative executive decision-making catapulted 
Caterpillar to the top of the earthmoving industry.  The federal government’s expanded role in 
funding and coordinating production during World War Two were essential to solidifying the 
company’s reversal of financial fortunes. After the war, continued cohesion between the state 
and corporations, most notably the large companies that dominated key economic sectors, was 
decisive in maintaining corporate profitability through business overseas. 
Caterpillar benefited greatly from the enormous expansion of contracts that the 
government awarded during World War Two. Relying heavily on the largest corporations to 
meet the unprecedented need for wartime production, the federal government awarded $175 
billion in “prime” contracts, i.e., those between the army, navy, and other government 
procurement agencies, and their suppliers, between June 1940 and September 1944. According 
to the War Production Board, fully “two-thirds of this vast amount ($117 billion) went to the top 
100 corporations,” with fifty-one percent of the $175 billion going to the top thirty-three 
corporations alone. While automobile, steel, aircraft, electrical, and oil corporations comprised 
most of those top thirty-three corporations, International Harvester (ranked thirty-third in the top 
100 corporations), Caterpillar (ranked forty-fourth), and Allis-Chalmers (forty-fifth) benefited 
handsomely from the wartime largess, with IH receiving $1.035 billion in prime contracts, 
Caterpillar reaping $602.7 million, and Allis-Chalmers taking in $585.7 million from 1940 to 
1944.
29
 Although Caterpillar produced tank engines and transmissions, as well as parts for 
ordnances, most of its armed forces contract work was devoted to tractors and other earthmovers 
crucial to paving airstrips, and clearing out forests and bombed-out areas. That is, although the 
                                                          
29
 John M. Blair, Harrison F. Houghton, and Matthew Rose, Economic Concentration and World War II: Report of 
the Smaller War Plants Corporation to the Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business, 
United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 27-30; quote and 
definition of prime contracts on 27. 
25 
 
company produced myriad goods for the war effort, much of its production was in its staple 
items. Government contracts were the overwhelming sources of Caterpillar’s sales, with the 
$602.7 million constituting 82.46% of the company’s total sales revenues of $730.9 million from 
1940 to 1944 
30
 
The war served as a monumental boon for Caterpillar and the other business behemoths 
not only because of the billions in government contracts they procured, but also because of the 
government’s massive commitment to financing both the conversion of existing facilities and the 
construction of new ones. Among the thirty largest producers of fabricated metal products (out of 
seventy total) during the war, excluding aircraft and shipbuilding, Caterpillar ranked nineteenth 
in the total usable value of its facilities in 1945, having received just over $50 million in public 
financing for its factories, the fourteenth-highest amount of government financing in this 
category and nearly four times the company’s own wartime investment of $13 million. It used 
these subsidies to expand its East Peoria facility to over 500,000 square feet of floor space.  With 
gross capital assets of just over $33 million in 1939, Caterpillar saw the value of its facilities 
nearly triple to over $96 million by the end of the war.
31
  
 The government’s enormous investments in corporate America ensured a pervasive role 
for American businesses in the successful economic war effort, and at a considerable expense. 
Cost-plus contracts issued by the government covered the costs of researching, developing, and 
manufacturing war-related goods, and guaranteed profits above and beyond business 
expenditures. While these wartime contracts spurred investments in research, more than doubling 
the annual pre-war research investments that corporate America made, they drastically increased 
the share of taxpayer-paid investments while greatly reducing corporations’ own share of 
                                                          
30
 Nolde, All in a Day’s Work, 216-217. Caterpillar’s sales revenues from 1940-1944 are from ibid., 276, Financial 
Summary table. 
31
 Ibid., Table 40, 116.  
26 
 
research payments. Additionally, government investments aided manufacturers by funding the 
building of vocational schools and employee training that provided companies with sufficient 
numbers of qualified workers. Directly and indirectly, then, wartime spending and centralized 
economic and industrial planning were enormous benefits for America’s wartime industries, 
particularly the largest firms which saw their competitive positions over smaller companies 
greatly enhanced. Conversely, many small and medium-sized companies realized declining 
fortunes during and after the war. With the vast majority of government contracts awarded to the 
largest firms, smaller competitors became dependent upon the larger ones for their existence by 
performing subcontracting work assigned by the giants. Although most frequently assigned to 
the largest companies, “prime” government contracts did not stipulate that they needed to 
perform all the work contracted, resulting in the larger firms farming out excess, sub-assembly, 
and sometimes less lucrative work to their smaller competitors. Caterpillar held onto and fulfilled 
its war contracts, while contracting out much of its far smaller production for civilian consumers 
to smaller companies. These wartime demands more than doubled the company’s labor force in 
East Peoria to a high of 23,000.
32
 Certain economic sectors suffered a serious attrition of small 
businesses during the war, with half a million such companies in the service, retail, and 
construction industries closing in this period.
33
  
World War Two proved a watershed event in the convergence of government and 
corporate interests, with far-reaching implications for the emerging postwar economic order. It 
entrenched big business at the federal level, tying political and economic policy planning more 
closely together.  After the war, government and business leaders coordinated re-conversion 
efforts to transition private companies previously involved in and benefiting mightily from 
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government military contracts back to producing goods for civilian consumption. However, there 
were two mounting concerns, shared by policy planners, businesses, and organized labor alike, 
about the shape that the postwar economic order would take. Reconversion and the time it may 
require elicited fears of high unemployment, declining civilian purchasing power even after 
wartime restrictions, and invoked the not-so-distant memories of Depression-era privation. The 
second problem was more market-oriented, with policymakers eager to ensure sufficient markets 
for American-made goods, since the U.S. owned roughly half the world’s postwar industrial 
capacity.  The economic revitalization of postwar Europe was instrumental for American 
business interests generally, and in this instance Caterpillar. Through the Marshall Plan, the U.S. 
helped to plan and fund European reconstruction through over $17 billion in subsidies, whose 
disbursement was carried out through the corporate-dominated Economic Cooperation 
Administration. In addition to ensuring the place of western European nations under America’s 
coalescing Cold War aegis, postwar economics as implemented through the Marshall Plan 
offered funding for the purchase of U.S. goods that in the two years after the war, cash-starved 
and war-ravaged nations lacked.
34
  Such policies provided a secure presence and revenue stream 
for corporations, primarily large, dominant firms. With the dire need for earthmoving equipment 
and spare parts to rebuild European nations, and its dealer network far more extensive than its 
industry rivals, Caterpillar was uniquely positioned to capitalize on the postwar demand. From 
1954 to 1954, its sales increased over 56%, from $231 million to $407 million.
35
  
While large firms already dominated key industries such as steel, automobiles, electrical 
products, and earthmoving and agricultural machinery, they became monopolies during and after 
the war, merging with or eliminating many smaller rivals. The earthmoving industry was 
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emblematic of this larger trend in the American economy, with several large American firms 
commanding most of the world’s sales by the mid-1960s through a combination of acquisitions 
and increased penetration of foreign markets. Large-scale projects both domestically and abroad 
sustained demand for earthmoving equipment, with the largest firms holding strategic 
advantages, such as manufacturing diversified product lines, efficient mass-production that 
reduced costs, and vast capital resources deployed in diverse markets, over their rivals. 
During the postwar period, Caterpillar solidified its position in the industry by expanding 
its sales and production operations in the US and abroad.  Domestically, it benefited handsomely 
from America’s booming economy which funded numerous projects, such as interstate 
highways, urban expressways, airports, real estate development, and mining. Congressional 
approval for the Federal-Aid Highway Act that in effect created America’s interstate highway 
system was almost as important for Caterpillar’s fortunes as was World War Two. The company 
expanded its production capacity to keep pace with product demand by renovating and 
expanding its factories in East Peoria and San Leandro, California. Adding new factories in Joliet 
(1951), Decatur (1955) and Aurora (1958), Illinois, York, Pa. (1953), and Davenport, Iowa 
(1956) decentralized Caterpillar’s operations that had been based in East Peoria.36   
Equally important was its development of a global manufacturing base.  Citing increased 
competition from other American companies such as Allis-Chalmers and International Harvester, 
which were developing their own global workforces, Caterpillar shifted some production in the 
1950s to massive new factories abroad to be closer to foreign markets that it targeted and 
increasingly dominated. Its Newcastle, UK factory opened in 1950, making bulldozers and 
replacement parts, while factories in Sao Paolo, Brazil and Melbourne, Australia, opening in 
1957, made road graders for South America and Asia, respectively. In 1960, forty-eight percent 
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of the company’s total sales were to customers overseas.37 In order to further garner foreign 
market share, and to avoid tariff walls that many nations erected, the company expanded abroad 
through the 1960s. By 1966, Caterpillar operated wholly owned subsidiaries in eight countries in 
addition to joint ventures in Japan and India, keeping pace with rivals IH, Massey-Ferguson, 
Deere, and Allis-Chalmers in the relocation of factories abroad.
38
 
Inscribing Paternalism: Community and Labor Relations in the Postwar Period 
Caterpillar did not have a free hand with which to operate as it grew into a powerful, 
successful multinational corporation. Part of the wave of industrial unionism sweeping across 
America in the 1930s, Caterpillar for the first time in 1934 faced a concerted organizing drive 
that it opposed, though not quite as staunchly or as violently as Ford, the so-called Little Steel 
companies, and others.
39
 After the National Industrial Recovery Act passed, Caterpillar willingly 
complied with the provisions the Administration established for the tractor sector, reducing the 
hours of its workday from forty-four to forty, and increasing wages by ten percent. However, 
these improvements did not stanch the sentiment for unionization among its factory workers.  
As chapter 2 will discuss, the advent of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 
brought a permanent place for industrial unionism at Caterpillar. In late 1936, disgruntled rank-
and-file workers formed the Amalgamated Union that later merged with and was led by 
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organizers in the CIO’s Steelworkers Organizing Committee (SWOC). An organizing strike by 
the Amalgamated in 1937 led to a contract with Caterpillar, with the Amalgamated joining the 
left-wing Farm Equipment Workers in 1938. Caterpillar countered these efforts at unionization 
with a variety of methods that included company unionism and, in all likelihood, spying on its 
workers. According to former employee Walter Bristow, who helped to form the Amalgamated 
in 1936, Caterpillar was fully aware of the organizing efforts underway. After a few organizing 
meetings the Amalgamated held outside the plant, it met with a company official who, according 
to Bristow, hardly seemed surprised to learn of the Amalgamated. “"We went to a (Caterpillar) 
vice president's home and told him we were starting a union and he just smiled at us.  He knew." 
Until this informal meeting with the company executive, the workers who formed the 
Amalgamated had only held unannounced meetings outside work, at such locations as a local 
school and the back room of an auto repair shop.
40
  
Caterpillar also encouraged the formation of a nominally independent union, the 
Caterpillar Employees Alliance that unsuccessfully urged striking workers to return to work 
during the Amalgamated’s 1937 organizing strike. In late July 1937, the Employees Alliance 
signed the same agreement for its smaller membership that the company had signed with the 
Amalgamated. Yet the Employees Alliance lasted only until early 1939, fading away in a demise 
of diminishing returns compared to the more active and successful FE.
41
 Although Caterpillar did 
not openly tout the militant, violent anti-unionism that other companies did in the 1930s and 
1940s, this scarcely meant that the company embraced the unionization of its employees. On the 
contrary, it only tolerated the existence of the various unions at its factories—FE in the late 
1930s and 1940s and later the UAW and the International Association of Machinists at its Joliet 
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plant— when faced with considerable union strength. When it sensed weakness, Caterpillar 
wielded its power boldly and creatively in the postwar years by developing innovative programs 
directed toward its employees and people in their factory towns to circumscribe the power and 
influence of unionism.  
Led by the mercurial rise of the industrial unions in the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO), unions gained numbers, political strength and finally, during World War 
Two, much-needed financial and organizational security. Maintenance-of-membership 
provisions, guaranteeing union membership for employees in unionized workplaces and 
employer-deducted union dues, established unions as a powerful counterweight to businesses 
that had, prior to the passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935 and protective 
measures from subsequent developments in labor law, treated unions with impunity and outright 
violence. Far from a perfect system, labor relations under the NLRA nonetheless empowered and 
protected collective union activity as never before.
42
  
Bolstered by unionization rates that for private sector workers reached a postwar high of 
thirty-five percent in 1954, union leaders gained power and a place, if certainly a subordinate one 
to government and business leaders, at the table of wartime economic planning.
43
 They pushed 
the Truman administration and Congress to enact a wide range of legislation, from full 
employment to national health insurance coverage that would have expanded the role of the 
federal government in the economy. Taking advantage of the pervasive presence they gained 
during the war in vital economic sectors such as steel, auto, electrical products, mining, and oil, 
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unions struck en masse in 1945 and 1946, shutting down whole industries for wage gains, shorter 
hours, and control over work rules.
44
  
Fearful of labor’s power and possible government incursions into what they perceived as 
their free market domain, business leaders fought back by organizing broad-based, well-
orchestrated campaigns to influence American public opinion and policy. Led by business 
groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the Chamber of 
Commerce, the corporate offensive sought to roll back organized labor on hotly contested 
battlegrounds of labor law. The first was to circumscribe the scope of collective bargaining to 
reserve for business the “right to manage.” Most clearly highlighted in the UAW strike against 
General Motors, in which Walter Reuther insisted that the company “open its books” to prove 
that it could not afford to raise workers’ wages thirty percent without raising prices, many 
postwar strikes concerned issues of corporate profits, the ability to afford wage increases, and 
access to financial records. Although National War Labor Board decisions granted management 
considerable latitude in “opening or closing new units, choice of personnel, [and] choice of 
merchandise to be sold,” as well as initiating technological changes, the size of the workforce, 
and subcontracting, unions’ challenge to those prerogatives enraged business executives. 
Companies fought tooth and nail in the postwar period to ensure that bargaining would be 
limited to what the National War Labor Board termed the “day-to-day life of the employees and 
their relations with their supervisors.”45  
Corporate interests also targeted reforms in the NLRA to reverse what it considered to be 
the law’s exceedingly pro-union provisions and bias. Beginning in earnest in 1946, the NAM 
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took to the newspapers and radio to advocate for changes that, after Republicans swept into 
power in that year’s midterm elections, comprised the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. These included 
guaranteeing employer free speech with employees, guaranteeing employees’ “right to work” 
without maintenance-of-membership provisions (which eventually led states to enact right-to-
work laws doing just this), verification that union leaders were not communists, bans against 
union financial contributions to political campaigns, the exclusion of foremen from union 
membership. Most of these and others, including a ban on secondary strikes and wildcat strikes, 
made their way into Taft-Hartley.
46
  
Caterpillar dealt aggressively with FE, becoming one of the first companies to utilize the 
anti-communist provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act when it refused to bargain with or recognize 
the left-wing FE local 105, which represented workers at the company’s largest factory in East 
Peoria. Capitalizing upon a climate of mounting national as well as local anti-communist 
hysteria, the company’s aggressive stance toward FE precipitated the local’s ouster from the East 
Peoria works and FE’s eventual decline.47 Caterpillar’s bold anti-union stroke received strong 
support from local papers. An editorial in the Peoria Journal touted the “value and worth” of 
Taft-Hartley’s anti-communist clause, while heaping encomia on the company. “Such victory 
over the forces of communism,” the paper lauded, “would not have been possible without the 
courageous determination of Caterpillar.”48 
The community was staunchly conservative, consistently supporting the Republican Party 
for most of the twentieth century.  Local papers, particularly The Peoria Journal-Star, frequently 
criticized Democratic politicians and policies, and endorsed Republicans for office.  The 
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Journal-Star was a staunch critic of President Roosevelt and New Deal economic policies, 
considering the latter an “invasion of private lives.”49  It connected Caterpillar with its anti-New 
Deal position, arguing that the company’s innovations with the diesel engine did more to provide 
jobs and support the local community than the New Deal and higher tax rates, which it termed a 
“deterrent” for “business enterprise.”50 The city historically kept its tax rate low, with Peoria 
voters maintaining conservative anti-tax political positions, exemplified by their refusing to raise 
school taxes or support school bond issues in the 1950s.
51
  
Peoria’s stridently anti-communist strongly opposed Soviet expansionism in Eastern 
Europe after World War Two and the role of communists and socialists in the labor movement, 
especially among CIO unions. FE’s ouster followed on the heels of an incident the previous year 
in which its anti-radical proclivities—and possibly Caterpillar’s—and community’ racial 
tensions dovetailed.  Peoria gained national attention in April 1947 for refusing to allow the 
singer, actor, and activist Paul Robeson to play in Peoria.  Initially slated to appear at Peoria’s 
city hall before a local concert at the Shrine Mosque, Robeson came under fire after Peoria 
Journal columnist Jimmie Fidler criticized him for singing “Communist songs” at a concert in 
Los Angeles.  Robeson compounded matters by dedicating one to Gerhardt Eisler, whom the 
paper termed “America’s No. 1 communist,” and who had recently been arrested and was 
awaiting trial.  Under considerable pressure from the City Council and civic groups such as the 
American Legion—reportedly in concert with Caterpillar—to deny Robeson use of the hall, 
Mayor Carl O. Triebel at first defended Robeson’s constitutional rights to free speech, then 
relented, denying the famous African American baritone.  Despite word from his friend William 
Patterson that he had seen more guns in Peoria “than he ever had before,” Robeson came to 
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Peoria and met a small group in the living room of Ajay Martin, an African-American officer of 
FE local 105.
52
 
 Although Caterpillar workers in East Peoria belonged to Local 105 of FE, and Martin had 
previously worked in that local, it does not appear that they either sponsored or supported 
Robeson’s appearance.  FE representative Mary Sweat wrote that although several FE locals had 
condemned Mayor Triebel’s refusal to let Robeson appear, “the large Caterpillar Tractor Local 
105 FE-CIO has yet to take action.”  One possible explanation was that, with Congress debating 
the anti-communist, anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act, Local 105 thought it best to stay out of the 
public eye regarding Robeson. Sweat also suggested, as did FE President Grant W. Oakes, that 
Caterpillar and other local businesses had prevented Robeson’s appearance behind the scenes, 
for she reported being “refused time on the air” and being “unable to buy space in the 
newspapers” to advertise Robeson’s would-be concert.53 Even if local business had played no 
role in preventing Robeson’s public appearance, the local press fomented enough animosity 
toward Robeson in its stories and editorials that buying ad space, at least in newspapers, would 
have been unlikely.
54
  The next month, Oakes circulated a memo to all FE local unions apprising 
them of the Robeson incident and accusing the company of using it to foment employee 
animosity.  Connecting the ban to a purported plan by Caterpillar to bust Local 105, Oakes 
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asserted that the company “began using the issue right in the shops to disrupt our locals, discredit 
the leadership, and pave the way for wage cutting…” 55 
 It is also unlikely that Robeson’s political views alone prompted such a vehement and 
potentially violent response from Peorians.  For many, Robeson may have represented a threat 
because, as an outspoken African American championing equality as well as political radicalism, 
he threatened the local racial hierarchy in which segregation at work and in public proliferated.  
Even for people unfamiliar with Robeson or his political views, the color of his skin would 
hardly have eluded those who read the Journal, which continually referred to him as “Robeson, a 
Negro” as it bade the man it dubbed an “uncompromising foe of Christianity” “good riddance” 
from Peoria.
56
 The demise of local 105 was a significant victory for local right-wing and anti-
communist forces as well as for Caterpillar, for it meant the removal of Ajay Martin as a local 
union representative, thus depriving the Peoria area of one of its most prominent left-wing 
leaders and, as this chapter will later discuss, an outspoken local activist for civil rights. 
Emboldened by the successes against Robeson and the FE local, and abetted by avowed anti-
communist columnist Gomer Bath of the Peoria Star, the American Legion in Peoria 
campaigned vigorously in 1950 against the Peoria library’s purchase of several United Nations 
films they deemed “subversive,” such as “Of Human Rights” supporting the UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.”57 Anti-communism played well in Peoria, linking newspaper, 
business, and community interests to what they deemed an essential patriotic cause. 
Constructing Competitive Citizenship: Corporate Communication Programs 
 Direct communication with employees and local communities was essential to 
Caterpillar’s approach to labor and community relations, and it worked diligently to persuade 
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people of the beneficial roles it played in their lives.  It developed extensive networks to transmit 
the company’s fundamental beliefs about the value of work, loyalty to the company, the role of 
business in their communities, labor relations, and political views.  By the early 1950s, 
Caterpillar had established a company newspaper, Caterpillar Folks, for its East Peoria and 
Peoria-area factories, and did the same as it opened factories elsewhere. Roger T. Kelley, 
company vice president of personal and public affairs, conveyed Caterpillar’s objective to be 
“employee identification with company goals…and of understanding and, whenever possible, 
agreement with those goals.” Kelley believed this could be done “by communication that is 
factual, simply and honestly presented, and couched, wherever possible, in terms of reader 
benefit or interest.”58  
 Cultivating connections between employees and Caterpillar’s goals meant bypassing the 
union to address employees as individuals who, regardless of union membership, still held a 
distinct relationship that these publications portrayed as personal. Rather than strictly lambasting 
unions in acrimonious attacks, company papers spent far more time attuning employees to 
business developments in the US and around the world. Through them, Caterpillar and other 
businesses reinscribed a paternalistic approach toward their employees that harked back to the 
1920s, when company welfare programs used to forestall unionization were the norm.
59
 
However, with the prevalence of private-sector unions in the postwar period, corporations such 
as Caterpillar adapted themselves to and acknowledged unions’ more durable place at work and 
in society—even and especially if they did not desire their presence in their places of business. 
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Company CEO William Blackie reflected this revised philosophy toward unions and employees, 
saying “Where employees have elected to have union representation, the people in those unions 
are nonetheless our people. Just because they were given the opportunity to organize in a 
collective unit—and chose to do so—they are no less a part of us.”60 The quote reflects an 
important development in the business propaganda of “practical conservatives”: the company 
admitted an awareness of the new power unions held by avoiding anti-union sentiment, and 
acknowledging that one can be a union employee, while yoking that dual identity back within a 
larger, paternalistic framework that began with the employer-employee relationship.
61
 
Reminders about job performance and efficiency connected employees to Caterpillar’s 
quest for competitiveness. It frequently extolled the virtues of competition as the engine driving 
the company’s improvements in productivity, efficiency, cost-containment, and product quality. 
In its imagery and advertisements, Caterpillar emphasized competitiveness not just as a business 
value, but an individual and national one as well. Pride and efficiency in a job well done 
connected the employee—as an individual—to the business’s vitality. Maintaining low 
production costs and high product quality were obligations “right in the hands of Caterpillar 
people” that required “personal attention” and “personal concern.”  Attention to these details 
would improve company competitiveness, increase “man-hours of work for Caterpillar people,” 
and provide customers with the “best possible value in the machines they buy.”62 That 
“personal” appeared as such reinforced Caterpillar’s effort to circumvent its factory employees’ 
identification with the union, and bond them to business-oriented goals.  
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During contract negotiations and strikes, it was not unusual for the company to mail 
letters to employees apprising them of the company’s position on crucial subjects, and on 
occasion to gather workers for speeches by corporate executives. Company communications also 
served as organs to criticize unions generally and the UAW specifically over wasteful practices 
such as featherbedding, and the use of individuals’ union dues for political lobbying.63 Factory 
newspapers promoted the benefits of free enterprise, free trade, and modernization for 
communities in the US and around the world.
64
  Company papers connected free trade and 
corporate profits with the well-being of workers and their families, featuring cheerful employees 
both at work and in comfortable homes with their families, enjoying modern amenities such as 
new household appliances. These features almost always focused on white male workers, who 
comprised the vast majority of the region’s and Caterpillar’s workforce. They reinforced the 
image of the white male breadwinner by showing men toiling at work and relaxing at home, 
while women toiled at home to accommodate the relaxation of Caterpillar workers. These 
profiles were thus cultural products that reaffirmed a form of masculine economic nationalism, 
by connecting physical male-dominated work and its benefits to a decent way of life and, just as 
importantly, the success of corporate America.  
Culture and leisure served as important sites to reinforce company identification. 
Caterpillar utilized its employees to cultivate name-brand loyalty, and deepen cultural 
connections with its workers. It encouraged employees to paste Cat bumper stickers on their 
vehicles and their luggage to spread the company’s name around the country, and to allow 
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workers from different locations to identify each other. This fostered a sense of pride and 
identification with Caterpillar as an alternative to their identity as union members.
65
  
The company sponsored numerous sports and recreational programs, strengthening the 
ties between employees and the company. While these gained in popularity in the postwar 
period, Caterpillar developed sports programs early in its history “as an element of Caterpillar 
culture,” with its predecessor Holt sponsoring basketball and Saturday baseball teams by 1915. 
Until 1961, the firm maintained a very competitive team in the National Industrial Basketball 
League (NIBL), competing against teams from Goodyear, Philips 66 and other corporate 
sponsors.  In well-attended games in the Peoria Civic Center and Bradley University, the NIBL 
team drew some of the nation’s top talent, often players who worked summer stints at its 
factories, including five members of the 1952 men’s Olympic squad that won the gold medal in 
Helsinki. Workers had opportunities to bowl, golf, and play basketball against their co-workers 
in organized leagues with results published in the company papers.  The Caterpillar Employees’ 
Bowling Association attracted nearly 1,000 bowlers in 1959, according to its Peoria-area factory 
newspaper Caterpillar Folks.
66
 These company-sponsored recreational activities tended to be 
gender-stratified, with separate women’s and men’s bowling and golf leagues, with softball 
offered in both co-ed and gender-specific leagues.
67
 Corporate-sponsored recreation became a 
means by which companies such as Caterpillar could connect with their employees away from 
the workplace. Sports, which became more popular spectator activities in the 1950s through 
radio and television, offered workers opportunities to socialize with people they often only saw 
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in the factory. Additionally, employer-sponsored leisure provided the chance to alleviate the 
difficulties and drudgery of mass-production work that often fostered a range of negative 
emotions such as alienation and frustration—which might otherwise be channeled into 
workplace conflict and strike activity—that businesses strove to avoid.68 
 Community relations were no less important to Cat than employee relations. In 
connection with the Chamber of Commerce, company recruited managers to “develop informed, 
articulate spokesmen,” organize discussion groups, and meet with people in local communities to 
discuss economic and political issues.  The Chamber of Commerce worked with several hundred 
firms to hone their communications skills to more effectively persuade the American public of 
the benefits of free enterprise.  Caterpillar played an important role in these efforts, with Fred 
Jolly, Cat’s community relations manager, sitting on the Chamber’s Business Relations 
Committee.
69
  It circulated company papers throughout factory towns to spread the gospel of free 
enterprise, mailing them to churches, small businesses, and local clubs.  Seeing local barber 
shops as important centers of political and social discussion, Caterpillar started inviting Peoria 
barbers in 1950 for factory tours to help them “talk factually about the company and its 
policies.”70   
Company executives stressed several related themes throughout the 1960s.  The company 
adroitly cast its expansion in terms that minimized potential threats to local jobs by emphasizing 
the benefits that its success would provide for individual workers, the communities in which they 
lived and worked, their nation, and consumers around the world.  It consistently connected 
company profitability and competitiveness with increased industrial productivity, personal 
prosperity and job security, national and international progress, and the fulfillment of America’s 
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role as leader of the free world during the Cold War.  By proffering a discourse that de-
emphasized its appetites for greater profits and worldwide market share, and instead accentuated 
localism, nationalism, anticommunism, and progress, Caterpillar cast its increasingly 
internationalist orientation, indeed its raison d’etre, all at once as wholly American, local and 
munificent. 
Company president Eberhard and executive vice-president William Blackie justified 
relocating production to its shareholders by emphasizing the “increasingly industrialized and 
competitive” world in which it competed for business.  Eberhard and Blackie framed the firm’s 
growing international production base as an appeal for parity with foreign manufacturers who 
had previously enjoyed conditions that the company, without access to the same labor markets, 
considered “unfair.”  They claimed that foreign companies utilized “advantages arising from the 
greater costs of transportation and duty applicable to U.S.-built product in a number of important 
markets, and also from the manufacturing cost advantage derived from lower foreign wage 
levels.”  The conclusion for Eberhard and Blackie was inevitable: “Caterpillar and many other 
American companies must undertake production in foreign markets if they are to have the same 
cost advantages available to competitors abroad.”71 
Yet as its production base grew well beyond America’s national boundaries, the company 
repeatedly reminded its workers that it remained headquartered in and committed to Peoria, 
Illinois.  Eberhard told a meeting of the Peoria Rotarians, “We believe in Peoria as a good place 
for our largest plant and the base of our operations.  We have always believed this…Because of 
our long and successful association with Peoria, we have come to regard this community and our 
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Company as ‘Partners in Progress.’ We want the city to remain a good place to call our home.”72 
It fostered a sense of civic duty by donating company equipment to assist Peoria in clean-up 
drives, and the Post Office with transporting Christmas presents. When heavy rains caused the 
Illinois River to crest seventeen feet above normal in late May, 1943, the company donated over 
250 pieces of equipment to build and repair levees, while thousands of employees filled 
sandbags and operated equipment in Peoria’s flood-ravaged downtown. In annual parades to 
commemorate Memorial Day and July 4
th
, which served as performative exercises reinforcing 
national identity through mass participation and reverential treatment of symbols such as the 
American flag, Caterpillar employees parading with company equipment further connected the 
company with the community.
73
  
Additionally, it argued that its foreign operations abetted domestic production and 
employment.  In a speech to the Peoria Cosmopolitan Club, Eberhard rationalized Caterpillar’s 
recent expansion into overseas production, stating that “…foreign production does not 
necessarily displace U.S. manufacturing of machines in the U.S. plants…We know that our 
overseas operations have provided more jobs in Peoria rather than taken jobs away.”74  Both 
foreign sales and foreign jobs, he insisted, were good for American workers.   
In Peoria, this particular point may have resonated as deeply as any, for the community 
grew heavily reliant on Caterpillar for employment, which sustained other sectors such as retail 
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and service. From 1960 to 1967, Caterpillar provided more than half the area’s manufacturing 
jobs, even as other local industries such as Hiram Walker, Pabst, and lift manufacturer Wabco 
were profitable and important local businesses. While government grew into one of the most 
important sources of employment, it lagged far behind manufacturing throughout the 1960s, 
while the number of agricultural workers in the Peoria area dropped from 6,475 in 1960 (5.3% of 
the area’s total employment) to just 4,500 in 1968 (3.1 % of total employment).75  
Caterpillar emphasized the benefits that local communities, America and the world 
received from its products and profitability.  Small businesses, the company’s “biggest market,” 
performed services with products such as mining, waste disposal, paving, and flood control that 
improved the quality of life for Illinois residents.
76
 Its annual reports and company papers served 
not only as informational status reports on the financial condition of the corporation, but also as 
advertisements proclaiming the necessity of for its equipment to worldwide construction of 
roads, dams, bridges, homes, towns, mines, canals, and energy projects.
77
  In their 1956 letter to 
its shareholders, company executives Louis Neumiller and Harmon Eberhard declared that 
around the world, “there is today a huge reservoir of work to be done for which Caterpillar 
equipment is particularly well suited.”78   
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Glossy photographs and rough sketches accompanied hortatory passages that 
characterized resource development with its goods, and the subsequent profits from their sale, as 
more than good for business, more than good for world development, but as a fulfillment of 
Americans’ spirit and ideals. Advertisements and articles blended images of modern technology 
and society with agrarian, pre-industrial themes to portray Caterpillar as plowing an ongoing 
path toward progress at home and abroad.  Harking back to American pioneers who heeded the 
call to discover “the North American continent…its mighty potentials ready to be harnessed to 
haul in a prosperous future,” John Wardale proclaimed in Tracks and Treads that ‘we in the 
earthmoving industry…as individuals and collectively, are making our contribution to the 
American heritage.  Earthmoving is basic—it is the one standard requirement.  We have to turn 
soil to cultivate, move earth to make way for a road or clear a site for the foundations of homes, 
factories and offices.”79  These espoused labor with Caterpillar machinery as embracing “our 
heritage…from which man, in our time, has fashioned a better life.  It is a world in which the 
spirit of freedom has grown, has sometimes ebbed, but has never died as men fought to preserve 
it for posterity.  And thus it is for succeeding generations to assume responsibility for 
maintaining and developing this, their birthright.”80 This, Caterpillar publicized, was America’s 
greatest gift…its REAL wealth and power…the American concept of freedom [and] liberty.”81  
When framed as a national value, competition was both economic and social, pitting it 
and its workers against communist countries on the opposing side of the Cold War as well as 
other corporations in the “free world.”   During the 1960s in particular, Caterpillar publicized the 
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importance of competition on these two fronts interchangeably, emphasizing the economic and 
ideological superiority of capitalist, free-market nations against communist nations such as the 
Soviet Union on the one hand, and on the other the responsibility of workers to be loyal, 
productive and efficient on the job when competing against other corporations.  In the process, it 
sought to instill in its workers a dual concept of competitiveness that was at once proudly 
patriotic—good for the country—and pro-business—good for the company and its employees. 
The Soviet Union bore the primary brunt of this anti-communist propaganda. In a three-
article series in 1959, the company simultaneously derided the inferior business practices of 
Soviet state-run industry and fretted about the possibility that the Soviet Union’s scientific 
prowess might increase its industrial capacity enough to eventually overtake the U.S. The articles 
proffered a fundamental contradiction by at once contending Soviet industrial and societal 
inferiority, while fretting about Soviet industry as if they posed an imminent threat to American 
industrial might
82
 After an extensive tour of Soviet factories in 1961, products division manager 
Bob Morrill was unimpressed by the state of its heavy-equipment industry, which Morrill termed 
“10 to 20 years behind the United States.” Morrill concluded that “first, little work is actually 
underway, and second…they are far behind in the construction equipment field, and not anxious 
to display this fact.”83  Caterpillar claimed that the Soviet system had more than merely inferior 
industrial techniques, but contained deeper, ideological problems.  Rather than providing 
opportunities for its citizens to excel, Russia—which its publications used interchangeably with 
“Soviet Union”—encouraged equality rather than excellence, stifling people’s innate competitive 
desire.  This was more than unfair to its citizens; it was in fact “foreign to the nature of man.  Far 
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from wanting to be equal, man wants to excel—and will try to excel as long as there is a reward 
for doing so.”84  Thus, competitiveness was a core component of economic vitality as well as 
social progress because it provided the impetus for achievement, a cornerstone of the American 
way of life. 
Successful Cold War competition, for a dominant international manufacturer such as 
Caterpillar, required lower tariffs for imports and exports alike. Caterpillar consistently argued 
for expanded trade and lower tariffs as a means to garner greater access to established markets in 
Europe and Japan and, by the 1960s, the burgeoning industrializing regions such as the Middle 
East, South America, and Southeast Asia. Its representatives frequently appeared before 
Congress to speak on behalf of bills and trade agreements that eased tariffs on American imports 
and exports alike. In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in 1958, company vice 
president William Blackie championed “freer international trade” by linking his company’s 
business strategies to national objectives, submerging the former to the latter with patriotic 
appeals.   Framing his arguments for the company’s expansion into foreign markets not merely 
as essential to its vitality, but particularly to the nation’s economic health, and to national 
security particularly regarding the Soviet Union, Blackie asserted that it was not “sufficient to 
appraise [international trade]…only in the narrow context of the well-being of one 
company...The major consideration must be the welfare and security of the United States as a 
whole.” In 1957, roughly forty-two percent of Caterpillar’s sales were outside the U.S., a nine 
percent increase from the previous year.  Connecting exports to domestic jobs and the health of 
its “plant communities,” Blackie argued that, had its foreign sales not risen during the economic 
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slump of the late 1950s, the company “would have been obliged to lay off about 4,000” 
employees.
85
 
Invoking the specter of communism, particularly in light of the Soviet Union’s successful 
launch of the Sputnik satellite, Blackie portrayed low tariffs and American leadership in 
international trade as bulwarks against aggressive Soviet expansion that was equal parts 
economic and militaristic. American access to world markets and, in turn, the ability of 
developing nations to sell to the U.S., would dissuade “less-developing countries” from viewing 
the Soviet Union as a preferable alternative for their “wanted goods.” Trade was a strategic Cold 
War front on which American trade policy, and American businesses such as Caterpillar, must 
join forces to thwart the “declared and mounting Soviet offensive to beat us, not with 
intercontinental missiles but with intercontinental trade.”86  
With one eye on its communist competitors, Caterpillar kept its other firmly fixed on 
growing challenges in the 1960s from foreign corporations.  The company anticipated threats to 
its worldwide market share that competitors such as Komatsu would pose by the end of the 
1970s, insisting that improvements in competitors’ quality and increasingly cost-effective 
production demanded that the company “offer better values in order to stay competitive.”  
Company publications framed this discourse in terms that conflated the company with the nation, 
thus conveying the threat that foreign companies posed not only to the company, but also to the 
nation.  Tracks and Treads stated, “More and more highly competitive overseas manufacturers 
are challenging America’s traditional quality leadership.”87 In consecutive issues of Caterpillar 
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News and Views, the company published product, price, and hauling capacity comparisons 
between its products and those of its rivals. While touting the superior quality of its products, 
Caterpillar stressed the difficulty that the company’s products faced on the world market when 
pitted against cheaper, foreign-made goods.  Company and employees alike needed to keep costs 
atop their lists of priorities in order to maintain corporate competitiveness and employees’ jobs.88 
 It seems that Caterpillar’s publicity efforts had some of the desired effect and influenced 
employees and area residents. The company claimed that, through interviews and questionnaires 
it circulated at its 1965 annual meeting asking workers about the sources from which they 
preferred to get information about Caterpillar, other than employee meetings (35% of 
respondents), workers chose the company-wide magazine Caterpillar World (26%) and plant 
newspapers (19%) more often than supervisors (12%), local newspapers or the union newsletter 
(4% each). One ought to treat these findings with some skepticism, for the annual meetings 
themselves, open to all employees, were also designed to inculcate a pro-business mindset. Nor 
was there reference to how opinion survey questions were presented to what the company 
claimed were randomly chosen employees, nor a sense of how many unionized factory workers 
vis-à-vis supervisors and nonunion office staff attended. On the other hand, company 
publications were directly mailed to all employees. While many may have blithely discarded 
them, home delivery also meant they could be read in one’s spare time away from the bustle of 
the workplace and from co-workers and, as the company intended, read by family members. 
Additionally, the company’s annual “Power Parade” displaying product performance in action 
for employees, their families, and the Peoria community drew well over 50,000 in one weekend 
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in 1964.
89
 The role that consistently positive media coverage played in shaping public opinion is 
worth considering. The conservative, pro-business Peoria Journal-Star became the area’s 
primary newspaper by the 1960s, and generally avoided directly criticizing the company, 
including during strikes in this period. It too reached the majority of area residents, including 
people well outside Peoria. Survey data gleaned by American Newspaper Markets Inc. indicated 
that “97% of Peoria county households subscribed to the Journal-Star,” with the four counties 
immediately surrounding Peoria County having subscription rates between 53 and 59% of 
households.
90
 While it is always difficult to gauge how the general public receives information, 
the fact that the general public and Caterpillar employees consistently received and purchased 
information that cast it and its business practices in a positive light is well worth noting. 
A Brighter Future? Urban Improvement and Civil Rights in Peoria 
 Strong economic performance, the emergence of a local civil rights movement that broke 
down barriers in employment, residential, and consumer segregation, and changes in local 
government structure signaled important changes in daily life in 1960s Peoria. This heightened a 
sense of optimism among civic leaders that the city was shedding its negative reputation as a 
“hick town” that was a backwater to some, lacked inclusiveness for others, and was seen by most 
as led by corrupt and indifferent public officials. Changing these brought to Peoria, according to 
a local banker, “a new atmosphere in this town, a whole new psychology.”91 
 Backed by Caterpillar executives and other local business leaders, Peoria altered its 
government structure. With corporate executives pushing openly for a more efficient city 
government, a referendum passed in 1952 that ushered in a city manager who no longer belonged 
to the legislative council. The referendum also eliminated the long-standing system of ward –
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based elections that were perceived as corrupt and maintaining unresponsive officials, and 
replaced it with city-wide elections for council members. The council and city manager acted to 
make equal a tax code that taxed some business higher, and some considerably lower, than their 
rates out to have been. They also successfully pushed for new school bonds to build new schools 
and updated deteriorating ones.
92
 
Civil rights activism beginning in the late 1940s slowly but steadily broke down many 
racial barriers in Peoria, beginning with successful efforts to desegregate downtown restaurants. 
The Revered C.T. Vivian, who gained notoriety during the civil rights movement in the South as 
a founding member of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and with his 
participation in key struggles such as the 1961 Freedom Rides and the voter registration drive in 
Selma, Alabama in 1965, was a central figure in the Peoria civil rights movement in the late 
1940s. After attending Western Illinois University and moving to Peoria to work at the Carver 
Community Center, the twenty-three year-old Vivian recalled how deeply segregation permeated 
Peoria. “There was only one place in downtown Peoria . . . that you could eat.  That was 
Thompson's Restaurant.  We had to sit in the back.”93 He became involved with a group of white 
civil-rights activists influenced by the Chicago-based Committee (later Congress) of Racial 
Equality (CORE), and based in churches around Bradley University on the city’s west side. 
While a group of about 20 non-violent activists including Vivian picketed in front of and 
demanded service in various downtown eateries, they focused their attention especially on 
Bishop’s Cafeteria, a popular and affordable shop on Main Street. In a 1999 interview, Vivian 
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recalled the combination of persistence and moral suasion within nonviolence that became a 
trademark of the civil rights movement: 
We'd wait in line and they'd try to move people ahead of us.  We'd say we were next. 
Well, often times, they'd move people past you anyway, but generally they'd have to seat 
us just to get us out of the way. But we did not mind because that raised the issue in the 
minds of everyone else. They have to decide, is this what I'm like?  Am I a person that 
denies other people a chance just to sit down and eat?  Am I a person who wants people 
to go to war and fight and die for a democratic country and then deny them democracy?  
 
  
After several months of picketing outside and sit-in style actions inside Bishop’s, Vivian and his 
fellow activists successfully brokered a deal with Bishop’s that guaranteed equal access and 
service for African Americans.  This led to similar settlements with other restaurants that saw the 
desegregation of about two-thirds of Peoria’s eateries by 1955, according to a survey performed 
by Bradley University’s Sociology Department.94   
 Grassroots efforts to desegregate schools led to an increase of African Americans at 
Peoria High School. For decades, most black high school students attended Peoria Manual, near 
one of the city’s black neighborhoods, while Peoria High, the city’s best high school, was nearly 
all white. Geraldine Mitchell, who was later chairperson of the Peoria Housing Authority, 
wanted her children to attend Peoria High, which was also close to their home. One of her 
youngest daughters, Gloria Oliver, recalled in a 1996 interview, "What my mom did was 
integrate that school herself," said Oliver.  "She marched us up there and enrolled us.  I think 
they were just in shock at her audacity.  After that, many other people followed."
95
 
 Through meetings with business officials and public actions such as picketing and sit-ins, 
African Americans began to move into occupations from which they had been excluded. By the 
early 1970s, blacks made inroads into office, sales, and managerial positions in retail and 
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banking industries, held more semi-skilled and skilled positions in private sector as well as 
utilities and telephone companies, and held far more public sector jobs than before in health care, 
education, postal work, and government employment. The first black official was appointed to 
the city council in 1959, and the first black school principal appointed in 1962.
96
  
Residential segregation began to erode in the late 1950s after a 1954 city council 
investigation revealed the possibility of segregation in the Taft Homes soon to be constructed. 
With the adoption of an open housing policy at Taft, according to Romeo Garrett, no incidents of 
racial violence or intimidation were reported between whites and blacks. Garrett argues that 
racial violence did not occur when a black family bought a house in an all-white area of the city 
in 1959, although the family reported receiving threatening phone calls. Key to forestalling any 
possible outbreak of violence were police statements that they would arrest anyone inciting 
violence, and the support for civil rights of the local Catholic diocese.
97
 Residential segregation 
persisted through the 1960s, however. As of 1970, nearly sixty-four percent of African 
Americans still lived in the southwest corner of Peoria bracketed by Seventh Avenue (now 
Martin Luther King Jr. Drive) on the north, Western Avenue on the west, Franklin Street to the 
east, and Lincoln Avenue to the south.
98
  Although about 1,500 blacks also lived just northeast of 
Peoria’s downtown, with many residing in the desegregated Taft Homes housing projects, and a 
couple hundred more around Peoria Stadium on the city’s north side, most neighborhoods in the 
city remained over ninety percent white.   
In the 1960s, Caterpillar deepened its ties to the Peoria area, invigorated the city’s urban 
renewal efforts, and bolstered the investments of local business people by constructing its new 
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world corporate headquarters and offices overlooking the waterfront downtown. Having initially 
planned to build its office complex several miles north of the city in Mossville, Caterpillar 
decided to locate its headquarters within the city proper. It was persuaded to do so after Sears 
chose to remain in downtown Peoria instead of moving to a suburban shopping center ten miles 
away. With its threat to move out of town as its lease on a four-story building was set to expire, 
Sears incited fears among local business leaders, such as F. M. Bourland, vice-president of the 
First Federal Savings and Loan Association in Peoria, of the city’s decline but, just as 
importantly, their “downtown interests going down the drain in 10 to 15 years.  Certainly, one of 
our motives was to help the city…But for us, the profit motive was very real…we had to protect 
our own sizable investment in downtown.”99  This prompted Bourland and seven other local 
business officials to form the Peoria Development Corporation (PDC), which planned to keep 
Sears in the city by purchasing a large strip of waterfront property. Ironically, crucial financial 
assistance came from Sears’s department store rivals. With $100,000 from the owners of 
Bergner’s, and an agreement with Carson Pirie Scott to swap three waterfront lots for stock in 
the Development Corporation, the PDC acquired two square blocks in 1961 that, by 1965, was 
Sears’s new location. The investment paid off for the PDC overall and especially for Bergner’s 
and Carson Pirie Scott, whose own downtown locations experienced higher sales volume several 
years after Sears moved.
100
 
By 1967, Caterpillar had completed and moved into its new offices next door to Sears. 
Yet vital to its move was satisfying Caterpillar’s demand that the dilapidated county courthouse 
that had occupied this land be razed, and a new courthouse relocated elsewhere downtown. 
Funding for a new courthouse required a referendum for issuing bonds, which the conservative 
                                                          
99
 Adde, Nine Cities, 111. 
100
 Ibid., 113. Sears eventually moved to the Northwoods Mall, which opened in 1973, on September 19, 1998. 
55 
 
county had thrice rejected. However, Peoria business people lobbied the Illinois state legislature 
to pass a law that at once eliminated the need for a referendum, and allowed community leaders 
to form a Public Buildings Commission to issue bonds to fund land development, which it did 
for Caterpillar’s new headquarters. 
Celebrating Peoria’s being named an “All American City” for the second time in 1967 
further illustrated its commitment to the city. One of the company papers for its Peoria 
employees, Caterpillar Folks, heralded the city’s award by trumpeting the company’s moving its 
“corporate headquarters from California to this area.  We decided to build the East Peoria Plant 
into our largest single manufacturing operation.  We have made this our research and 
engineering center…All of these have been decisions in favor of this, the Peoria area.  And 
looking back on them…we can happily say that they have been good decisions.  Caterpillar has 
prospered in Peoria, and Peorians have prospered with us.”101 This prosperity helped to hone 
what it called “the Caterpillar image,” which “has been earned over many years and is a very real 
asset.  It has come to mean to others that we are a good company to work for, a good company to 
invest in, a good company to do business with, and a good company to have in a community.”102   
Conclusion 
 By the late 1960s, much had changed in the Peoria area. Civil rights activism prompted 
significant alterations in daily social relations, opening opportunities and bringing greater 
equality for African Americans as consumers and workers. The city’s downtown area had drawn 
important, well-known national companies in Sears and Caterpillar, which were also 
cornerstones for the local retail and manufacturing sectors. This spurred waterfront development, 
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increased the city’s tax revenues, and helped revitalize a blighted neighborhood.  The area’s 
largest employer, Caterpillar grew leaps and bounds, from a large national company with an 
international presence to a dominant corporation with global manufacturing operations and 
control of worldwide markets.  With thriving industries, low unemployment, improvements in its 
urban landscape, and economic benefits beginning to spread to its African American community, 
Peorians viewed their future with measured optimism. While the need for social and economic 
improvements remained, such as reducing the income disparity between white and black 
families, the city had done much to shed its image as a “backwater.”103  
 Fundamental to the transformation of postwar Peoria was the more prevalent role that 
Caterpillar had in shaping economic and social relations in the community. The paychecks it 
issued were instrumental to sustaining the local economy. As it became the largest employer in 
an industry that became ever more vital to Peoria’s economy, the company wielded its vast 
financial resources and personnel to shape its image among its employees and the community. 
Discourses couched in paternalistic tones that knitted themes of anti-communism, free trade, and 
competitive success were tailored to connect a largely sympathetic, conservative community 
with the company’s business objectives. Crucially, presenting its image and objectives as 
benevolent and productive to the community shifted the public’s focus from the often conflict-
ridden relationship defining social relations at work between the company and its unionized 
factory workers, who developed their own responses and perspectives on the company’s day-to-
day operations.  Characterizing its postwar ascent as the product of a free enterprise system 
elided the fact that Caterpillar relied heavily on federal policies—from issuing military contracts, 
to ensuring access to global markets through trade and foreign policy—to secure its place atop 
the earthmoving industry. By providing relatively stable employment for over 20,000 local 
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workers even as its manufacturing base expanded abroad, Caterpillar staved off questions as to 
whether or not its moves overseas might harm Peoria’s economy. Its capacity to shape the 
earthmoving industry and how the local community perceived its operations reveal the 
considerable power the company exercised in Peoria.  
 Relations between the far larger white population and the much smaller but growing 
African American community improved considerably in the postwar period over a more violent, 
segregated history. However, this evolution proceeded unevenly for black Peorians. Although 
they achieved gains in occupational and housing opportunities, most remained confined to a few 
neighborhoods with substandard housing, and many lacked upward mobility on the job. In both 
spaces, blacks and whites occupied spaces in which race still shaped actions, perceptions, 
experiences, and outcomes. Caterpillar in the years to come would play a prominent role in how 
white and black workers experienced and perceived work, and their places within and outside the 
factory walls. 
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Chapter 2: Grappling with Globalization:  Labor Relations and the Limits of 
Solidarity and Community in the Era of Global Production 
              
At the 1964 convention of the International Metalworkers Federation, the UAW’s report 
reflected a growing anxiety that belied its image and position as one of the strongest labor unions 
in the US.  Fearful of the power of “giant international corporations” to shift operations around 
the world, and its implications for union members, the UAW took the unprecedented step of 
diverting interest and dividend payments from its strike fund investments to its newly created 
International Free World Labor Defense Fund.  “Within one world,” the report warned, “there 
has grown up and interlocked world of corporations” that workers could only challenge with “an 
operating international solidarity program.”  Seeking to assist unions abroad that faced the “same 
problems which haunt American workers,” the UAW saw in the Metalworkers Federation and 
other international labor institutions a nascent “vision of international labor solidarity” that could 
become a “reality at union meetings…steward training sessions, and seminars.”1   
 Yet for workers at Caterpillar, which had opened several new factories around the world 
in the 1960s, the “vision of international labor solidarity” did not materialize.  Despite some 
overtures toward international solidarity in the 1970s, there is little evidence indicating that the 
International’s efforts resonated with rank-and-file workers in Peoria, the center of Cat’s 
business operations.  Why did the disquiet about corporate power that motivated the UAW to 
fund solidarity efforts around the world not resonate among its members at Caterpillar?  
 This chapter examines the UAW and workers at Caterpillar as they encountered a new, 
global landscape of industrial production.  It argues that, as the UAW grappled with the 
proliferation of global labor markets, possible remedies such as international solidarity failed to 
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resonate with Local 974 members in Peoria.  Instead, pressing problems at work, as well as 
strong local and national identities, shaped American workers’ strategies and perspectives in the 
postwar period.  Social and cultural cohesion at work and in local communities fostered shop 
floor solidarity and militancy that strengthened the union’s position with the company, providing 
workers with previously unattainable levels of financial and occupational security. However, this 
localized strength was fraught with significant fissures—along racial and gender lines, between 
workers, between the UAW International and Local 974, and within the local community—that 
portended problems with the spread of global production. 
 A focus on internal union politics and shop floor conditions provides not only important 
insight into the priorities and conflict-ridden relationship between union and company, but also 
within the UAW itself. It also proffers a critique of postwar contractualist labor relations and 
unionism that reveals workers’ distinct vulnerability to the sweeping changes that the 
globalization of work, and the deindustrialization that resulted in factory towns such as Peoria, 
wrought in the 1980s.  Additionally, the long-standing conservatism in the Peoria area provides 
an important case study to examine how workplace militancy coexisted with political and social 
conservatism among union members. In the process, it demands a reconsideration of the trope of 
a rightward political turn among America’s working class, for conservatism dominated Peoria 
politics throughout much of the twentieth century.  
Origins of Local 974 and Contractualism at Caterpillar 
The origins of industrial unionism in Caterpillar’s East Peoria factory and local 974 lay in 
the 1930s, and entail the brief but intense rivalry between the UAW and the Farm Equipment 
Workers Union (FE), a left-led union in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) that had 
represented workers at Caterpillar, Deere, and International Harvester.  Strike activity and signs 
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of solidarity surfaced on July 3, 1934, when a group of 500 foundry workers (out of 750) in East 
Peoria stopped working. Led by members of the Molders’ craft union, the employees sought 
wage increases and preferences from the company on re-employment placement for twenty-five 
workers who had been laid off in May. After a week-long strike that included incidents of picket-
line violence between picketers and workers not honoring the picket line, and through the 
mediation of the National Labor Board, they reached a settlement.
2
  
Combining traditional tactics with the innovative sit-down strike that had recently proved 
successful for the nascent UAW during its famous forty-four day strike in Flint, Michigan, the 
Amalgamated called and held a recognition strike on the evening of April 6, 1937, in which a 
group of workers inside the East Peoria plant, joined by approximately fifty others who climbed 
the outside gates, simultaneously held a sit-down strike.
3
 The strike ended on April 9 when the 
two sides signed a contract representing the majority of the workers in East Peoria, and the 
Amalgamated eventually became a part of FE in 1938.  Granted affiliation with the CIO as the 
Farm Equipment Workers Organizing Committee in November 1938, FE overcame stubborn 
company resistance to organize workers at Caterpillar, Deere, and Harvester by 1942.
4
   
Seeking to expand into the earthmoving industry, the UAW wielded a two-pronged 
strategy against FE.  It attempted to convince the militant but cash-strapped FE to join it as a 
division within the UAW.  It also contested FE’s jurisdictional rights in the Agricultural 
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Implements (Ag-Imp) with the CIO, arguing that allowing two CIO unions to represent Ag-Imp 
workers made it vulnerable to raids from the rival American Federation of Labor (AFL).  As 
early as 1942, the UAW tried to organize farm equipment workers.  When F.E.W.O.C. chairman 
Grant Oakes petitioned the UAW for funds to help organize Harvester, whose place in the 
industry and anti-unionism led Oakes to characterize it as “the GM of farm equipment,” UAW 
Secretary-Treasurer George Addes demurred, citing the outstanding issue of jurisdiction within 
Ag-Imp.  UAW officials fueled dissent among political outsiders from FE Local 105 at Cat’s 
Peoria factory, and Local 108 in Harvester’s McCormick Works—the biggest locals at each 
company—by meeting in 1945 in an unsuccessful effort to raid FE’s large locals.  FE leaders 
resented the raids, branding those who worked with the UAW as “quislings and traitors,” and 
appealed to CIO president Philip Murray to intervene on their behalf. While Murray, in the 
summer of 1945, urged the competing unions to iron out their differences in order to streamline 
and hasten organizing efforts in the industry, the FE, concerned about losing power and 
ideological autonomy within the larger, liberal UAW, resisted.
5
   
The two unions nearly combined in 1947.  However, newly elected UAW president 
Walter Reuther feared that the addition of FE’s left-wing officers would tip the balance of power 
against his anti-communist caucus, and mustered enough opposition to vote down affiliation.
6
  
After the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, which among other things stripped unions of 
representation rights if union officers refused to sign non-communist affidavits, the UAW gained 
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FE’s members at Caterpillar and eliminated FE as an important political rival. Caterpillar refused 
to bargain with FE Local 105 because its national and local leaders stridently opposed the law’s 
anti-union provisions and therefore would not sign the non-communist affidavits, thus forfeiting 
the right to represent the workers in May 1948 and depriving FE of about one-fourth of its total 
membership. After the UAW defeated the International Association of Machinists (IAM-AFL) in 
a run-off election, it formed Local 974 in June and negotiated its first contract with Cat.  The 
UAW helped evict FE from the CIO, and by the early 1950s eclipsed it as the dominant union 
within the Ag-Imp industry, representing workers at Caterpillar rivals John Deere, International 
Harvester, and J. I. Case.
7
   
Solidarity Forged: Industrial Democracy  
Local 974 grew significantly as Caterpillar expanded its Peoria-area facilities.  In the 
1955 negotiations, it won representation rights for more 3,000 workers at several units in the vast 
East Peoria complex, and later encompassed workers at a foundry in Mapleton, Morton Parts 
facility, Mossville Engine, and a factory in Delavan as well.  At first, the company planned to 
transfer workers from existing, unionized facilities to new—and non-union—ones. Initially it 
proposed that these units should not be included in Local 974’s labor agreement despite its plans 
to move many of its members, which the Local and International adamantly opposed, causing 
Caterpillar to relent.
8
  
  Local 974 consistently showed Cat its collective strength by striking at the end of every 
contract from the late 1950s through 1983, completely shutting down all factories where it 
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represented the workforce. Since the UAW represented the vast majority of Caterpillar’s and 
workers in the heavy machinery, by the early 1960s it was not only able to establish but in fact 
dictate pattern bargaining, in which the basic contractual terms between the UAW and a given 
company became the benchmarks for the rest of the industry.
9
 In 1967, the UAW successfully 
negotiated its first central contract with Caterpillar, further consolidating its strength in Ag-Imp 
and against its biggest corporation.
10
  
Local militancy and UAW power brought the membership greater financial security than 
they had before through steady gains in wages, cost-of-living allowances to keep pace with 
inflation, retirement income from a company-invested pension, and supplemental unemployment 
benefit (SUB) pay to offset periodic layoffs.  The UAW negotiated the first pension at Caterpillar 
in 1950 and, by 1970, had won the 30-year-and-out pension retirement provision.
11
  Hourly and 
annual earnings for unionized workers at Cat significantly outpaced other area laborers, 
especially agricultural workers in the primarily rural counties surrounding Peoria, making a job 
at the company quite lucrative.
12
 
Crucially, workers also gained important protections in the workplace.  A detailed job 
classification system delineated responsibilities for 524 different occupations across all skill 
levels in the 1958 contract.  This system determined what tasks workers should—and should 
not—perform, preventing management from indiscriminately assigning work or combining—and 
eliminating—jobs. This fostered solidarity among workers in departments, who could 
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collectively protest what they deemed unfair assignments of work.  Through the detailed 
grievance system their contracts provided, workers could contest numerous management 
decisions such as production quotas, job classifications, disciplinary actions, overtime 
assignments, layoffs and others.
13
 
The system of workplace contractualism also gave workers the right to strike over any 
health and safety issues that presented immediate dangers, and over increased production 
standards if a backlog of unresolved grievances over speedups existed.
14
  They also used their 
contractual power to combat speedups by filing grievances en masse—particularly before 
contract negotiations—and striking, as they did in 1964, to recalibrate the pace and terms of 
production in their favor. A 1964 speedup strike revolved around the company’s attempts to 
assign certain moving equipment, to add an extra machine to a gear-shaping operation, and to 
raise production standards for welders on the D6C tractor. The UAW won most of its demands in 
the strike settlement.
15
  Such militancy reflected an aggressively pursued workplace solidarity, 
helping them stabilize the pace of production and the job classification system. 
974 members also conducted wildcat strikes to vent frustration over production standards, 
a lack of progress in negotiations and grievance handling, or to display their displeasure with 
what they perceived as callous managerial behavior. First-shift workers at Cat’s Mossville 
engine plant shut down operations there, and others at Morton Parts, Mapleton Foundry, and the 
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Technical Center and hose plant joined for several days in November 1969, because non-union 
people were running new machines that Mossville workers felt union workers ought to run, and 
on which the company wanted to set production standards. According to 974 President Bill 
Short, over 800 unresolved grievances had built up, but the UAW failed to authorize the strike.
16
  
Race on the Shop Floor 
The persistent exclusion of blacks and women from most jobs at Caterpillar resulted from 
a combination of factors such as corporate hiring practices, reliance on informal word-of-mouth 
networks, racial segregation in and around Peoria, and constructions of race and gender.  Most 
workers interviewed described coming to the company through networks of family and friends 
who either put in a good word for them with supervisors they knew, or referred them because 
they knew the company was hiring.  Jerry Brown, who was Local 974’s bargaining chairman in 
the 1980s and president during the turbulent 1990s, recalled that when began working at 
Caterpillar in 1965, his starting pay of $2.56 per hour was over a dollar an hour more than his 
previous job at a clothing store, and over fifty cents an hour higher than at a local corn processor. 
Brown’s uncle suggested that he apply at Caterpillar, and referred him to management.  
According to Brown, this was common practice at the time. “He [the uncle] put in a word for me 
to get me hired…At that time, they [managers] would ask you if you had any relatives available 
to work.”17  This kept the workforce tightly knit, as fathers saw their sons and sometimes 
grandsons work beside them, or at least securing reliable, well-paid work in one of Caterpillar’s 
many facilities around Peoria.
18
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It also ensured that the workforce was overwhelmingly white and male.  Most unskilled 
occupations required heavy lifting and arduous, repetitive work, while semiskilled and skilled 
labor instilled and drew upon specialized mechanical skills—all of which had long been deemed 
men’s work.  White men held most jobs, especially the semiskilled and skilled jobs.  Of the 
2,233 craftsmen that the employed company-wide, exactly seven were listed as “Negro” and 
male, and exactly one more was female.  Only 283 semiskilled operatives out of 11,772, or 2.4%, 
were Negro men, while 187 more, or 1.6 %, were women—eleven of whom were listed as 
Negro.  Most African-American men were relegated to foundry and laborer work during this 
period, with others working as janitors or in company cafeterias.  The apprentice programs 
severely limited access to white men, with only one of 353 apprentices in 1966 company-wide 
listed as Negro and male.  Although Blacks comprised 9.6% of Peoria’s population in 1966, they 
only held 2.6% of Cat jobs in the Peoria area (486 out of 18,271).
19
  
Even skilled black workers faced racial barriers at Caterpillar. Ed Nelson, who in 1945 
became the first African American hired at the company’s East Peoria facility, was offered a 
janitor’s position sweeping up chips in the foundry. This was despite his extensive experience 
that included successfully completing Caterpillar’s diesel mechanics courses in 1943 while 
serving in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and working as a diesel mechanic and instructor at 
MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida during World War Two. Nelson said in a 1996 
interview that, when he asked what opportunities for advancement there were, the company 
interviewer tersely replied, “Not much.” “’Then I’m not interested,’ I told them. I told them I 
came here to work on the assembly line, and I could go somewhere else." Nelson left, but the 
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company called him back the next day, when he began a twenty-four year career as a machinist 
with Caterpillar. 
Yet Nelson serves as the exception to the rule regarding race and opportunities for good jobs 
across skill levels and blue-collar and white-collar jobs at Caterpillar. Despite employing 39,511 
workers in the US in 1965, just 1,006 were African American, and 272 more belonged to other 
non-white groups—a mere 3.56% of the company’s domestic workforce. A 1966 National 
Industrial Conference Board study with detailed occupational delineations reveals that, of the 
1,278 African American and non-white workers whom Caterpillar employed in 1965, that 1,097 
(85.83%) were concentrated in semi-skilled, unskilled, and service work. These figures for total 
non-white employees in 1965, as low as they are, actually represented a 100% increase from the 
637 non-white workers Caterpillar employed just two years earlier. (See Table 2.1) 
Hiring by word-of-mouth and social networks at Cat typically meant white male workers 
referred other white men for Cat to consider hiring.  The result was a level of racial segregation 
in Cat factories that closely paralleled spatial segregation in Peoria and surrounding 
communities, and chapter 1 discussed.  The cities and towns around the city in which many Cat 
workers lived were even more thoroughly segregated.  Morton (population 10,419), ten miles 
east of Peoria and home to Cat’s sprawling parts warehouse, and was also exclusively white, as 
were nearby Creve Coeur (population 6,440) and Marquette Heights (2,758) just south of the 
city.  East Peoria, also in adjacent Tazewell County and the site of Caterpillar’s massive factory 
complex, counted a mere eleven African Americans among its 15,747 inhabitants.
20
   
This had significant ramifications for labor market opportunities in Peoria. In a time 
when the labor process at Cat was its most labor intensive and employment at its highest, more 
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than half the area’s population received little consideration for work at Cat.  Nor did these groups 
find work in Peoria’s construction trades.  Similar word-of-mouth hiring practices among family 
and friends kept skilled work in the building trades in white male hands.  Forced to work 
elsewhere when Peoria’s largest employer and others failed to hire them, women and people of 
color worked in disproportionate numbers in the region’s service sector jobs, which paid 
significantly less.
21
 Importantly, these hiring practices had long-term effects for working-class 
Peorians.  As other major employers such as Wabco, Pabst, and Johnnie Walker shifted 
production and closed down area factories and Caterpillar itself suffered losses in the early 
1980s, it signaled the decline of industrial work in the area.  With Caterpillar doing little outside 
hiring throughout the 1980s, relying upon some of the thousands of laid-off employees when 
business improved in the late 1980s, the generation of white male workers hired in the 1960s 
became ensconced in the best-paying jobs available. 
References to race were rare in Local 974’s newspaper.  Yet some, including the 
occasional slur, were published.  One reflected the resentment among many whites that African 
Americans were unfairly receiving the tax dollars of hard-working whites.  In his “Things To 
Know” column, Frank Miller offered this observation: “There has been quite a bit of talk by 
some of our political leaders to turn over our 51
st
 state to the Black Americans.  That state is the 
State of Taxes.”22  Implicit is a level of comfort in a space that white men dominated to make 
such a stereotypical remark without risk of rebuke, or worse.  
Women were excluded from most factory jobs as well.  The pattern of Cat’s hiring 
primarily white men for factory work strongly implies biases that constructed these jobs as men’s 
work.  Even as the company started hiring women into more shop floor jobs in the 1970s, 
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according to Jim O’Connor, most of the women were relegated to “light” operations such as 
hand trucking, which involved using a manually controlled power jack to lift and tow parts to 
and from work stations.  O’Connor also remembered seeing increasing numbers of women in 
management by the 1980s, yet not in “heavy” factory operations requiring considerable lifting.23 
The shop floor and labor relations system thus became gendered spaces characterized by rough 
language between male co-workers and between workers and management.
24
  Newsletters during 
the 1960s often included pictures of young women in bathing suits posing during beauty contests 
to appeal to the nearly all-male membership.  They also inserted brief barbs aimed at women in 
the space between articles such as this that treated ogling women as normative: “A man is getting 
old, when he inspects the food instead of the waitress!”25   
Once the company began to hire women for factory work in greater numbers in the 
1960s, the new workers faced some resistance, including the perception that they could not 
handle the rigors of manual industrial labor. Jane Evans, who was hired into Caterpillar’s East 
Peoria factory in 1969, was put right away on stamping track plates, a “mankiller” job that 
required heavy lifting to place on and remove steel track squares from a stamping press that 
eventually became part of the heavy outer track belt. “My supervisor looked like he expected me 
to quit the first day,” Evans recalled with a laugh. “But I’ve always been the type of person to 
prove you wrong, and I’ve never let people, man or woman, tell me I can’t do something. So 
even though I was sore as hell that first week and could barely move, I showed him I could do 
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that job. After that, the boss pretty much left me alone.”26 The crucial lesson to draw from 
Evans’s first, tough experiences on the job is not necessarily that she achieved a personal victory 
over a supervisor, but rather that this skepticism greeted Evans as soon she started the tough job. 
While many other male Caterpillar employees who were interviewed began by making track 
shoes, no one else revealed management’s skepticism about their capacity to do the job. In fact, 
some indicated that the fact that they were “big, strong men” was exactly why so many new male 
hires started on this job. 
Co-workers disciplined each other with coarse language that questioned one’s 
masculinity and humanity.  Production employees deemed to be too close to management were 
called “suck asses” and “ass kissers.”  Workers who exceeded production quotas were 
dehumanized as “rate rats.”  It was not uncommon for production workers and foremen to yell 
and swear at each other, often without disciplinary action.  Interactions between men on the shop 
floor inherently involved showing strength and toughness in order not to appear weak or pliable, 
especially to supervisors.  The union paper cultivated this atmosphere with prescriptive articles 
advising men on various matters such as child rearing.  One column by a woman, Geraldine 
Hertz entitled “What Kind of Father Are You?” urged men to “be tender with a teen-aged 
daughter, but…tough for his boys.”  Hertz averred that men must convey strength and discipline 
to the family to teach children to “respect his authority.”  Of particular concern to Hertz was that 
men not allow women to dominate family life, which she suggested was the “classic example of 
the home that produces a homosexual.”27 The lessons for the home stood for the factory floor as 
well—not exhibiting strength could produce a homosexual, if not in actuality, at least in the eyes 
of one’s co-workers with whom one spent eight hours a day. 
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UAW power at Caterpillar grew through an admixture of shop floor militancy, 
contractual gains, and social cohesion characterized by racial and gender exclusion that 
paralleled Peoria’s labor market. Workers behaved militantly at work, relying on a contractual 
system that afforded them degrees of latitude in dealing with management.  However, it 
coexisted with a general conservatism in Peoria, and among some of its members.  
Contractualism and workplace jurisprudence became entrenched in an important series of 
decisions in 1960.  Three important court decisions known as the Steelworkers Trilogy upheld 
the primacy of workplace grievance and arbitration systems to resolve disputes in workplaces 
with contracts containing said systems.
28
  These rulings confirmed that the workplace and the 
system of industrial jurisprudence would be the locus of power and dispute resolution over work 
rules and contractual provisions, not the nation’s judicial system. 
 The trust that unions invested in contractualism paid considerable dividends as long as a 
fairly stable labor relations system persisted.  Yet Steelworkers ensured that dispute resolution 
and, crucially, the day-to-day workplace problems to be resolved, would be removed from the 
public purview.  Reliance on this system further distanced the workplace and its operations from 
the local community, whose members might pass by Cat’s large factories yet know next to 
nothing about the conditions under which workers toiled, or the processes required to make 
heavy machinery.   
 Furthermore, Local 974’s trust in contractualism meant that it did not reach out and form 
connections with community groups to broaden its base of support.  John Gwynn, executive 
director of Peoria’s NAACP, said that unions such as 974 did not reach out to African Americans 
for political or social outreach, cutting itself off from a growing segment of the population and 
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failing to foster a better understanding between two distant groups.
29
  Given the racial 
segregation at work and in Peoria, it seems likely that race played a prominent role in this slight.  
 This reliance on workplace contractualism allowed various forces in the local 
community, such as Cat’s communications network, to shape perspectives about business 
matters.  It also allowed workers’ other allegiances, including nationalism and religion, to fall 
within the purview of Peoria’s long-standing conservatism without a strong countervailing 
narrative from the more liberal UAW.  Although the UAW held considerable power at work, it 
did not go unchallenged.  In fact, the union grew at the same time that the company began to 
shift manufacturing to new factories overseas.  This prompted considerable concern within the 
upper ranks of the UAW over how to match corporate expansion overseas. 
Unrequited Internationalism: Global Production and the UAW 
Caterpillar’s worldwide growth in the 1950s paralleled its widespread US expansion in 
the 1950s, establishing it as a global manufacturer and challenging the formidable, but 
essentially national, countervailing strength the UAW held.  By integrating new plants in 
Glasgow, Leicester, Newcastle, and Melbourne with its long-standing network of domestic and 
overseas dealerships, Caterpillar diversified its manufacturing base to minimize its product 
delivery time to its growing foreign markets that increasingly comprised its customer base, and 
that Cat coveted. In 1960, forty-eight percent of Cat’s total sales went overseas, much of it 
originating from its American factories.
30
 It also allowed Caterpillar to circumvent much of the 
tariff burden it incurred, both domestically and overseas, for its intra-corporate and international 
trade.  After World War Two, in order to provide some measure of protection for their devastated 
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economies and national companies, European nations raised tariffs on American products to 
significantly higher levels than on other nations’ imports. For example, in the nascent European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1962, duties on the tractors, excavators, and trucks that 
Caterpillar made were nine to fifteen percent on American-made goods entering EEC nations—a 
steep price increase on large machines that, even in the early 1960s, could cost six figures. The 
EEC at this time was making the transition toward eliminating tariffs on many products made 
within and traded between EC countries, and establishing a common external tariff.
31
  
Shifting production to Europe, South America, and Australia allowed Caterpillar to skirt 
these tariffs and realize greater profits from the sales in the rapidly-recovering postwar Western 
Europe, whose aggregate Gross National Product, though behind that of the US, was growing at 
a precipitously faster rate than the US.
32
  Soon after the round of tariff reductions, Caterpillar 
announced that it would enlarge its factories in Brazil and France, while extending its foreign-
based production into Mexico and South Africa.  Additionally, Cat entered into a joint venture in 
1963 with Japanese manufacturer—and acknowledged competitor—Mitsubishi, Shin-Mitsubishi 
Ltd., that provided the company with production facilities on six continents.
33
 
Caterpillar profited from its production strategy partly because workers in its new 
factories, even in heavily-unionized European nations, earned far less than their American 
counterparts. In 1972, hourly wage scales for its production workers in the US were on average 
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300 to 400% higher than those at the company’s Gosselies, Belgium factory, and nearly five 
times the rates for skilled workers in Grenoble, France.
34
 (See Table 2.2) 
Additionally, as the UAW pointed out with concern, increasingly international 
corporations such as Caterpillar reaped financial rewards from tax loopholes that allowed 
businesses to avoid much of their domestic tax burden. Through tactics such as transfer pricing, 
companies could write off the costs of doing business overseas, where the financial burdens for 
labor, materials, and tariffs were usually far less than in the US, onto its domestic ledger sheets, 
thus minimizing its profitability and therefore its tax obligation.
35
 
Citing increased competition from other American companies such as Allis-Chalmers and 
International Harvester, Caterpillar used global business as a pretense to stand firm on wage 
increases and pattern bargaining during its 1961 contract negotiations with the UAW.  Occurring 
at a time in which large corporations more frequently held hard bargaining positions on wages 
and were more willing to provoke strikes, Cat’s tough attitude toward the UAW stood apart from 
other labor disputes during this period because the company stressed wage restraint in order to 
compete for world sales with global competitors.
36
 Chairman of the board Louis Neumiller and 
president Harmon Eberhard told shareholders the company’s top priority was “a holding of the 
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line on wage rates” in order to enhance its “ability to compete in world markets.”  They cast this 
policy as more than simply a matter of importance to the company, urging “the big and powerful 
labor unions [to] act in a more responsible realization that the best interests of their members 
cannot be forever different or separated from the best interests of the nation as a whole.”37 What 
was good for the company, namely cost containment and increased export sales, was good for its 
workers and America, according to Cat’s executives.  They argued that UAW’s insistence upon 
wage increases was irresponsible—to its members, the company, indeed to the nation—because 
it jeopardized the company’s ability, through export sales, to pass on the “benefits of increased 
productivity…to all the people in the form of lower prices.”38 
The company’s campaign to “hold the line on wage rates” paid off in 1961.  Cat 
successfully negotiated for lower wage increases than the union had demanded.  The firm also 
emerged from the 1961 round of negotiations with a free hand to expand its overseas production 
base.  In the months following its contract settlement with UAW, Caterpillar announced that it 
would enlarge its factories in Brazil and France, while extending its foreign-based production 
into Mexico and South Africa.  Its joint venture in 1963 with Japanese manufacturer Mitsubishi, 
Caterpillar Mitsubishi Limited, manufactured certain large-scale tractors and track loaders for the 
Far East market, and provided the company with production facilities on six continents.
39
  The 
relocation also allowed it to avoid paying higher tariffs on goods produced in and exported from 
the US, by moving production and targeting sales to countries with lower tariff walls.
40
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Yet initially during the 1960s and early 1970s, UAW’s international economic agenda in 
the Cold War period differed less in overall structure and more in details from the trade 
expansionism that Caterpillar and other large multinational businesses supported. The Union 
agreed to moderate its wage demands in 1961 under pressure from Caterpillar to “hold the line 
on wages” in order to enhance the company’s trade competitiveness with overseas 
manufacturers.
41
 UAW trade policy represented a precarious amalgam of nascent free-trade 
principles that espoused lower tariffs, increased exports and jobs for American—and especially 
unionized—corporations, combined with advocating government intervention domestically to 
protect American workers from unemployment and plant closings resulting from tariff-free trade. 
When the US and Canada eliminated tariffs on autos and parts shipped between the two 
countries, Leonard Woodcock, UAW vice-president heading the union’s GM departments, 
testified before Congress to advocate the agreement, and UAW President Walter Reuther 
asserted that the trade agreement would bring wage parity between US autoworkers and their 
lower-paid Canadian counterparts. While the UAW’s monthly paper Solidarity touted the 
agreement as “common sense,” and an avenue for increased employment and trade for American 
and Canadian autoworkers alike, it also pointed out that the agreement intended to create jobs on 
both sides of the border needed to contain provisions to retrain American workers potentially laid 
off as a result of the trade pact.
42
 Yet the article failed to explain the apparent contradiction 
embedded within the piece—why a trade agreement billed as a boon to American businesses, 
workers, and consumers would require protections in case workers lost their jobs because of the 
same tariff-free trade pact.   
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Slowly, the UAW began to form international alliances with Caterpillar’s foreign 
workers. Utilizing multinational labor coalitions such as the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) and the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF), the UAW and its international and 
local representatives began to branch out, communicating and meeting with their counterparts 
from Europe, Latin America and Asia. In 1967, the Federation had formed an Agricultural 
Implement Industry Council, at which, beginning annually in 1971 global workers from 
Caterpillar, Komatsu, International Harvester, J. I. Case, Terex, Massey-Ferguson, Allis 
Chalmers and other earthmoving equipment manufacturers gathered to “share our experience, 
pool our knowledge, and plan our future strategy.”43  
Despite meeting through the IMF for several years, the unions and their representatives in 
these industries from across the globe knew very few details about each other—their wage 
levels, contractual terms, number of workers at various factories, in some instances what unions, 
if any, represented the workforce. They did know that they shared the same large, multinational 
employers, and were part of a complex, international, fully integrated production system.  By 
developing a “standard specification of design and quality at all locations,” Caterpillar produced 
parts that were “completely interchangeable throughout the world.” Of equal importance, by 
establishing manufacturing sites not as self-sufficient facilities but rather as units dedicated to 
particular component work such as foundry forging, parts manufacturing and distribution, 
hydraulics, and finishing assembly, Caterpillar ensured that no “single plant anywhere, including 
the United States, makes the complete line of Caterpillar products.”44 To this end, it had not one 
but multiple sites for its product lines. For example, by 1978 both the Newcastle, England and 
                                                          
43
 IMF World Agricultural Implement Industry Conference, March 1967, 1, UAW International Affairs Department, 
Herman Rebhan Collection, Box #5, File #17 IMF-UAW Ag-Imp Conference Speeches 6-8 May, 1975, Archive of 
Labor and Urban Affairs-Wayne State University—hereafter UAW IAD HR, ALUA-WSU. 
44
 Company and Market Reports (Preparatory Document), UAW IAD HR, Box #14, ALUA-WSU. 
78 
 
Joliet factories assembled scrapers, bulldozers, rippers, and hydraulics, and both the Aurora, 
Illinois and Grenoble, France facilities made crawler tractors and loaders.
45
  Although each 
factory usually made products with variations in size and horsepower, such an integrated system 
gave the company the potential, through machine and tool modifications, to shift production 
from one facility to another in the event of a strike, lockout, or shutdown, or to eliminate 
production—and jobs—at one site and transfer them to another. This insulated it from strikes in 
one country. On the other hand, it also opened opportunities for workers to organize across 
national boundaries and share knowledge about occupations and production policies to gain a 
strategic advantage against the company. 
Seeking to curtail the “ever growing economic and political power” of the large 
multinational corporations dominating the Ag-Imp and earthmoving equipment industries, the 
Agricultural Implement Industry Council attempted to raise “employment and living standards 
throughout the world, and particularly in the developing countries.” In a joint declaration issued 
at the 1972 IMF World Agricultural Implement Industry Conference, workers from twelve 
nations derided the corporations’ “regard for human labour as they do raw material, a commodity 
to be purchased in the cheepest [Sic.] markets and the fruits of such labour to be sold to the 
consumer at the highest price…The allocation of international investments and production is 
determined without any real consideration of the welfare of workers and the people directly 
affected by such policies.” Conference attendees proposed establishing “better communications 
and coordination of action” among international Ag-Imp workers, offering “to coordinate all 
practicable solidarity to achieve victory” in disputes, and “to coordinate termination dates of 
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collective bargaining contracts so that trade union strength can be combined to assist in the 
bargaining struggle in the various countries.”46  
To help bridge this divide between Cat’s unions and workers, vice-president for 
Agricultural Implements Pat Greathouse, one of the UAW’s stronger advocates of international 
ties, pledged at the 1972 World Conference to invite union representatives from some of 
Caterpillar’s global factories to attend the next round of UAW negotiations with Caterpillar in 
Peoria.  Several did on July 10, 1973. Later IMF Ag-Imp conferences, such as the one in 
Chicago in May 1975, expressly sought to “gather workers concerned with three, 
massive…multinationals [Caterpillar, Deere, and Harvester] so as to establish a concrete and 
viable solidarity network, one that we may call upon for help in case of need.”47 However, these 
meetings did little to generate acts of solidarity or long-lasting connections between either the 
various international unions representing Ag-Imp companies such as Caterpillar, or between their 
memberships. International solidarity hardly extended beyond expressions of “firmest fraternal 
solidarity.”  During their strike in May 1973 Pat Greathouse pledged to Caterpillar’s union 
leaders in France and Belgium that the UAW would not “undertake any work of a nature 
designed to limit or undercut your actions.”48  
In part, these unions were still learning basic details about each other as well as the 
particular power dynamics between the various unions and CAT within each country. Burton 
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Bendiner, general secretary at the IMF, informed the UAW that Force Ouvriere (F.O.), a union 
from Caterpillar’s Grenoble factory belonging to the IMF, “had very little strength in Grenoble,” 
and lacked the financial wherewithal to send its own representatives to the negotiations in Peoria. 
Bendiner also revealed that Belgium CMB, representing workers at Caterpillar’s Gosselies, 
Belgium plant also required financial assistance to attend the negotiations because it was not “not 
the dominant union” there, representing fewer workers than two other, non-IMF affiliated 
unions.
49
 According to the report circulated after the May 1975 Ag-Imp conference in Chicago, 
Cat management in Europe kept its job classification systems secret from both F.O. and Belgium 
CMB, preventing these unions from knowing the basis upon which management divided job 
responsibilities. Such information might have assisted unions trying to oppose management 
attempts to combine occupational tasks to eliminate jobs, to accurately assess the proper 
allocation of overtime and layoffs, to gauge and possibly contest production quotas, and other 
pertinent issues that their counterparts abroad who had such information could more successfully 
address. This illustrated the relative weakness of some European CAT workers vis-à-vis their 
American counterparts who negotiated with and struck to stringently delineate job 
responsibilities, production quotas and, subsequently, the number of workers those jobs 
required.
50
 
There is little—if any—evidence to suggest that the potentially far-reaching proposals of 
the 1972 World Ag-Imp Council that championed greater international worker solidarity actually 
came to fruition. Although the United States sent thirty-five delegates to the 1975 WAIC—by far 
the largest delegation of the twelve participating countries—a mere five were rank-and-file 
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workers, only three of whom belonged to the UAW.  The other two were members of the 
International Association of Machinists (IAM) Lodge 851, representing Cat workers in Joliet, IL, 
and the UAW with its CIO history, and the IAM with its long-standing background in the AFL, 
neither communicated directly nor coordinated with one another collective-bargaining strategies 
against CAT. The other thirty were all international representatives whose work was far detached 
from shop-floor workers and responsibilities.
51
 Nor is there evidence within bargaining minutes 
in the 1970s indicating proposals to coordinate UAW’s contract termination dates with those of 
Cat’s foreign factories.52  Since 1956, the UAW had established a Cat Council of local union 
representatives (not including IAM-represented workers in Joliet) that convened several times 
annually to apprise other unionists of pressing shop-floor matters, and discuss strategies for 
upcoming bargaining sessions.
53
 Despite the proposals articulated at the World Ag-Imp Council, 
and the presence of UAW International representatives the Cat Council became neither an 
international institution nor a forum in which issues of international solidarity might be 
discussed.
54
 UAW Local 974 News, the Peoria-based semimonthly newsletter for 974’s far-flung 
membership, never discussed working conditions, issues, actions or proposals at Cat’s overseas 
plants.  In theory and practice, international solidarity among Ag-Imp workers had little 
resonance in Peoria. 
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The UAW’s earlier efforts to coordinate bargaining strategies in auto proved 
unsuccessful with their German and Japanese counterparts, whose sizable unionized workforces 
gave them particular strength in the IMF.  Unlike American unions that were organized by 
industries, European metalworkers unions such as West Germany’s IG Metall were organized 
across industries.  Strikes tended to be regional rather than solely industrial actions, involving 
numerous employers.  According to Lichtenstein, “Because no single [European] industry 
employed a majority of its membership, union leaders saw productivity bargaining as highly 
divisive.”55 The UAW had even less success when coordinating similar efforts with the 
conservative Japanese auto unions, which worked within a corporatist system of enterprise 
unionism that aligned the interests of workers and companies.  Their conservatism was in part a 
product of purges during and after World War Two that paralleled America’s own decimation of 
the Congress of Industrial Organization’s (CIO) left-wing industrial unions and leftists in the 
UAW’s ranks.56 Yet Japanese unions in particular, as did their American counterparts, yoked 
their economic fortunes not to international unionism, but rather to export-based economics in 
key sectors such as auto, steel, and Ag-Imp production. Within the Cold War system of 
international capitalist industrialism, nations such as Japan and Germany were heavily reliant on 
the US market serving as the buyer of last resort, and leaders and unionists in these core 
industries focused on what they considered their national, rather than international, priorities.
57
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Another likely reason for the failure of international unionism to take root lies in the 
complex history of contractualism between Caterpillar and the UAW, and shop-floor relations 
between union workers and the company’s lower-level managers. The absence of references to 
Caterpillar’s international workforce in UAW materials indicates a sense of trust and security in 
the labor-relations system that the two sides had forged in the previous three decades. Workers’ 
willingness to walk off the job for various reasons reflects more than the shop-floor militancy 
that prevailed among Local 974 members, but the success of it, during this period. More than 
mere custom or habit, striking, even wildcat strikes, had been a reasonably safe and successful 
activity for Caterpillar—indeed for many American—workers. Before the 1980s and the 
menacing threat of permanent replacement that the Reagan administration had unleashed during 
the 1981 PATCO strike, companies were reluctant to take on unions so directly as to challenge 
their very jobs. Unions and workers, in turn, felt no need to alter long-standing collective 
activities that had worked for them. Though essentially liberal and innovative in its politics, the 
UAW was rather conservative and unwavering in its labor-relations tactics.  In sum, as long as 
the scaffolding of labor-relations and shop-floor power between the union and company, and 
within the union itself, held steady, the UAW and its members had no urgent need to rethink 
basic labor-relations strategies. Since international unionism did not galvanize Caterpillar 
workers, it is necessary to examine preexisting conditions on the shop floor, within Local 974, 
and in local communities to better understand what forces shaped working-class and local union 
perspectives. 
The Limits of Contractualism 
Despite significant degrees of control that the UAW exerted at Caterpillar, maintaining 
those gains was a constant struggle against management. A labor-management environment in 
84 
 
which foremen and supervisors exerted substantial leverage made strenuous physical labor even 
more demanding.  In particular, management held and exercised considerable power regarding 
the organization and pace of production in ways that used workers’ knowledge while often 
denying them control over, input in, and satisfaction from their work. For many workers, 
interactions with supervisors were daily reminders that, despite efforts to create a “more mature 
relationship between [the] Union and the Company,” issues of power and authority continually 
pervaded shop-floor and labor relations.
58
 
Contractualism operated more to mitigate the harshest effects of industrial relations than 
to eradicate that harshness which continued to be, even in the unionized era, workplace hazards, 
the rigorous pace of work and caustic supervision. Most jobs at Caterpillar were physically and 
mentally grueling. The process of manufacturing often very large units of earthmoving 
equipment burdened the body with heavy lifting, contorting one’s torso for welds or the 
fastening of parts, and the persistent peril of injury—all in an often cramped, dirty, dangerous 
and noisy environment that was hot in the summer and cold in the winter.  Retired worker 
Michael Legel described having “steel chips in my boots and fingers,” as well as bandanas 
soaked with sweat that he would wring out. “Every drinking fountain had salt dispensers” to 
compensate for dehydration. Legel also suffered a partial loss of hearing in his right ear from 
working in the die room, where track links were pressed.  Steve Frakes, a retired welder who 
crossed the picket line in 1992, recalled that sparks from his welding gun burned his exposed 
arms, neck, and face.  The remedy was wearing long sleeves, even in the summer.
59
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Workers frequently complained to their union representatives about being harassed by 
supervisors, or refused opportunities to go to first aid until a relief worker came to take their 
place to continue production. Shop stewards resented management’s refusal grievances to settle 
outstanding grievances, forcing cases to pile up and go to arbitration.   
An especially pernicious power that foremen utilized was the ability to “job-fail” workers 
for failure to maintain either proper quality or quantity standards.  If workers failed to meet pre-
determined production quotas, or if their work resulted in too much unusable product or “scrap,” 
foremen had the capacity to “job-fail” people.  This would result in their being bumped down to 
lower-rated and lower-paying jobs. Those without the seniority to bump into lower-rated 
positions faced possible unemployment during slow periods if they failed to adequately perform 
a job.
60
 All current and retired employees interviewed cited this managerial authority as a 
humbling threat for workers, which the company wielded frequently.   
Employees bristled at the “job-fail” authority foremen held because of its wide-ranging 
consequences.  More senior people who were job-failed could bump less-senior people out of 
their jobs, resulting in displaced workers continuing to bump down the seniority and production 
lines, or being laid off themselves. This fractured cohesive work groups and friendships, causing 
resentment toward the job-failed worker. These moves also meant that people moving into new 
jobs usually knew and performed them less efficiently than those whom they replaced, disrupting 
work flow and incurring the wrath of the most aggressive foremen, or “bird dogs,”61 who 
hounded workers to keep production high. Job-failing could also prevent workers from 
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transferring jobs or garnering overtime outside of their regular classifications.  If workers felt 
that they knew enough about a different job to work on it, they could petition management to 
judge their work on the basis that they could do it without being trained. If they were deemed 
capable of performing these extra jobs, workers opened up opportunities to work overtime or 
avoid layoffs, while being job-failed closed those doors.
62
  
Steve Frakes asserted that foremen often made qualification decisions arbitrarily, using 
the threat of job-failing workers—especially against people apt to resist foremen—to keep 
production high, but also to keep less-senior and lower paid people. Management also created 
pace-setters to squeeze out extra production, and then pressure the others to in turn produce 
more.  Frakes explains it as follows: 
It created a lot of hard feelings within the rank-and-file of the UAW because here on one 
hand you maybe had a guy that was producing ten pieces a night…and you have one 
individual who’s producing twelve or thirteen…because then the supervisor’s coming 
down and looking at the rest of these guys going, ‘Well if he can do it, how come you 
can’t?’  Never mind that they had production standards…that said that ten was supposed 
to be right.
63
 
   
In addition to disagreeing with how management wielded its authority to judge their 
abilities, workers’ also resented who made these decisions, especially managers without an 
industrial background.  Though workers generally knew their jobs far better than management, 
even those who had been plucked from production jobs, managers and engineers typically failed 
to heed their advice.  Jim O’Connor said that for years the company failed to update its cards 
detailing proper production processes because it dismissed input from its employees. He referred 
to the shop floor as “definitely…a caste system…[T]hese people ignored you. It’s like, ‘You’re 
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beneath us. How dare you even approach us?’ We were the shop rats and they were the elite.”64 
Beginning in the 1970s, Caterpillar promoted fewer production workers to management and 
instead hired college-educated managers. They might have had degrees in business 
administration, but they lacked the necessary knowledge for industrial production.  Frakes 
worked for two different “educated idiots” who had degrees in philosophy and lumber 
management, respectively.  While working in machine repair, Mike Legel recalled that when he 
tried explaining to a general foreman why a machine was down, the foreman responded, “‘You 
guys do whatever it is you have to do to get that machine running.  I have a degree in 
horticulture.  I have no clue what you’re talking about.”65 
Additionally, resolution through the grievance procedure usually involved delayed 
justice, if justice was realized at all.  In a contractualist system of company action and union 
reaction, workers seeking recourse for disciplinary issues could wait weeks or months before the 
dispute was resolved, while unresolved grievances taken to arbitration could take anywhere 
between several months to a year or two before an arbitrator rendered a decision.  The grievance 
system provided measures of power to workers and the union, but did not abrogate 
management’s authority to act first.  Nor did it assure victory, or come cheaply.  Settling 
grievances or pursuing arbitration cases proved expensive for both sides, particularly through 
legal fees.  If Caterpillar lost an arbitration case, it may be required to make financial restitution 
to a worker or group of workers.  For the union, however, lost grievances and arbitration cases 
not only meant no financial recompense, but also money spent and lost on staff and legal fees. 
As a result, it was not uncommon for workers to avoid utilizing the grievance system 
altogether, pursuing instead forms of resistance by flying below the radar of management.  In 
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both the skilled or semi-skilled occupations, employees attuned to the rhythms and vagaries of 
industrial life sought to use the uniquely intricate knowledge they gained to temper the grind of 
the factory, for example by meeting production quotas before the end of the day to extend their 
rest period. Workers also resorted to more surreptitious methods of combating management’s 
speedup efforts by using their knowledge of the production processes and machinery to curtail 
production.  In July 1970, Cat fired Theodore Hartl, an automatic lathe operator, for sabotage. A 
note to a co-worker that a foreman had discovered revealed that Hartl had loosened screws to 
induce a breakdown on a new lathing machine after a time study on it had resulted in higher 
production standards for the operators.
66
 
More often, workers simply sought escape from the harsh and often stultifying regimen 
rather than directly confront managerial power. Absenteeism was endemic, and violators of the 
company’s “AWOL Rule,” covering employees who failed to either report to work or notify the 
company of their absence for three days, were fired. Still others avoided the grind of the factory 
while at work, carving out personal time and space within the vast confines of Caterpillar’s 
sprawling factories.  Workers, particularly those on second and third shifts, escaped work by 
leaving for breaks and lunch early, and hiding in not-so-plain sight in the locker rooms, 
bathrooms, and the nooks and crannies of less frequented areas of the company’s complexes.  In 
one extreme example Harley Bantz, a millwright on third shift, was fired for keeping what can 
only be called a small but functional apartment at work in a remote corner of East Peoria’s 
Building CC. Plant security and a manager discovered that workers had assembled 
“beds…fashioned out of company boxes and materials, sex magazines and literature under 
private lock and key in a shop desk, numerous foodstuffs…radios, a hot plate, a coffeemaker, a 
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blanket, bottles of distilled water, cushions, a tub made into a refrigerator, and a stainless steel 
oven.”67  It was not uncommon for workers, especially those working overnight, to sleep on the 
job.  Two workers, Michael Bushell and Richard Bown, were fired for sleeping in the ersatz 
apartment that Bantz and others had fashioned for themselves. Retired worker David Williams 
acknowledged sleeping occasionally while working on third shift, saying, “I didn’t have all these 
bigwigs and, about 5 o’clock you had to straighten your act up, you know. They started filtering 
in then.”68 
The International and Local 974 for the most part were in agreement about the need to 
confront management encroachments of power on the shop floor, even if they occasionally 
differed about the proper methods and degrees of resistance.  However, issues of power between 
974 and the International were often as bitterly contested as those between union and company.   
Internecine Disputes 
The UAW International’s role in Peoria has alternated between its intruding in and being 
distant from Local 974’s affairs.  In turn, the International bristled at 974’s propensity for 
independence from, and at times disregard toward, the parent organization. This occasionally 
adversarial relationship within the UAW created a climate of distrust that has persisted between 
the International and 974.  
Tensions between the two came to a head in 1957 over allegations of elections 
improprieties within 974.  The Local’s March 5 elections for UAW Convention delegates 
prompted members to send “many telegrams and letters of protest…to President Reuther’s 
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office,” according to the testimony of Don Rand, UAW Credentials Committee member.  An 
International investigation found that “[b]allots were found in ballot boxes where they did not 
rightfully belong,” with “boxes [that] were opened by unauthorized persons.”  The investigation 
determined that local election watchers affiliated with an ex-officer entered the election hall and 
disrupted the vote count. Compounding matters, local media reports charged two members with 
ballot-box stuffing and election improprieties.  In response to these reports, protests from Local 
974 members, and its own investigation, the International Executive Board ordered Local 974’s 
officers to hold the elections results.  The local officers refused.
69
 
The International responded angrily, not only because of the perceived effrontery of the 
Local officers, but also because of the national political context.  The Senate’s McClellan 
Committee had begun investigations into allegations of racketeering within the labor movement.  
While it focused primarily on the Teamsters, the McClellan Committee later scrutinized the 
UAW’s actions during its fierce strike against the Kohler Company in which stewards sent from 
Detroit beat up Kohler scabs, resulting in a memorable exchange between Senator Barry 
Goldwater (R-AR) and President Reuther during Reuther’s three-day testimony in March 1958.70 
To potentially make matters worse for the UAW, a member of Local 974’s Executive Board 
contacted the McClellan Committee accusing the UAW International of “being in the same 
category as the Teamsters.” UAW Secretary Emil Mazey, who feared the possibility of negative 
press and resented the comparison with the Teamsters he considered “a disgrace to the labor 
movement,” excoriated Local 974’s officers. 
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You fellows play your politics pretty dirty and you play them pretty rough…These 
headlines are headlines that enemies of the labor movement are very glad to see.  They 
couldn’t have done a better job themselves.71  
 
The International removed all but two of Local 974’s officers and placed 974 under trusteeship 
in 1957.
72
 
 The rancor between Local 974 and the International continued to fester near the end of 
the eighteen-month trusteeship in which the International directly ran 974.  Ray Canty, former 
recording secretary of 974 who was removed from office in 1957 and suspended for three years, 
led an unsuccessful movement of East Peoria plant employees to disaffiliate from the UAW and 
form an independent union, the Independent Industrial Workers of America.  This particularly 
angered the International because Canty formed this group during contract negotiations with 
Caterpillar.  Around the same time, members of the independent union movement distributed 
anti-UAW leaflets at the company’s Aurora, IL factory—during a UAW organizing drive there 
against the IAM.  One leaflet attacked Ag-Imp director Pat Greathouse, who was administering 
Local 974, as “a Walter Reuther yes man…from Detroit” and a “dictator.”73  
Consequently, the International closely followed the Local’s politics from without and, 
according to 974 members, within.  As one of the largest locals in the entire union, by far the 
largest in the UAW Ag-Imp department,
74
 securing the support of and working with Local 974’s 
leaders was crucial for the election of regional directors.  Consequently, the International 
attempted to shape the course of events within Local 974 and to elect officer candidates it 
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favored.  According to Jim O’Connor, president of 974 from 1980 to 1983, it was an open secret 
that the International played a prominent role in shaping the Local’s internal politics: 
Our local represented a huge amount of voting strength at the conventions, and the 
regional director at the time, Robert Johnson, was notorious—if one political caucus in 
this local 974 got strong, [for] interject[ing] staff and money into the other organizations.  
[H]e could raise money from his own staff.  974 was always treated differently than 
Decatur or Aurora or any of the smaller units.  They pretty much appreciated the 
International and everything the International did for them.  Down here, when you got 
elected, you understood that the International had been involved in your local union 
politics.
75
 
 
The International’s role in 974’s politics and the perception that 974’s officers were subservient 
to the International were frequently used against candidates during hotly contested elections. 
Election flyers throughout the 1960s criticized incumbents for allegedly failing to stand up to 
Ag-Imp Director Pat Greathouse and Region 4 head Robert Johnson, characterizing Local 
interests as divergent from “Detroit.” During the race for Local president, B. J. “Bill” Short 
ridiculed his opponents, C. L. “Curt” Martin and George Eisfelder, for being “Greathouse Yes 
Men.” According to Short, Martin, who was president during the 1964 negotiations and strike at 
CAT, “let Greathouse call the shots—Martin let Greathouse go on T.V. telling the workers to go 
back to work before the contract was ratified.”  The loyalties of Eisfelder, president during the 
1967 round of negotiations and subsequent strike, were suspect according to Short’s flyer 
because he “Rubber Stamped anything Pat Greathouse want[ed].”76  
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Yet it would be inaccurate to characterize the Local as easily dominated by the 
International. Letters from Local 974 officers to Pat Greathouse and his staff prior to the 1979 
negotiations reveal a deep distrust of upper-level staff, whom 974’s Claude Turman termed “very 
rude” and “very unprofessional…Your staff members fail to follow through with grievance 
information for the employees.” The 974 bargaining committee co-signed a missive to 
Greathouse castigating long-time UAW representative Marshall Hughes as “an effective liar” for 
his handling of grievances concerning a snow day, when the company closed their factories.  
Reminding Greathouse of “the hundreds of thousands of dollars this Local Union sends Detroit 
annually,” the committee asked, “if your primary function is not to give good, prompt, courteous 
advice to our Membership, then we should know what it is you’re supposed to be doing.”77   
In these negotiations, 974 officials were upset that John Deere, and not Caterpillar, was 
chosen to set the standard for pattern bargaining that set the stage for an eighty-day strike that the 
International refused to authorize, denying strikers vital strike pay. Despite this, 974 workers 
stayed out and won, illustrating both strong local cohesion and the ability to beat the company 
without the International’s financial assistance.78 During pre-strike negotiations, Greathouse 
expressed frustrations to the International Executive Board in his dealings with Local 974’s 
bargaining team.  
“You got a total of thirty-five people on the committee, and eighteen of them come from 
that Peoria local.  So when you have a problem, they go off and have a caucus, come 
back and vote as a bloc, and tell what the policy of the committee is going to be. From 
the beginning, they set out that they were going to completely rewrite the agreement and 
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told the company from the opening day: ‘Come October 1, if we haven’t got a contract 
the way we want it, we are going to shut the plant down.’79 
 
Among the outstanding issues during the 1979-1980 strike was Caterpillar’s974 workers 
won this provision in 1976 through direct action applied on their own bargaining team. David 
Williams, who had worked in the Mapleton foundry in the 1970s, recounted organizing a picket 
of third-shift foundry workers at the Hotel Pere Marquette in downtown Peoria, where Cat and 
the UAW held negotiations in 1976, demanding the 25-and-out provision.  Only after a personal 
telephone call from Greathouse, assuring him that he would insist upon 25-and-out, did Williams 
and other foundry workers relent.
80
 
 The union’s amalgamated structure that incorporated Caterpillar’s diffuse factories in and 
around Peoria exacerbated this intensely political climate within 974 that Tony Green, president 
of Local 974 from 1984-1990, has termed a “political whorehouse.”81 For officer and steward 
elections, 974 was divided into seven units that at times combined workers from various local 
factories into one unit, but primarily isolated them by the particular shops in which they worked. 
For example, skilled trades people in all factories were in one unit, and another was comprised of 
workers from numerous shops such as the Technical Center (where many skilled and semi-
skilled workers conducted experimental work on prototype units and parts), Proving Grounds 
(where equipment testing occurred), Basic Engine, and several warehouses. However, most other 
Units were subdivided strictly by shop.
82
  Such compartmentalization served to isolate workers, 
localizing their particular conditions and political factions instead of facilitating connections 
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between workers in other shops. According to Jim O’Connor, candidates for union office found 
it difficult to make inroads outside their own shop.  Former Publicity and Education Director 
Wayne Schmidt reflected that 974’s intensely competitive political climate “probably turned a lot 
of people off…Outgoing officers never helped incoming people with how to handle problems or 
laying out precedents” for their successors to follow, opening them up to criticism later for doing 
a bad job in office.
83
 
 It is against this fractious backdrop that the UAW, and to a lesser degree Local 974, 
encountered and confronted global production. The emergence of global production ultimately 
revealed divergent priorities that the International and local held in a rapidly evolving industrial 
landscape.  In the process, a chasm widened between the two parts of the union that ultimately 
produced destructive, if delayed, consequences.    
  Some members, like much of the Peoria community, were likely turned off by the 
Union’s often adversarial relationship with Caterpillar that produced not only regular strikes at 
the end of contracts, but also occasional wildcat strikes and work stoppages over speedups in the 
1960s and 1970s.  Peoria and the surrounding counties were rather conservative politically, 
regularly sending Republican legislators to state and federal office and voting, often 
overwhelmingly, for Republican presidential candidates throughout the postwar period.
84
 Within 
this Republican stronghold, it is reasonable to conclude that unions, firmly entrenched within the 
Democratic Party since the 1930s, had their detractors within Caterpillar’s factory walls as well 
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as the surrounding communities. When Local 974 struck over increased production standards 
and unresolved job classification issues in 1964, it prompted letters from the community 
criticizing the Union for “bickering like recalcitrant children,” and for causing people 
“psychological frustrations.” Among these, one letter anonymously signed “A Cat. worker on 
strike, acknowledged that “some jobs are timed too high,” but also criticized “some ‘goldbricks’ 
who resist giving an honest days work.” [Sic.] The anonymous “worker in the shop” opined that 
the Union overstepped its parameters by demand[ing]…how much they were willing to do for a 
day’s pay, and conducting a strike “the majority of workers are [not] in agreement with.”85  
 Anti-communism, to be sure, shaped the politics of workers and UAW Local 974 in 
Peoria.  Scarcely the bailiwick of either liberals or conservatives during the Cold War, anti-
communist fervor was nonetheless an important element that the company, its employees, and 
Local 974 shared.  The International was stridently anti-communist, and trumpeted greater 
domestic productivity an effective tool to forestall the growth of communism in third-world 
nations, arguing for an exchange of American finished products for raw materials from resource-
abundant but “under-developed countries.” It framed its assistance to unions and workers abroad, 
such as French miners and Turkish metalworkers, within a stridently anti-communist context, 
justifying international aid for workers as a “positive answer to communist subversion which 
seeks to exploit poverty and social injustice.”86 Local union publications reinforced anti-
communist sentiment through political cartoons.  One such sketch in UAW Local 974 News 
framed patriotism, anti-communism, and freedom in overtly masculine terms by displaying a 
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construction worker direction a crane, with “U.S.A.” marked on its side, toward the completion 
of a building with “A FREE AND PEACEFUL WORLD” written on its roof.  The worker’s face 
expressed urgency in this endeavor, with an ominous storm cloud with the Soviet hammer and 
sickle insignia on its facade hovering over the nearly-completed structure.
87
  
 Despite their history of disagreements, Local 974 and the International shared common 
ground regarding anti-communism.  Local 974 remained hawkish over the Vietnam War 
throughout the 1960s long after other unionists and much of the US had soured on the war. Local 
president “Doc” Harwood, whose son was serving in Vietnam in 1967, penned an open letter to 
his son in the local’s paper assuring him that despite the difficulty inherent in his duties as a 
soldier, Harwood had faith that his son’s experiences would “make you a better American, a 
better man and a more enthusiastic member of the U.A.W. than you can, at this time imagine.”88 
Ralph Aleshire suggested several ideas intended to hasten the end of the Vietnam War, and alter 
the scope of the draft that disproportionately affected working-class men.  He advocated using 
“the most powerful weapons at our disposal”—presumably nuclear weapons—against North 
Vietnam “to destroy as much of their country as possible, if they do not call for an immediate 
peace conference and begin negotiations.” Appearing to target college students who were exempt 
from the draft, Aleshire proposed revising the draft “to include ALL between the ages of 18 and 
26 (who have not already) who hold or are able to hold a civilian job.”89 
Expressions of animosity from 974 members toward America’s youth were 
commonplace, especially excoriating them for a lack of patriotism and a lack of respect for their 
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elders.  Doc Harwood thanked a Bradley University business professor for inviting him to speak 
before a class about unions and collective bargaining in 1969.  Clearly juxtaposing the students 
with the stereotype of the “unwashed hippie” at this time, Harwood’s characterizations of the 
class’s appearance and demeanor place him—and likely others within 974—squarely among 
those at the time who became more politically conservative over the social unrest of the 1960s.  
After the class, Harwood was pleased to report that each of the “40 young men…was properly 
groomed and their manners were above reproach,” with nary a trace of “smart aleck punks in the 
crowd.”  The caliber of young men in the class reassured him that he would “never need to worry 
about America.”90 
In the postwar years, the Local’s leaders participated in labor education programs through 
the Peoria Social Action Institute’s Labor School that fused social justice and anti-communism 
in a curriculum for area activists.  Founded in 1942, the Labor School sought to develop a 
“properly informed citizenry to ward off dangers” such as “communism…a constant threat” 
“from within as well as from beyond” the country.  Classes ranged from labor history to labor 
law to public speaking.  One in particular, “Christian Social Principles,” was taught by 
Monsignor Robert Peters of Peoria’s diocese, and it emphasized topics such as “human dignity,” 
“workers’ right to organize,” and “Communism: what’s wrong with it?”91  While non-
denominational, the School appears to have been designed to appeal to Peoria’s sizeable Catholic 
population.  Yet the Local appealed to other denominations, particularly in its newspaper which 
routinely published religious sermons and articles from local and regional ministers.  These tracts 
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downplayed class differences and conflict, instead emphasizing salvation through personal 
redemption and individual acceptance of Christ as one’s savior.  The overarching message from 
these articles was of an individual’s responsibility for one’s own actions, good or ill, and 
opportunities for success through personal uplift.  As Lisa McGirr has shown, this refrain 
overlapped with social and religious conservatism that arose on the political right in the 1960s 
and 1970s.
92
  
 Locals’ newspapers throughout the 1960s regularly contained advertisements for U.S. 
savings bonds that urged the membership to plug its steadily rising wages back into the federal 
government to sustain programs for “education, family security, retirement and many other 
worthwhile causes.”  The savings bond program was touted as more than a safe investment for 
workers, but as “a multi-billion-dollar insurance policy on our way of life.  Americans who 
wisely invest in these bonds are betting that our system is the best system.”  Images of George 
Washington, the American flag, and men hard at work supplemented the patriotic rhetoric in 
order to invoke nationalistic pride among potential bond buyers.
93
 
The frequency with which locals’ publications addressed issues affecting both veterans 
and soldiers on active duty suggests that patriotic imagery and rhetoric resonated strongly with 
UAW members.  Local 974 routinely published columns offering advice to veterans about 
benefits to which they and their families were entitled, how and whether or not to report income 
and benefits with the Internal Revenue Service, and how to ensure benefits for families of 
deceased veterans. More importantly, the issue of returning veterans was deemed sufficiently 
important for the union and company to negotiate contract clauses allowing workers away on 
                                                          
92
 Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), 240-254. 
93
 See “That’s A Fact,” UAW Local 974 News, November 24, 1964, 5, and May 10, 1967, 3, Unbound Newspapers 
Collection, Box 160, UAW 974 file, ALUA-WSU for two of many examples in locals’ publications.   
100 
 
military duty to continue to accrue seniority as would an active employee.
94
 While statistical 
information is episodic, it is clear that many Cat workers were veterans, while others were on 
active duty during the late 1960s.  Local 974 officials reported in 1970 that “about 1,000” 
workers were on leave, including “Military” and “Medical Leave.”95 
Cat workers served in the military for various reasons.  For many, there was the sense of 
masculine patriotism that Harwood articulated above, with military service acting as a rite of 
passage to manhood for young men. Others such as Jerry Brown figured that being drafted was 
inevitable, and joined to “get it out of the way.”  Some were drafted, including Fred Williams, 
although both he and Brown served in Europe during the Vietnam War. Both Brown and 
Williams cited an inability to afford college as a reason for performing industrial work and 
working-class Americans usually lacked the deferments that college students received, 
subjecting them to the draft and combat duty in Vietnam in disproportionate numbers.
96
 In 
addition to fervent patriotism and anti-communism on the home front, wartime experiences, the 
horrors of combat, and class shaped working-class perspectives on war, the Vietnamese and, for 
those who served in World War Two and Korea, the Japanese and Koreans respectively.   
According to John Martin Willis, soldiers from neighborhoods with median annual 
family incomes below $5,000 were four times likelier to die in combat in Vietnam than those 
from areas with average incomes over $15,000.
97
  They were most often subjected to violence 
which, in Vietnam, reached catastrophic depths due to the unparalleled and often indiscriminate 
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use of ordnance, chemical and biological agents, and the guerrilla tactics the National Liberation 
Front used.  The frustrating style of guerrilla combat, pervasive violence, and a climate of racism 
toward the Vietnamese led to widespread atrocities extending far beyond My Lai in March 1968, 
in which perhaps 500 women, children, and old men were slaughtered.
98
 In sum, those who 
served in war witnessed horrors and violence that most of their friends and family would never 
knew, before returning home.   
Combat in Vietnam produced numerous responses—disillusionment with the government 
and authority generally, depression, prolonged trauma, antiwar resistance, and sympathy for the 
Vietnamese.  It also fomented in some an intense resentment of and racism toward the 
Vietnamese during and after the war, especially those who saw friends die in combat.  Arthur 
Egendorf’s study of returning veterans found that 32 percent of white soldiers admitted negative 
feelings toward the Vietnamese, compared to only 9 percent of black veterans.
99
  It is important 
not to draw conclusions too broadly about war, racism, and veterans, for racism is neither an 
inevitable nor a permanent byproduct of war.  Nor is it innate to working-class soldiers or 
people.  Rather, soldiers, particularly working-class soldiers, were subjected to a form of 
globalization disassociated from everyday society.  This globalization through war experiences 
produced negative results such as resentment and racism, hewed by the horrors of war that, for 
some, etched negative and durable impressions of ‘others’ into their outlook.  Many soldiers who 
returned home to stable jobs in factory towns never left.  In nearly all-white communities in the 
Peoria area, there were not racially diverse populations with which workers could interact.  
Industrial work in stable industries such as heavy machinery thus produced a degree of stability 
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that rooted many workers to their communities and their jobs.  Yet as chapter three will discuss, 
some drew upon their wartime experiences to respond to uncertain socioeconomic times with 
militaristic rhetoric, demonizing the burgeoning industrial rival Japan in ways reminiscent of 
World War Two.  
Conclusion 
For much of the postwar period, the UAW’s focus on contractualism proved a sturdy 
defense against corporate efforts to roll back the union’s power, and an effective means to extract 
concessions from Cat on wages, benefits, and working conditions. Yet it enmeshed local unions 
in a seemingly endless series of contractual battles with the company over issues such as 
productivity, work assignments, and disciplinary actions.  This refracted the union’s focus 
toward resolving local disputes rather than tackling new, distant ones such as the globalization of 
production.  Workers’ strong local and nationalist identities also shaped their strategies and 
perspectives as Cat globalized its operations.  On the one hand, company hiring practices that 
relied upon family ties for new employees fostered an impressive and durable cohesion on the 
shop floor.  This facilitated resistance to speed ups, and protected the elaborate system of job 
classifications that prevented Cat from unilaterally eliminating jobs.  On the other hand, these 
practices excluded many local citizens along racial and gender lines, limiting the potential allies 
locally available to the union.   
Yet global trade soon brought global workforces, creating the potential for competition 
among international workers for industrial labor, and job and subsequently membership losses 
for the UAW.  Crucially, global production at Cat took root as the interests and priorities of the 
UAW International and Local 974 often diverged, with the International grappling with global 
production and the Local enmeshed in local disputes.  Until the early 1980s, local union officials 
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and members frequently clashed with its representatives and the International union itself over 
bargaining strategies and internal politics, producing a climate of distrust between the local and 
International. Moreover, the growth of 974 into a large and effective, but diffuse, local union 
also entrenched an impersonal bureaucracy on the shop floor, limiting its effectiveness. 
During the 1970s, as imports foreign competition challenged the supremacy of American 
companies, the UAW made overtures toward international union solidarity as it reconsidered its 
long-standing belief that productivity gains at home could aid people abroad, slowly shifting 
toward limited protectionism. Ultimately, however, its fell back on the trust it held in traditional 
tactics of solidarity, and a faith in the relatively top-heavy union apparatus that fed and supported 
that approach to labor relations.  How these efforts unfolded, and how they shaped the responses 
of the company, union, and its members in the face of America’s emerging economic crisis 
illustrated the political, philosophical, and organizational weakness of organized labor in the late 
twentieth century. 
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Chapter 3: The Death of Contractualism: Labor Relations, Nationalism, and 
Race in the Era of Deindustrialization 
              
The 1980s were bleak times for American industrial workers. Shuttered factories 
pockmarked their formerly vibrant industrial cities, throwing hundreds of thousands of 
workers—mostly men—out of work and into crowded unemployment offices.  Factory towns in 
Illinois such as Peoria, Decatur, and Aurora, where Caterpillar was one of the largest if not the 
largest employer, were particularly vulnerable, with thousands of layoffs at Caterpillar crippling 
local economies.  People who had held the same jobs for years were not just unemployed, but 
lacked alternatives for good-paying, often unionized factory jobs.  Elegies to desperate working 
people and dying industrial centers became increasingly popular, with Billy Joel’s “Allentown” 
reaching number 17 on the Billboard Hot 100 songs in 1982, and John Cougar Mellencamp’s 
“Rain on the Scarecrow” elevating to number 21 in 1986.1  As consumers, people saw that 
imports ranging from automobiles, electronics, and clothing dominated or made significant 
inroads into the domestic economy, eliminating many American-made goods.
2
  There were many 
reasons why American workers, businesses, and the national economy reeled by the 1980s—
America’s Cold War macroeconomic policy, the rise of foreign competitors, the crippling double 
burden of stagnant economic growth and rising inflation.  Yet for many, who were long 
accustomed to the reliability of steady employment but suddenly wracked by financial insecurity 
and fear about the future, the first target for their blame and resentment was also one of the most 
distant—the Japanese. 
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Enraged by the federal government’s trade policies that failed to curtail the unfair 
“dumping” of “Jap Junk” into America, retiree Bill Martin and laid-off member Jim Bishop 
wrote an open letter to local Congressman Robert Michel. With an intense hostility depicting 
international economic competition as war, Martin and Bishop fumed, “You people in 
Washington are trading our $10 and $12 an hour jobs for jobs below the poverty level…I see our 
homeland being bought up by foreigners…I fought the Japs in WW2 and I know you fought this 
war also. Doesn’t it make you angry at what these Japs are doing to us? If you think I’m coming 
down hard on the Japs, you’re right. I think they are a bunch of two-faced, lying, back-stabbing 
bunch of slimes, and if we turn our backs on them, they’ll cut our throats…They take care of 
their own and the hell with everybody else…Remember, they were in our Congress talking peace 
while they were bombing Pearl Harbor.”3   
Although this slur-laden letter was the most overtly hostile and militaristic piece that 
Local 974 News published at this time, it was far from the only one to discuss trade policy, 
international competition, Japan, or foreigners in general.  In fact, such pieces routinely appeared 
within the monthly newspaper’s pages, often several in an issue during the mid-1980s.  Articles 
emphasizing foreign competition, the need to reassert the dominance of American 
manufacturing, and anti-Japanese sentiment became more numerous at the same time that the 
UAW became more conciliatory toward Caterpillar and auto companies.  Local 974 News 
stressed these themes at the same time that the union and Caterpillar implemented the Employee 
Satisfaction Process (ESP), a joint labor-management program designed to improve the 
company’s competitive position, and resolve workplace conflicts without strikes or class-infused 
animosity.  
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  This signaled a decisive shift in labor relations between the UAW and Caterpillar, with 
each side touting ESP as a new and effective way to peacefully and jointly solve problems on the 
job.  Ever since Caterpillar workers voted to join the UAW in 1948, relations between the union 
and the company had contentious at best, and ornery and militant at worst. The union routinely 
struck at Caterpillar with the expiration of every contract, including a 205-day strike in 1982-83 
that until then had been the longest ever in the industry.  Relations on the shop floor between 
workers and their immediate supervisors were frequently hostile, for years punctuated by heated 
arguments and wildcat strikes.  What caused these two long-standing combatants to join forces 
and form collaborative, alternative work groups?  What effects did joint labor-management, or 
“jointness,” programs have on the workers and institutions involved at the company? 
This chapter examines the shifting conditions and fortunes for working-class people in 
Caterpillar factories, and the towns in which they operated, during an era of tremendous 
socioeconomic flux.  It argues that a convergence of fundamental changes in political economy, 
production strategies, shop floor life, and internal union politics in the 1970s and 1980s 
drastically undermined the Union’s capacity to resist Caterpillar’s concessionary demands of the 
1990s. In particular, economic competition between it and its ascendant Japanese rival Komatsu, 
and the US and Japan in general, augmented workers’ and companies’ fears of America’s 
economic decline in the late twentieth century. Caterpillar’s full-scale adoption of lean 
production strategies such as downsizing, automation, and employee-involvement programs 
intersected with workers’ fears of unemployment, deep-seated nationalism, frustrations with 
industrial life and stale bureaucratic unionism, and the rise of business-friendly leaders within the 
UAW.  This confluence of aggressive corporate strategies, divisions among workers, 
nationalism, and union accommodation toppled essential elements of the contractualist 
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scaffolding that had protected workers, leaving the UAW divided, isolated, and vulnerable well 
before doing battle in the 1990s.  The shop floor emerges as a vital site where class and national 
identities were formed and renegotiated as workers became increasingly enmeshed in global 
production and competition, and confronted with deindustrialization, in the late twentieth 
century.  
 Competition and Crisis at Cat: The Challenge of Komatsu 
Until the end of the 1970s, as American companies in various industries lost both market 
share and profits while imports from foreign-owned companies rose, Caterpillar enjoyed 
prolonged profitability from its dominant global market share among the world’s biggest 
manufacturers of earth-moving equipment.  Long concerned about competition with foreign 
firms, the company nonetheless consistently sold more than half the total amount of earthmoving 
machinery purchased worldwide in the 1970s even as global demand for earth-moving 
equipment doubled.
4
  By the end of the decade, however, Japanese manufacturer Komatsu 
emerged as Caterpillar’s primary competitor in the industry—a shift indicating a growing trend 
in industries American companies had long dominated, the specter of which Caterpillar and 
American public alike found threatening.   
Since it first began operations in 1921, Komatsu was a small business relative to other 
earthmoving machinery companies such as Caterpillar, International Harvester, J.I. Case, 
Bucyrus Erie, and others.  With most of its sales in Japan, Komatsu found expansion difficult for 
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two main reasons—the pre-eminent position of its main competitors in most of the world, and 
the poor quality of its own products. Yet its fortunes changed for the better in 1963, when 
Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Investment (MITI) opened the earthmoving industry 
up to foreign investment.  While MITI continued tariff protections for Japan’s burgeoning auto 
and electronics industries, it did not consider earthmoving a field in which the nation’s 
businesses held a long-term advantage over its foreign rivals. This decision to allow foreign 
investment provided tremendous capital and technological benefits to Komatsu, which quickly 
formed licensing agreements with American manufacturers International Harvester, Cummins, 
and Bucyrus Erie in product lines in which Caterpillar had a strong or the dominant share.
5
  
Harvester had developed good technology for its line of wheel loaders, which are small to large-
sized tractors that run on wheels instead of tractor tracks, thus sacrificing some reliability in 
adverse conditions in favor of greater speed and maneuverability.  Cummins was a leader in 
diesel engines generally used in heavy machinery. Bucyrus Erie had developed reliable 
excavators, which are small to large scoopers that remove considerable amounts of earth at a 
time, often for loading onto large trucks. Although these licensing agreements restricted 
Komatsu’s capacity to export products built with licensed technologies to the US for seventeen 
years, they did allow the company to dominate Japan’s domestic market despite Caterpillar’s 
presence through a licensing agreement with Mitsubishi.  Komatsu developed its first research 
and development department in 1966 to study and hone the application of its electrical 
engineering developments.  By the mid-1970s, it had penetrated markets in Europe, the Middle 
East, and even North America much as Caterpillar had, by creating subsidiaries abroad that 
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allowed the company to circumvent tariff payments.
6
  Within the earthmoving industry, Komatsu 
had become a force to be reckoned with. 
It did so in large part by adopting lean production strategies.  Fundamental to lean 
production were the principles of maximizing productivity with the fewest possible people, and 
the Total Quality Control (TQC) concept.  TQC combined product quality and cost efficiency in 
all facets of manufacturing, from the acquisition of high-quality raw materials and parts to the 
elimination of product and performance flaws, including in clerical work and financial 
bookkeeping.
7
  By improving the quality of its products and selling them more cheaply than its 
rivals, in part because of wage levels that were fifty-five percent of those of Caterpillar workers 
but also because of the company’s overarching focus on continually reducing costs, Komatsu 
increased its sales to the Middle East, Asia and Latin America—regions in which Caterpillar had 
long dominated.
8
 As it became an industry power, Komatsu’s long-term goals shifted from 
sustained growth to direct competition that it neatly summarized with the combative slogan, 
“Maru-C,” or “Encircle Caterpillar.”9  Exports accounted for fifty-five percent of Komatsu’s 
total sales by 1975, and between 1971 and 1980, the firm’s total sales more than doubled, 
increasing its share of world industry sales from ten percent to over fifteen percent in the 
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process.
10
 As a result, Komatsu grew rapidly and by 1984 had gained fully one-fourth of global 
heavy machinery sales.   
Beginning in 1980, worldwide demand for earthmoving equipment had dramatically 
slowed, bringing the recession that had wracked other industries to earthmoving as well.  Many 
of the largest industrialized nations, including the US, were in the midst of a deep recession.  As 
oil prices rose in the 1970s, demand in these nations declined, and the recession rippled to 
encompass oil-rich nations as well.  Smaller industrialized nations faced financial difficulties as 
large international banks restricted lending policies that had fueled both the growth of these 
nations, and the earthmoving equipment industry, throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
11
 This 
downturn significantly reduced Caterpillar’s share of industry sales from just over fifty-three 
percent in 1980 to forty-three percent in 1984, bringing staggering annual losses to Caterpillar 
for three straight years starting in 1982.
12
  
With the inception of its sales slump in 1980, the company conducted widespread layoffs 
that disproportionately affected its largely unionized U.S. workforce as it lost about $1 billion 
between 1982 and 1984.  Massive job cuts continued through 1984 as the number of unemployed 
Caterpillar workers rose to over 30,000, two-thirds of whom were UAW members.
13
 Among 
American Ag-imp companies in December 1982, more workers were actually unemployed than 
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working.
14
  Combined with the closings of other area businesses such as Hiram Walker, Pabst 
Brewery, and truck parts supplier WABCO, unemployment figures in October 1982 ballooned to 
19.2 percent in Peoria.   In Decatur, another city in which the company was and remains the 
largest employer, the jobless rate hit 18.9 percent in October 1982 as GE, Essex Wire, engine 
manufacturer Borg-Warner, and other plants closed. Even long-term employees at Caterpillar 
with more than ten years seniority were laid off for extended periods of time.
15
 
The extraordinary unemployment figures for the cities of Peoria and Decatur, nearly 
double the national rate of 10.4 percent, illustrate the dire consequences that cities and workers 
faced when reliant upon a primary employer.
16
 Even though they were represented by 
Republican House minority leader Bob Michel, Peoria and Decatur lacked the political clout to 
draw big businesses and public works projects to replace the growing number of shuttered 
factories.  It was only in 1976 that an expressway linked Decatur, a medium-sized city of 94,600, 
to Champaign to the east and Springfield, the capital of Illinois, to the west.  Yet soon after a 
major highway finally linked it to other metropolitan centers around the state, Decatur found its 
largest employers leaving town on it. 
The rapid onset of deindustrialization on Peoria and Decatur left few options for workers.  
Many workers had secured good-paying industrial jobs at Caterpillar and elsewhere through 
connections with relatives and friends already employed there, who put in a good word for them 
with a supervisor.  Even those who lacked a network of kin and friends who could lobby for a 
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job on their behalf described moving with relative ease from one industrial job to another—until 
they began working at Caterpillar.
17
  
One Decatur-area businessman described the good fortune of being hired at the company 
in more celestial terms: “When you get a job out there, you feel like you’ve died and gone to 
heaven.”18 These jobs paid much better than other area employers, even unionized ones, creating 
a “blue-collar elite” of primarily white male workers in the postwar era who could afford a 
house, a car, myriad consumer items, send their children to college, and save some money for the 
future.  This nurtured a remarkable degree of social cohesion for industrial workers, many of 
whom described living in or around Peoria for most of their lives. Even those from outside the 
Peoria area were willing to drive considerable distances to work at Caterpillar and, with such a 
good job, could afford to do so.  
When the company laid off thousands of workers, many waited months and in some 
cases years to be called back. In part, this was because their previous experiences with layoffs 
indicated that they would eventually return to work, since layoffs had at times been seasonal or 
short-term.  Yet the layoffs of the 1980s were different.  The wave of plant closings intensified 
competition for what good jobs remained.  As this chapter will later discuss, Caterpillar also 
called back far fewer laid-off workers than before as it reorganized its production lines and 
implementing new, automated technologies to drastically reduce the number of assembly-line 
workers needed for production. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, more than rampant unemployment wracked the 
nation’s consciousness and status as a superpower and leader of the free world.  Coming on the 
heels of America’s ignominious withdrawal from the war in Vietnam in 1973, the Watergate 
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scandal toppled President Richard Nixon in August 1974, forcing for the first time in American 
history the resignation of a sitting president.  Particularly for hawkish Americans, the overthrow 
of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in the fall of 1979 re-ignited Cold War discourse of a 
potential “domino effect,” this time much closer to America’s borders than Vietnam.19 At the end 
of 1979, Americans also saw fifty-three Americans taken hostage from the American embassy in 
Tehran, Iran in retaliation for America’s admitting its long-standing ally, the deposed Shah of 
Iran, for medical treatment.  Nightly news broadcasts counted the number of days the hostages 
spent held in Iran, simultaneously tabulating the frustrations of the seemingly helpless Carter 
administration and American public.  In central Asia, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, 
contributing to already heightened Cold War tensions in the U.S. and prompting President Carter 
to announce America’s boycott of the Moscow Summer Olympics in 1980.20 In the span of 
several years, many Americans felt that their national prestige and patriotic pride had taken 
several strong body blows, exacerbating a growing sense that the United States—as the pre-
eminent military and economic power on earth—was in decline. 
With the election of former California governor and ardent cold warrior Ronald Reagan 
to the presidency in 1980, the nation experienced an upsurge in patriotic pride that channeled the 
nation’s irascible mood of the late 1970s into a renewed fervor for the Cold War, and a 
demonizing of perceived national enemies.  Calling the Soviet Union the “evil empire,” Reagan 
stoked the patriotic passions that millions of Americans already held, especially among the ranks 
of the working class who, dismayed by high unemployment, inflation, and the image of 
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American foreign-policy weakness under President Carter, helped to elect Reagan in convincing 
fashion.
21
  
Reagan had many supporters within the ranks of the UAW.  While many letters to UAW 
Solidarity criticized Reagan’s economic policies and stances toward unions, particularly after his 
firing of PATCO workers in August 1981, others railed against the UAW for its critical stances 
toward Reagan.  One Mrs. Roy Maystead, the wife of a UAW retiree, stated in March 1982, “I 
get sick to my stomach when I read your newspaper.  All the complaining!  We have a president 
who is really trying to improve the conditions in our country and the people should give him 
back 100 percent.  Give President Reagan a chance!  Be positive!”  Another, from Brenda Boyd 
of Tulsa Oklahoma, took UAW Solidarity to task for what she considered to be the paper’s bias 
toward the 1984 Democratic presidential ticket of Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro.  “All I 
am saying is your journalism on Mondale vs. Reagan was inappropriate.  Too much space [was] 
devoted to it, too [much was] biased…I feel like I speak for the majority since Reagan won by a 
landslide.”22   
Reagan received significant support in and around the Peoria area, including within Local 
974.  Jim O’Connor, a retired worker who was union president from 1981 to 1983 and later a 
UAW area representative, commented in 1982 that many Local 974 members “were going 
around wearing Reagan buttons,” and estimated that “Reagan got eight out of ten” votes from his 
membership.
23
  While these estimates may seem high, Peoria, Tazewell, and Woodford counties 
that surround the Peoria metropolitan area had long been Republican strongholds.  Rarely did 
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Democratic presidential candidates carry these primarily agricultural, rural counties.
24
 
Particularly with Reagan, many were drawn to his positive, patriotic rhetoric and aggressive 
foreign-policy positions. Local 974 union member Rich Corbin, while critical of what he termed 
Reagan’s “anti-unionism,” defended Reagan’s tough stance toward the Soviet Union, stating, 
“The one good thing that you can say about Reagan was he didn’t take any shit from the 
Soviets.”25 Reagan’s attacks on “big government” and social policies such as welfare, and 
defense of individualism and strength as essential facets of an American character, likely 
appealed to many male workers in an era of economic insecurity.
26
 
Yet despite the support he received from blue-collar workers and some unions in 1980, 
Reagan was far from a pro-union president.  His permanent replacement of PATCO’s striking air 
traffic controllers in August 1981 sent a clear signal to big business and organized labor alike 
that Reagan stood staunchly beside businesses, not workers.  Reagan’s decimation of the 
PATCO strike set off a tidal wave of company-initiated strikes and lockouts, forcing unions to 
choose between the rock of concessions and the hard place of losing not just fights with 
companies, but also their memberships.  The new labor-relations climate that Reagan’s anti-
union offensive encouraged increasingly meant that unions that lost strikes and lockouts also lost 
representation rights, with companies often choosing not to recognize defeated unions.
27
 
Amidst its financial losses and Reagan’s business-friendly climate, Caterpillar used the 
1982 contract negotiations with the UAW to press for steep concessions.  These included 
reductions in wages and cost-of-living allowances pegged to inflation, fewer paid holidays, 
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increased mandatory overtime, automatic dismissal for workers missing more than twenty 
percent of work time, and collapsing job classifications that protected workers from losing their 
jobs from changes to work processes and prevented the company from ignoring workers’ 
seniority in the event of layoffs and job transfers.  O’Connor termed the company’s hard 
bargaining a “company-engineered strike,” resulting in Local 974 and other UAW locals to strike 
the company for 205 days—the longest strike until that point by the UAW against any American 
multi-plant employer.  The two sides battled to a stalemate, with the UAW agreeing to a wage 
freeze and to reduce the number of job classifications, and the company agreeing to institute a 
jointly run apprenticeship program expanding access to skilled trades.
28
  
The strike took a toll on strikers and Peorians alike.  UAW members received only $65 
per week in strike benefits, a far cry from the average wage of $12 per hour they earned while 
working.  The prolonged strike and financial sacrifices UAW members made prompted them to 
ratify the company’s offer of a wage freeze and reduced job classifications—against the advice 
of the bargaining committee. The 1982-83 strike was also emblematic of the national trend that 
began in the early 1980s.  With unions leery of striking and being permanently replaced, the 
number of strikes involving 1,000 or more workers fell dramatically through the 1980s.  Strikes 
also became longer battles of attrition, with each side trying to outlast the other and force it to 
concede in key demands.
29
 In a city such as Peoria plagued by skyrocketing unemployment, the 
long strike angered local residents, who on the whole were more concerned about the impact of a 
strike on the community than they were about the reasons for the strike—Caterpillar’s demands 
for deep concessions.  “I think it’s foolish to strike the way things are,” asserted Larry Benedict, 
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a machine operator laid off in 1982.
30
  Clothing-store owner Roger Johnson contended that 
“Peoria had enough problems prior to the strike.  The strike just made it more difficult.”  When 
the next round of negotiations came in 1986, Peoria mayor Jim Maloof worried that another 
strike would occur.  “We’re still suffering from the last strike three years ago,” he said.  “No one 
has forgotten it because it devastated this community.”31   
The new era of economic insecurity threatened contractualism from outside, but it also 
faced problems from within. Despite significant degrees of control that the UAW exerted at 
Caterpillar, maintaining those gains was a constant struggle against management. As chapter 2 
discussed, a labor-management environment existed in which management held and exercised 
considerable power regarding the organization and pace of production in ways that used 
workers’ knowledge while often denying them control over, input in, and satisfaction from their 
work. For many Caterpillar workers, interactions with supervisors were daily reminders that, 
despite efforts to create a “more mature relationship between [the] Union and the Company,” 
issues of power and authority continually pervaded shop-floor and labor relations.
32
 
Destruction from Without, Erosion from Within: Jointness at Caterpillar  
Faced with mounting losses and an audacious challenge from Komatsu, Caterpillar 
decided that to beat back the threat to its industrial pre-eminence from the Japanese, it had to join 
them in implementing streamlined production processes and revamping its relationship with its 
workforce and the UAW along more favorable terms to the company. Throughout its factories 
worldwide but focused particularly on its American operations, it initiated two related programs 
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that were standard features of lean production and were designed to curtail labor and production 
costs, increase production efficiency, and orient its American workers toward company-centered 
goals.  It introduced the first, its “Plant With a Future (PWAF, pronounced “pea-waff”)” 
program, in 1986 after three years of internal studies.  Modeled after production techniques in 
Japanese industry, it was a massive, expensive and in some ways revolutionary endeavor for 
Caterpillar that cost the company nearly $2 billion to redesign its assembly lines, and procure the 
latest computer and robotic equipment.
33
   
The second, the Employee Satisfaction Process—or ESP—was a joint labor-management 
program that the two sides touted as a way to humanize industrial work and the workplace, 
improve worker-management communication, and foster cooperation on production issues. In 
practice, it also functioned to break down long-standing bonds of union solidarity by fostering an 
alternative, more business-oriented group consciousness. Although labor-management programs 
had long been commonplace in Japan and had proliferated between the UAW and American auto 
makers in the previous decade, they represented a drastic change from the antagonistic, 
combative relationship between the union, its members, and the company for the previous three 
decades.  Originating in the negotiations that settled the epic 1982-83 strike, ESP lay dormant 
until after the 1986 contract negotiations—the exact period when the factory overhaul began in 
earnest.
34
 
PWAF’s origins reflect the company’s international scope: a French manager of 
Caterpillar’s cavernous factory in Belgium, Pierre Guerindon, conceived the plan with other 
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plant managers and vice-presidents, and subsequently brought company managers on tours of 
factories in Europe and Japan.  These were not just the company’s plants, but also those of 
Japanese auto manufacturers such as Honda and Toyota from whom Caterpillar learned about 
lean production.
35
  The company drew upon the diverse experiences of its mid-level managers, 
who frequently rotated between other factories throughout the world where unions were either 
nonexistent or in weaker positions than their American counterparts, to formulate and implement 
its plan. For example, James Despain, who became the general manager of the company’s Track-
Type Tractor Division in East Peoria, spent considerable time in Japan and Mexico beginning in 
the early 1970s.
36
 
The fundamental structure and psychology underpinning PWAF differentiated it from the 
assembly line system that had for decades shaped work and people’s identities.  The company 
drastically altered its production and assembly systems by implementing innovative lean 
production techniques that utilized fewer people to manufacture products, and also organized 
them into different groups from before.  This began with a shift from a traditional mass 
production assembly line system to a “cell production” system utilizing “just-in-time” strategies, 
both of which were central to lean production.  
Within mass production assembly lines at Caterpillar, several production lines existed in 
which parts and components (groups of pre-assembled parts) shifted between departments.  This 
often meant that, as a particular machine such as a tractor was assembled, the parts for that 
tractor moved back and forth across the cavernous shop floor, consuming considerable time. It 
also meant that parts and components, most of which were made on-site, sat in storage until 
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needed for assembly, using considerable space and costing the company money since storage 
does not add value to the product.   
Additionally, companies employing mass production strived for cost efficiency by 
breaking down as many jobs as possible into predetermined, routinized tasks.  Workers were 
required to perform certain duties in a certain order, with the repetition of these tasks in theory 
maximizing cost efficiency by having that worker perform particular tasks—and no more—to 
make as many items for the lowest cost attainable. As the UAW gained strength at Caterpillar, it 
successfully negotiated strict job descriptions stipulating that workers could perform particular 
tasks and not others.  By the late 1950s, UAW contracts with Caterpillar identified no fewer than 
524 job classifications, accompanied by a paragraph describing in general terms the 
responsibilities workers had for each one.
37
   
With PWAF the company shed this production system in favor of a “just-in-time” (JIT) 
manufacturing strategy.  Differing from mass production strategies in several ways, “just-in-
time” production was tailored not to maximize the amount of goods assembled but to minimize 
the amount of time, space, personnel, and parts required to assemble them. This meant, first of 
all, organizing production in a more streamlined fashion.  Instead of making many excess parts 
that would then move into storage until needed, JIT kept smaller stocks of parts on hand to be 
delivered only when ready for assembly.  This reduced the cost of production and storage, as 
well as the storage space required for truncated inventories.  
Seeking to trim its supplier costs by over $1 billion, JIT also meant that the company 
outsourced parts production to facilities around the world at the same time that it narrowed its 
base of suppliers, squeezing out companies that could not guarantee low-cost parts delivered 
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within days.
38
 A long-time innovator in the use of robotics for production, Caterpillar rapidly 
automated its factories, incorporating robots for welding and materials handling and delivery.
39
 
Computers with fully integrated software on the shop floor showed workers in detail where to 
place parts, while providing the company with the capability to track production worldwide.
40
  
The shift to lean production via PWAF involved altering more than production systems.  
It required changing the psychology of its workforce.  Caterpillar sought to instill in workers 
senses of competitiveness and individuality by reorganizing workers into smaller groups called 
cells instead of departments.  Comprised of two to six workers, the cell system disrupted group 
dynamics that came from workers laboring in department with others performing the same jobs. 
The company touted cells as groups in which workers would perform multiple jobs, thus 
enhancing their skills and breaking up the monotony of industrial life.  While this transpired to 
some degree, cell production also eliminated jobs, with fewer workers assigned to do more jobs 
and producing the same amount that used to require more employees.  Yet this added 
responsibility came with degrees of independence and decision-making power that some workers 
appreciated.  Some cell workers scheduled their own production, and also made parts from 
beginning to end.  For Mike Clayton, a cell worker in East Peoria, this gave him “a lot more 
pride” than simply doing one job over and over again. He embraced the company’s new cost-
consciousness with aplomb, referring to his production cell as “my own small business right 
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here.”41 With cell production, the company encouraged workers to think of themselves as “cell 
proprietors,” as if they were independent entrepreneurs who had their own “little business right 
here on the factory floor,” instead of factory workers.42 
 As Caterpillar altered the landscape of the shop floor and pushed for changes in the 
labor-relations system in the late 1980s, it found that many people—union officers and rank-and-
file members alike—were amenable to change.  While some accepted change out of fear of the 
unemployment line and to preserve their jobs, others embraced new and friendlier behavior from 
managers who sought, rather than ignored, their input.  Corporate insistence that new 
technologies and new labor-relations programs would recognize and enhance workers’ skills and 
knowledge found many workers eager to accept fundamental changes—and make concessions—
particularly in a period characterized by intense international competition. 
However, PWAF as a lean production system ushered in what Mike Parker and Jane 
Slaughter have termed “management by stress,” increasing responsibilities and productivity 
while relying on fewer workers. Emphasizing worker responsibility for cost efficiency, 
historically the prerogative and responsibility of management, PWAF could become what Parker 
and Slaughter dubbed “super-Taylorism,” in which workers were enlisted to monitor themselves, 
directly perpetuating their own obsolescence.
43
 With company appeals to their pride, some 
workers needed little cajoling to seize the initiative and increase productivity, even if it meant 
they had to work harder and stay busier than before.  Frustrated by the wide space between the 
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transmission-manufacturing machines he operated, Brent Scalf had management move the 
machines closer together to minimize the walking distance and down time.  Combined with a 
machine change that sped up the grinding process he also operated, Scalf’s production increased 
fifty-five percent after his job was re-timed.  This saved Cat from needing new grinding 
machines, saving the company thousands of dollars. Scalf, meanwhile, earned no extra wages as 
a result of his suggestion to move his machines closer together.
44
   
Yet such alterations to work processes were rationalized as serving the greater good of 
improving Caterpillar’s competitive position by improving productivity and controlling costs.  
PWAF’s partner program, ESP, instilled the importance of teamwork between workers and 
management in the era of competition and cost consciousness.  It blurred the lines between union 
and management, cultivating a broader conception of belonging than the adversarialism that 
characterized union-management squabbling. No longer referred to as employees and 
management, “team members” volunteering for the ESP program received extensive training, 
typically “16 to 20 hours of classroom training at four hours per day.”  In these sessions, ESP 
groups participated in exercises to hone listening skills and, more importantly, to break down the 
traditional barriers between unionized workers and supervisors.
45
  Union leaders often served as 
coordinators, who themselves would receive further training and would in turn organize and train 
others as facilitators and form additional groups.
46
 These groups, or teams, met for an hour each 
week, alleviating workers from the rigors of factory life to discuss job-related problems and 
issues, as well as ways to improve production and cost efficiency. 
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For ESP to function effectively, its members had to foster an atmosphere of trust between 
union members and management where little, if any, had existed before. Participants 
acknowledged overcoming levels of suspicion when they first joined ESP teams.  Local 974 
member Bill Crowden admitted early on, “I figured I was getting a bill of goods.  You have to 
get over that obstacle of distrust.  It won’t happen overnight, but once people see this process as 
advantageous, it will happen.”47  Other echoed Crowden’s assessment of ESP.  Having worked 
for five months with other union members and management in the “Engineering Craftsmen” 
team to redesign the Central Shop in a section of Caterpillar’s East Peoria factory, union 
millwright Larry Schatz declared, “There are a lot of detractors on both sides, management and 
union, but the bottom line is that each team is made up of individuals and the only format a voice 
can be heard in is as a team member…I realize not everyone will join, but they’re fools if they 
don’t.  They truly are.”  Sam Britton, a union tinner for twenty years and fellow member of 
Engineering Craftsmen, concurred.  “Not only are you going to get better working conditions 
[through ESP], you’re going to get the harmonious relationship of working with company and 
union people.”48 
ESP encouraged union officials, members, and management to think as integrated units 
that would reduce the number of and need for grievances, and enhance job security through cost 
savings, even adopting a variety of group names to convey the positive, team-oriented approach 
to the challenge that competition presented them.
49
  Within a few months that ESP groups started 
in 1987, scores of teams involving several hundred workers all over Caterpillar factories.  
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The advent of lean production strategies and jointness coincided with changes in 
leadership and labor-relations strategy at the local and International levels.  Tony Green, a young 
but experienced shop-floor representative in Mossville, won the Local 974 presidency in 1984 
with the promise to defend workers’ interests while improving the Local’s historically 
tempestuous relationship with the company after the 205-day strike of 1982-1983.  The long 
strike convinced many members and all six candidates for Local 974 president in 1984 that a 
new, more moderate tone in labor relations was necessary for the Union.
50
  
While recognizing the “Catch-22” in which the union found itself—concerned about 
economic hardship and new technology eliminating jobs but also seeking to help “keep Cat 
#1”—Green worked intensely to improve the union’s relationship with the company by 
encouraging the rank and file to help make the company more competitive by participating in 
ESP. Green also publicized the union’s efforts at cultivating better labor relations with the 
company by throwing out the first pitch at a Peoria Chiefs minor league baseball game with 
company president Bob Gilmore, touring auto plants where employee-involvement programs 
existed, and touting the quality of Caterpillar products to potential buyers at the 1987 Con-
Expo.
51
 
During this period of crisis for the UAW, the Union became more willing to 
accommodate corporate objectives in order to ensure job security. It facilitated the shift to lean 
production and the formation of work cells by agreeing to drastic reductions in the number of 
classifications in the 1983 and 1986 negotiations, which by this time numbered 84 instead of the 
524 job classifications that existed in the late 1950s.  Cells allowed the company to use 
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employees more “flexibly.” This entailed minimizing the jobs outside one’s own into which he 
or she could bump if laid off, resulting in less senior people working, often with overtime, while 
more senior people were laid off.
52
 But for those who still held jobs, negotiations in 1986 and 
1988 yielded guarantees protecting nearly all active workers from layoffs throughout the length 
of the contracts, while also containing letters of agreement that made it policy to reduce the 
number of grievances by developing “a constructive relationship based on trust and respect.”53 
Although the UAW still filed grievances when disputes arose, it appeared the era of enmity 
between the union and company was waning. 
However, in the event that future disputes might occur, the company persuaded the UAW 
to yield crucial contractual ground by voting to allow workers at Morton Parts, a vital parts 
manufacturing and distribution center near Peoria that serviced Caterpillar plants and dealers 
worldwide, to work 120 days after the expiration of the contract—even if the UAW were on 
strike.
54
 The union’s trust in Caterpillar’s promise of more jobs to offset layoffs, and in the new 
system of “trust and respect,” would later provide the company with a significant advantage 
during the long strikes of the 1990s by continuing to provide important replacement parts to 
customers that, had the UAW not made this agreement, would have otherwise been extremely 
difficult to accomplish.
55
 At the time, the UAW believed that the promise of jobs for union 
members outweighed the potential for a strike that had not occurred for several years. 
In the late 1980s, the possibility of a strike seemed remote with two consecutive 
contracts, in 1986 and 1988, settled without a strike for the first time ever between the UAW and 
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Caterpillar.  The union’s espousal of ESP recast its own adversarial relationship with 
management as obstructionist and archaic behavior in a competitive era that required new 
approaches to problems. ESP leaders stated that “ESP isn’t for everyone.  If you can’t listen to 
other people’s ideas or suggestions or be able to give or take you probably wouldn’t be able to 
work within a [ESP] group.”56 This appealed to significant numbers of workers who had endured 
strikes and harsh managers, and now felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns about 
work, and who may have felt that they previously lacked the means to do so within their own 
union organization.  
Employees increasingly shared their detailed knowledge of their machines and the 
production process with managers who, unlike before, were willing to listen to their ideas.  Cost 
savings that these information-sharing programs generated through smoother tracking, transfer 
and storage of materials, and facilitating employee cross-training on different jobs, confirmed in 
its participants the effectiveness of the programs, helped return Caterpillar to profitability, and 
provided a resurgent sense of fulfillment and pride through industrial work.
57
  
Within the International leadership, the purpose and targets of employee-involvement had 
changed by the 1980s as rampant unemployment battered the auto industry, slashing UAW 
membership nearly in half.
58
  Drawing upon the efforts of such businesses as IBM, AT&T, 
Polaroid, and General Mills in the early 1970s to lessen their authoritarian managerial styles, 
UAW vice-president Irving Bluestone helped to form Quality of Work Life (QWL) programs to 
solve workplace problems that hindered workers’ productivity, lowered their morale, and 
challenged the authority of the union and companies alike. The rank and-file rebellion at GM’s 
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Lordstown, Ohio plant in 1971 and 1972 particularly worried UAW leaders.  Lordstown 
workers, especially the many young workers under 25 who had served in Vietnam, bristled at the 
brutal assembly line pace and the monotony that their highly specialized, repetitive jobs 
produced.  High wages hardly offset these conditions, resulting in high absenteeism rates, 
frequent sabotage, alcoholism, and a series of strikes that the International struggled to tamp 
down.
59
  Bluestone sought to improve the working environment and productivity in auto by 
reducing drug and alcohol abuse through counseling programs, making work more rewarding by 
increasing cross-training in other jobs, and infusing workers’ voices into production issues. Yet 
employee involvement or jointness by the mid-1980s under Bluestone’s replacement Donald 
Ephlin, became a program to restore corporate America’s industrial dominance by improving 
America’s competitiveness against Japanese rivals.60 Ephlin averred in militaristic rhetoric that 
the role of unions in the 1980s was to “reverse the rapid decline of America’s manufacturing 
industries and help restore US competitiveness where it counts, in the battle for markets and 
jobs.”61  Such language closely paralleled that of business leaders, including Caterpillar president 
Peter Donis. “The timing of the Japanese onslaught couldn’t have been worse,” Donis declared 
about Komatsu’s market growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  “Just as they launched their 
attack, the worldwide construction equipment market collapsed.”62 
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Yet the International’s embrace of jointness did not occur without contention within its 
ranks. Debates about jointness worked their way into the pages of UAW Solidarity in the mid-
1980s around the same time that Caterpillar and UAW had embarked on their own effort at shop-
floor cooperation.  In its publication, the International heralded the GM-Toyota joint venture in 
Fremont, California that re-opened a closed GM factory in 1985 as “A New Kind of Workplace” 
where UAW members wanted “the good feelings to last.”  One letter to the editor, from Local 
731 member Ed Hugo, dismissed any “correlation between Quality of Work Life [QWL, UAW-
GM’s version of ESP] and concessions and plant closings, while urging fellow UAW members 
to be patient with QWL-style programs in order to “work toward changing attitudes and working 
conditions that will hopefully make us more competitive.” Other letters expressed skepticism or 
outright hostility toward jointness as the union turning its back on its members’ class position 
and its own militant heritage.  Ralph Holbrook of Local 95 saw QWL as a way “to destroy the 
union from within…in 20 years, I have never seen our members so divided as they are now.  
People say…we can do without a union and union dues.  Wow!” Former Fremont GM worker 
admonished the UAW and fellow members to “be realistic.  We are workers, not owners.  Our 
interests are not the same.  Be vigilant, protect our rights.”63 
Others who opposed the UAW’s lurch toward cooperation with companies through 
jointness found themselves treated as enemies of the UAW one-party bureaucracy.  Retired 
International representative Jerry Tucker ran afoul of the UAW leadership in the 1980s through 
his staunch opposition to labor-management cooperation, and his innovative in-plant tactics that 
generated rank-and-file participation to counter companies’ drive for concessions.  The union 
consistently disavowed itself of Tucker’s attempt to rejuvenate adversarial unionism through in-
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plant strategies, such as slow-downs, that Tucker termed “running the plant backwards.”  
Contrary to the concessions that the UAW granted to auto companies in 1978 and 1979, and the 
traditional strike tactics that it on occasion continued to perform in the 1980s, Tucker’s savvy 
schemes enlisted the support of rank-and-file members for their success.  Utilizing their superior 
knowledge of their jobs, the various tasks that workers performed, and their awareness of 
production routines, patterns and deadlines, Tucker instilled confidence in workers that new 
tactics could prove successful, while also honing their ability to disrupt work at the point of 
production—the shop floor—rather than outside the factory gates on strike.  Tucker and the 
workers whom he represented in contract negotiations developed and implemented in-plant 
tactics in the early to mid-1980s, when companies adopted aggressive stances toward unions in 
negotiations, attempting to gain concessions either through hard posturing during bargaining, 
pushing unions out on strike when companies became increasingly willing to replace them, or 
both.
64
 
Tucker’s candidacies in 1986 and 1989 for the head of UAW’s sprawling Region 5 in the 
Midwest resulted in extremely close elections. Although Tucker lost the first, the result was 
overturned by an NLRB decision and he won a make-up election.  The UAW bureaucracy red-
baited and race-baited Tucker and his supporters in the New Directions Movement, which was a 
dissident anti-concession faction formed in the late 1980s. Tucker, who is white and has a wife 
who is African American, was accused of having an adulterous relationship with another Black 
woman, and his multi-racial supporters were apparently pelted with racist epithets.  Roy Wyse, 
Tucker’s opponent in 1989, stated that his first act as director of Region 5 would be to “take 
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down the Communist flag from in front of the Region 5 headquarters.”65 The responses to 
Tucker’s tactics, indeed to his very candidacy for union office, exemplified the elasticity and 
prevalence of ‘othering’ within the UAW.  Tucker’s efforts to democratize the UAW, to defend 
union members against concessions and the precarious class position that resulted, elicited ad 
hominem attacks and invocations of “un-American” nationalist imagery. 
In the course of conducting character assassinations on Tucker and his supporters, the 
UAW felled more than his candidacy for Region 5.  According to Tucker, the UAW leadership 
also attacked Victor Reuther, former UAW vice-president, union co-founder and brother of 
former UAW president Walter Reuther, for his support of Tucker’s candidacy, opposition to 
UAW’s cooperation with companies, and support for the New Directions Movement.  By this 
point, Reuther had already fallen out of favor with the UAW Executive Board for his criticism of 
the UAW’s policies on jointness. Tucker claimed that the UAW put out by word-of-mouth at its 
conventions that Reuther was “senile,” and was an embarrassment to his brother Walter, similar 
to how the American public viewed former President Carter’s brother Billy.66  
Those who publicly associated with Tucker or inquired about using his strategies rather 
than “traditional” strike tactics found themselves attacked or ridiculed at the local level as well.  
After attending a particularly contentious UAW Convention in 1989, Green wrote to the 
membership, “The knowledgeable voting delegates could easily see through the fictitious 
literature and speeches by the ‘New Directions’ leaders (?) and rejected their ideas and beliefs. 
We have made many strides through some very difficult times to be taken and thrown 
backwards.”67 Alternatives to jointness did exist, as Tucker and New Directions had argued.  Yet 
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its political opponents in the UAW, including local officers such as Green, left little doubt in the 
minds of rank-and-file members that those who supported Tucker, or used his tactics that ran 
counter to the union’s cooperation with corporations, were deemed outsiders who threatened the 
perceived progress of jointness and union efforts to keep American businesses competitive. 
Stoking the Fires of Competitiveness: The UAW, Nationalism, and Race 
The UAW’s effort to maintain the competitiveness of American businesses capitalized on 
and fomented the nationalist surge within its ranks that the era of intensified industrial 
competition with Japanese companies had generated. Publications such as UAW Solidarity and 
Local 974 News regularly published articles and letters to the editor touting the productivity and 
skill of American workers, as well as endorsements of America’s resurgent “Buy American” 
movement. They exhorted members to protect American jobs and maintain a decent way of life 
for their families by consuming American goods whenever possible.  The UAW consistently 
criticized the Reagan administration’s free trade policies that provided a steady flow of 
affordable imported goods to American consumers, but placed union members in competition 
with working-class counterparts abroad. Other, more stridently anti-Japanese missives utilized 
bellicose rhetoric that blurred the line between Japanese companies competing with American-
based firms and the Japanese people themselves.  Throughout the mid to late 1980s, these 
periodicals reminded UAW members and their families that they were in a competition with 
foreign workers on which not just their jobs, but an “American way of life” characterized by 
secure jobs, good wages and the capacity to consume, depended. 
According to publicity and education director Wayne Schmidt, the editor of UAW Local 
974 News during the 1980s, he oversaw all of what appeared in the union’s newspaper, selecting 
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pieces that he belied “the membership would respond to.”68  Increasingly the newspaper’s 
content contained articles and cartoons that criticized Japan and its trade relationship with the 
U.S., railed against imported consumer products, and urged UAW members and their families to 
purchase American-made goods. While articles that were critical of management actions 
considered abusive toward workers, and of the growing disparity between rich and poor during 
the 1980s were published, the predominant focus on trade, corporate competition, and preserving 
an “American way of life” illustrated how issues and constructs of nation superseded class by re-
framing issues within the context of national interests.  This effectively downplayed potentially 
divergent economic and labor-relations interests between UAW and Caterpillar at the precise 
time that the union and company embarked on the journey toward labor-management 
cooperation.  UAW Solidarity merits attention as well, not only because it is the primary 
information source for the union but also because its members regularly read it.  According to 
research that Peter Hart conducted for the UAW in 1979, the majority of its members read 
Solidarity, 53 percent of those indicating that they read it “most of the time.”69 
As a result of the mass layoffs and subsequent loss of dues revenue afflicting Local 974, 
the union decided at the beginning of 1985 to alter the format of UAW Local 974 News from an 
eight-page bi-weekly paper to a twelve-page monthly in order to cut back on expenses. In its 
transition to a twelve-page monthly, it also began to incorporate articles generated and 
distributed in monthly news packets by the UAW International’s network, the UAW Local 
Union Publishers Association, or UAW-LUPA. Sent in packets of thirty-five to forty articles and 
cartoons to local unions ten months of the year, these were distinguished in the UAW Local 974 
News by the UAW-LUPA tag line at the article’s end, as well as by the different type face from 
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locally written articles.  The content that UAW-LUPA sent was not randomly determined, but 
rather selected by the LUPA coordinator after reviewing “the local union papers and newsletters 
to pinpoint trends, viewpoints and issues of interest to local union members.”70  While by no 
means the exclusive source of “Buy American” or anti-Japanese material in the Local’s paper, 
the articles that UAW-LUPA sent and Schmidt selected frequently criticized Japan and its 
“unfair” trade policy and encouraged “Buy American” efforts.  Consequently, the International 
and Local 974 played central roles in stoking nationalist fervor among the membership, shaping 
members’ views of Japan and other foreign nations, international trade and government policies, 
and consumption.  
UAW Local 974 News consistently placed Japan, America’s nominal Cold War ally but 
primary economic competitor, and other nations squarely within the UAW’s critical gaze for all 
readers to see.  Trade policies were the primary front in the political and rhetorical attack that the 
UAW leveled against Japan and the Reagan administration, particularly for maintaining a policy 
of low tariffs for foreign cars, steel, electronics, clothing and textiles—consumer and industrial 
staples that the US increasingly imported from Asia and Latin America.
71
 Cartoons frequently 
portrayed Reagan as indifferent to the mounting trade gap, with one casting him as a modern-day 
Nero fiddling while the trade gap ballooned nearby.  In another, Reagan was taken to task for 
appearing to support the Buy American movement while undercutting it with his trade policies 
and consumerism that aided Japan. “Turn up the Sony television,” he asked an adviser.  “I want 
to hear the speech.” On the set, a man spoke surrounded by the patriotic imagery of an American 
flag and signs reading “Buy American,” clearly implicating Reagan and his import policies as 
anti-American and hurting American workers. As if from a horror movie, one cartoon 
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incorporated the image of a bonsai tree to represent Japanese imports growing out of control, 
spreading over the US Capitol building as a dehumanized but nonetheless menacing monster 
attacking the nation’s capitol.72  
The Buy American movement was placed front-and-center in the pages of Local 974 
News, urging members to at once purchase American and union-made consumer items despite 
the growing difficulty of locating such products. These articles, which frequently came from 
UAW-LUPA, connected the interests of local communities, union members, and American 
consumers as one and the same—“Buy Union, Buy American.” Not purchasing union-made 
American products meant paying “a price much higher than dollars and cents on the tag or 
sticker.  You pay that price over and again, in the kind of life people can live in your 
community—and your country.” Fearful of the decline of Fordism—the capacity to consume 
what one makes—members were warned, “If you out that American union-made product aside 
today, you may find that tomorrow it’s too late—that it’s no longer available.”73 
Consumption and production were directly linked to the fate of workers, American 
industries, and the nation alike on the pages of UAW periodicals.  Lacking good-paying 
industrial jobs as a result of outsourcing and foreign competition would result in a lower standard 
of living for working-class people, whose skills making cars and earthmoving equipment would 
no longer be of use.  Such a loss would mean that “more and more of us will be finding ourselves 
flipping hamburgers for $3.50 an hour.  There will be no benefits, no 40 hours per week…and no 
way to raise a family.  We won’t be buying cars, or paying taxes either.  Without taxes, no roads 
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will be built, therefore, there will be no need for road graders, trucks or heavy equipment.”74  To 
the UAW, preserving good jobs in the US was the “single most important” way to ensure a high 
quality of life for its members, but also for American industries and communities.  
This required the vigilance of spouses as well as industrial workers to locate and purchase 
American-made products.  Although women comprised an increasing percentage of industrial 
jobs by the 1980s, men still performed the vast majority of factory work, especially at 
Caterpillar.  Retired union officials estimated that women held ten percent or fewer of the 
workers at Caterpillar, with most of those in non-union clerical and managerial positions and not 
on the assembly line.
75
 However, this did not prevent the wives of male union members 
encouraging others to buy American and safeguard American jobs.  Lois Piazza, the wife of 
Local 338 president Sam Piazza, summoned women “to be the example for our husbands, 
boyfriends, sons and daughters” by avoiding foreign-made products. Piazza urged wives to buy 
American products that were implicitly, to her, of superior quality. “I know American-made 
clothes and shoes are hard to find and sometimes more expensive,” she confided, “but it’s worth 
it—buy quality instead of quantity.”76  To Piazza, when Americans consumers chose to buy 
American products, they helped save American jobs by avoiding foreign-made goods that were 
inherently ‘cheap,’ of poor quality as well as inexpensive.  This shaped the identity of American 
goods, as well as American workers, as superior to their foreign counterparts. 
Other arguments for protecting American jobs and buying American products reflected a 
pernicious flip-side to this burgeoning working-class nationalism that extended beyond 
criticizing trade policies and alleging the superiority of American products. Some, such as 
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Evelyn and Marshall Morgan of Chicago, Illinois urged Solidarity’s readers to boycott all 
Japanese goods. “The only way to beat the Japanese is to stop buying their goods of all kinds, 
especially autos and electronic products.  We must all hope that some day soon American 
manufacturing will again be No. 1 in the world.”77 The language is telling, eliding the distinction 
between Japanese corporations and citizens and calling for their defeat.  Additionally, the 
Morgans intertwined the interests of Americans in general with American manufacturing, even 
as American businesses closed domestic operations and moved jobs overseas.  That is, they 
presented the interests of American manufacturers as national whether or not their manufacturing 
operations remained completely, or even primarily, national in scope. 
 At times, the UAW accused the Japanese of hiring policies that discriminated against 
union members, African Americans, and women.  As Japanese automakers—at the behest of the 
UAW to employ American workers—opened operations within the US, they garnered criticism 
from the UAW and other unions for employing non-union construction workers and, later, 
opposing UAW efforts to unionize their factories. When Toyota’s Japanese construction firm 
hired mostly non-union labor for its Georgetown, Kentucky plant, the AFL-CIO picketed the 
work site and the Japanese embassy in Washington D.C. until the construction company, under 
pressure from Toyota, relented.
78
  
The UAW was particularly defensive about how patriotic images and institutions were 
represented and funded. Two issues of Solidarity in 1986 ran a brief letter from Niles Bell, 
member of UAW 624 in Minoa, NY, who felt that the Aloha Liberty Foundation in Honolulu, 
Hawaii “insulted every American citizen (in particular UAW members) by sponsoring a Statue 
of Liberty essay writing contest and rewarding the winning writer with a foreign car.” Bell 
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suggested that “the Aloha Liberty Foundation committee members should all be rewarded for 
their lack of common sense with a one-way ticket to Japan!”79 The union also took umbrage with 
Japanese manufacturer Subaru’s being selected as the official car of the US Olympic team.80  
Allowing foreign car companies to offer their products as a prize for a writing contest about a 
storied national landmark, and to raise money for America’s Olympic team, was not simply an 
insufficient way to honor symbols of Americana—it was downright unpatriotic.  
Race played an increasingly prominent role in anti-Japanese articles.  Honda came under 
fire from the UAW, which had a better record of combating racial discrimination than many 
American unions, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) for failing to hire African Americans at its Marysville, Ohio factory.  Urging union 
members to “buy American because Japanese racism isn’t welcome here,” Local 974 News 
reported that Honda’s discriminatory hiring practices resulted in an Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) decision forcing Honda to hire, with back pay, 370 African 
Americans and women.
81
 
However, examples of racism appeared in union newspapers other than when the union 
levied accusations of discriminatory hiring practices against Japanese firms.  Although the vast 
majority of articles, even those harshly critical, did not resort to slurring the Japanese, several 
used derisive characterizations and racist stereotypes, while others framed economic competition 
in decidedly militaristic terms.  They illustrated the persistence of anti-Japanese sentiment and 
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the resurgence of American nativism during this period, with long-standing stereotypes adapted 
to fit the shifting power dynamics between the two nations.   
These stereotypes cast the Japanese as inherently dangerous by portraying them as 
untrustworthy, deceitful, threatening to American institutions, culture, and economic hegemony, 
and militaristic.  Yet even as Americans characterized the Japanese as resurgent industrial 
“supermen” who threatened to topple the US from its postwar economic pedestal, they also 
sneered at the quality of Japanese products, terming them “Jap junk.”82 Americans also ridiculed 
the Japanese as industrial copycats, achieving national economic success simply by purchasing 
and mimicking (innately) American innovations and making them more cheaply.  While these 
stereotypes were somewhat contradictory—the Japanese at once as formidable and menacing but 
also unimaginative doppelgangers who produced inferior products—they ultimately acted as 
mutually reinforcing tropes.
83
  Americans in general, and workers threatened with 
unemployment and economic insecurity in particular, refashioned the “yellow peril” of the late 
nineteenth century to fit a late twentieth-century milieu in which rampant deindustrialization, and 
the globalization of work and consumer products, threatened to undermine American economic 
supremacy.  
Americans’ fears of unemployment, privation, and national decline emerge in the 
discussion above.  But the most visceral anti-Japanese letters to appear in union publications 
illustrate the focused resentment, and the durability of racist stereotypes, some Americans 
expressed toward the Japanese. After buying an American compact car, Jim Bollinger wrote a 
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letter to the editor expressing outrage that Nissan failed to increase their production in the US, 
and imported more parts to the US than it produced here.  Claiming that “only a small percentage 
are assembled in Tennessee [while] the rest come over from Japan,” Bollinger asked, “Isn’t this 
cunning to make people here think they are American made?” Yet Bollinger also fretted that 
unwanted aspects of Japanese culture would emanate from Japanese-American joint ventures 
such as NUMMI, which Toyota and GM founded in 1984.  “It is a known fact,” Bollinger 
warned, “that for some Americans to work in these ‘joint venture’ factories they are forced to 
learn a lot of the Japanese language.” This prompted him to end his missive ominously, “Just 
remember Pearl Harbor and that two of their ambassadors were here in Washington, D.C. at that 
time.  What do you think is coming next?”84 
Invoking the imagery of invasion to represent Japanese imports was far from new in the 
mid-1980s. Immediately after World War Two, but especially as Japanese textiles and clothing 
became more prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s, American textile workers themselves compared 
increased Japanese imports to a Pearl-Harbor like attack.  Auto workers facing heightened 
competition from fuel-efficient Japanese compact cars in the 1970s followed suit.
85
 When 
Komatsu began selling tractors in the US in 1981, the front cover of UAW Solidarity dubbed it 
“THE TRACTOR INVASION,” with the image of tractors emerging from the ocean with 
Japanese flags emblazoned atop them.
86
 
Yet the nativism that flared up in the 1980s among some Caterpillar workers occurred 
after the Buy American movement was already well under way, after other industries and other 
union members had faced foreign competition—and lost their jobs.  This also transpired after an 
important shift for unions espousing the Buy American movement.  When the Buy American 
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ideology percolated from rank-and-file union members to pressure union leaders in the 1970s 
and the early 1980s, it was primarily a bottom-up movement.
87
  But the mid-to-late 1980s, when 
Caterpillar workers began to tout consumer nationalism, the UAW devoted considerably more 
effort to harnessing its potential by touting economic nationalism, disseminating supporting 
literature through UAW-LUPA, and criticizing foreigners for eliminating American jobs.  
Bollinger’s letter defended working-class interests, but framed them within nativist 
rhetoric that relegated class concerns to secondary status behind national and cultural conflict.  
They also laid bare racist sentiments that some in the UAW feared may surface.  In 1982 Lee 
Price, who analyzed trade issues for the UAW Research Department staff, circulated a 
confidential memo alerting the union’s leadership to the possibility that such hostility may arise.  
“I would like to suggest,” Price cautioned, “that all our orientation sessions explicitly address a 
potentially explosive issue: racist remarks…We cannot avoid mentioning Japan.  But we need 
not mention race, physical features, ethnic slurs, or World War II.”88   
While it is difficult to assess whether UAW leaders turned a blind eye to or actively 
abetted anti-Japanese nativism, the presence of such acrimonious letters in Local 974’s 
newspaper—and the assertion of Wayne Schmidt that he oversaw whatever appeared on its 
pages—suggests that more than members’ free speech was at work when these appeared in print.  
“I had discretionary power of whatever went in the paper,” Schmidt said.  “There was nothing 
that required me to put somebody’s article in the paper.”89 While certainly more strident in 
language and tone than other pieces, these operated to reinforce issues of nationalism and 
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competition, while raising the rhetorical ante to a level beyond serious, but survival, for 
American workers and businesses. 
Such expressions of nationalism and competition went beyond anti-Japanese rhetoric. 
When Caterpillar announced that it intended to close its factory in Uddingston, Scotland in early 
1987, workers occupied the factory and refused to leave.  They reached out for support from 
their counterparts across the Atlantic, and received bits of information about the company 
moving work out of Scotland from Local 974 through Jimmy Airlie, the Scottish director of their 
engineering union, AEU.
90
   
However, they received a cold shoulder from President Tony Green. With 974’s 
membership beset by layoffs, and American factories in the Caterpillar chain closing or scaled 
down, Green discussed his recent participation in the 1987 Con-Expo show—which only 
representatives from corporations, farms, and customers typically attended—by saying that he 
was talking “to prospective customers and dealers…about the quality product that you build and 
the pride you exhibit in your work…We want to keep our jobs here, not to lose to Komatsu or 
any other earth-moving equipment corporation.” Responding to requests from some members to 
wear plaid ribbons as an expression of solidarity with their Scottish counterparts, Green refused. 
“There is very little sympathy on my part.  I have a hard time getting upset over a country which 
now has jobs (873) that were once ours,” Green explained. “I will not wear a plaid ribbon for 
them.  I am concerned with our plant closings.  We should be concerned with our members 
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whom we represent, not Scotland or any other foreign country.  If a ribbon should be worn, it 
should be for our members who have lost their jobs due to the plant closings.”  
Green’s unsympathetic stance toward the Scottish and other foreign workers reflects the 
ways in which nationalism and especially competition within a corporation for jobs divided 
workers. Green resented that Scottish workers called their American counterparts “greedy” when 
on strike against Caterpillar in 1983.  In turn, when the Uddingston factory re-opened in 1984 
performing work formerly done in East Peoria, Scottish workers opened crates of parts and 
found notes calling them “Tartan scabs” and dirty Scottish coolies.”91  Even though workers in 
Scotland and Peoria faced similar socioeconomic problems, national divisions and fears of 
unemployment prevented them from effectively uniting to solve their shared dilemma.  
Discourses of Nation and Race at Work: “Gung Ho” 
 
 Ron Howard’s “Gung Ho” (1986) presented an alternative to battling Japan, America’s 
economic enemy—teamwork between managers and workers. Set in fictional Hadleyville, 
Pennsylvania, it portrays the effort of the town to re-open and operate shuttered auto factory 
under its new Japanese owner, Assan Motors.  The protagonist is not an auto worker but rather a 
foreman, Hunt Stevenson (Michael Keaton), who convinces Assan’s leaders to re-open the 
factory under certain conditions—no union, wage reductions, higher productivity standards, and 
cross-training in different jobs.  Promoted to be a liaison between the workforce and the Japanese 
factory manager Oishi Kazahiro (Gedde Watanabe), Stevenson tries in vain to improve 
productivity and workers’ morale.   
Under pressure from Kazahiro, who like Stevenson is only in Hadleyville as a last-ditch 
attempt to salvage his career with Assan, Stevenson makes a deal for the factory to produce 
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15,000 cars in a month—the same as Assan’s top-producing factory in Japan—in exchange for 
more jobs and wage increases.  When Stevenson approaches the workforce with the plan, they 
balk, claiming such numbers are impossible.  As the crowd grows hostile, Stevenson lies and 
claims that for 13,000 cars in a month, they would get part of the raise.  Despite working unpaid 
overtime and weekends, workers fall short of the goal and, when Stevenson admits his lie, they 
strike, prompting threats from Assan to close.  Taking matters literally into their own hands, 
Stevenson and Kazahiro resume the task of making cars to meet the production goal.  Seeing 
their error of their selfish ways, workers end their strike and join the beleaguered managers at 
work.  An inspection by Assan’s top managers revealed that some cars were not finished and fell 
apart.  Yet Assan’s tough CEO, Mr. Sakamato, impressed by their efforts and improvement, 
agrees to keep the plant open and grants wage increases. 
“Gung Ho” acts as a cultural and racial foil to economic competition that, in the U.S., 
was increasingly characterized in militaristic rhetoric. The movie presented cross-cultural 
cooperation and understanding instead of murderous vengeance as a solution to America’s 
problems.  Workers salvaged their jobs, helped save their town, and warmed up to the Japanese 
managerial style in the end, with workers performing morning exercises as the film ends.  Like 
Stevenson, Kazahiro is portrayed as a sympathetic figure—harried by Assan’s executives, facing 
constant pressure to meet high standards, under stress, and expressing emotion.  In the process, 
the film succeeds in breaking through stereotypes of Japanese people and culture as rigid and 
stoic.   
However, it is especially in its portrayal of the auto workers that “Gung Ho” fails.  With 
managers as the main characters, the movie lapses into stereotypes of working-class people by 
presenting them as reactionary, short-sighted, self-centered, and vindictive.  Anger over 
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Stevenson’s lies and not the brokered speed-up is what fuels the impromptu strike, which the 
workers end not because the town needs the factory, but because the two managers—one of 
whom lied to them and both of whom drove them relentlessly—set an inspiring and 
individualized example of teamwork.  It is less out of concern for their health and safety and 
more out of willful resistance that the auto workers refuse to consider making 15,000 cars in a 
month.  And when they do attempt to meet the higher quota, not only do they fail, but they also 
attempt to mask their failure with shoddy work, thus invoking the image of the lazy union 
worker who cuts corners and is indifferent to quality.  
During a company baseball game intended to bring together workers and managers and 
bridge the cultural divide, Buster (George Wendt of “Cheers” fame), a disgruntled and popular 
worker on the line, sends Kazahiro sprawling with a body blow, eliciting sympathy from 
Stevenson and the audience.  The scene is revealing, for it exemplifies how rarely the film 
portrays the auto workers in a sympathetic light.  By telling the story from the standpoint of 
managers, the film fails to explain why workers in the shop might resist a speed up, why they 
might distrust what management tells them, or how shop-floor culture, workplace experiences, 
and identities such as class, gender, nation, race, and community might have shaped their 
behavior.  Workers in “Gung Ho” do not act with any apparent purpose, perspicacity, or strategy, 
but rather out of anger, pettiness, and off the cuff.  It is the managers in the movie who present 
new ideas, take charge, and convince workers of their need to adapt to new circumstances, while 
workers resist at every turn until the end, when they see that change from above and across the 
ocean is for their own good. 
“Gung Ho” also raises yet leaves unresolved a deep dilemma affecting people across 
national and cultural lines in the late twentieth century—the pressures of industrial life and 
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market forces on working people.  It offers employee-employer teamwork as a tonic for cultural 
conflict and unemployment.  But by submerging shop-floor stress and international competition 
under a storyline of cooperation, “Gung Ho” offers a simple solution to complex problems.  At 
the film’s end, one wonders if workers will continue to toil at the new, elevated production rates 
in exchange for their raises, what physical and psychological toll those standards would have 
exacted on their bodies, if the plant remained open, and where Assan Motors stood in the 
intensely competitive auto market.  Instead, it depicts workers performing fitness exercises 
before work to deal with the rigors of labor, and managers and workers at peace if not happy 
after ironing out their disputes, having conquered the film’s twin enemies of cultural stereotypes 
and class conflict. 
“Gung Ho” circulated among area theaters for just four weeks.  Nationally, it grossed just 
over $36 million.
92
  However, what it did was to reinforce important ideas during this tumultuous 
period.  “Gung Ho” conveyed to audiences the stark threat that deindustrialization posed for 
working-class communities, forcing difficult decisions that, in the 1980s, had significant 
economic, political, and cultural implications for workers.  In particular, workers were 
encouraged to adapt to new times, to embrace change however reluctant they might be about its 
implications, and to consider new strategies for success in a more competitive global economy. 
In the process, “Gung Ho” submerged class identification and class differences under the tropes 
of nationalism, foreign economic competition, and cross-class cooperation.  
Crucially, “Gung Ho” popularized discourses that imparted the importance of defeating a 
common enemy, and becoming one’s other to do so. For Stevenson, it required learning new 
ways to increase productivity from Japanese executives and, in the process, defeat the enemies of 
unemployment and shop-floor strife at home.  These discourses in popular culture echoed those 
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emanating from Caterpillar and within the UAW, offering workers who were threatened with 
unemployment and foreign competition a way to save their jobs and preserve their status as a 
“blue collar elite,” and focusing their animosity on the Japanese as both the source and solution 
of their problems. 
Fissures on the Shop Floor 
Despite the initial promise and allure of ESP programs that were intended to improve 
labor-management relations, they instead deteriorated the spirit of unionism and the system of 
job-control unionism that had prevailed among workers at Caterpillar.  ESP teams inculcated the 
need for workers to accept change in the workplace, particularly through cross-training into other 
jobs to utilize workers more flexibly.  However, extensive shop-floor rearrangement through 
PWAF programs that union leaders and ESP teams touted as beneficial for the seniority-laden 
workforce upset workplace dynamics developed over long periods of time.  Workers wary of 
jointness and multi-skilled operations were now interspersed with others who embraced jointness 
and cross-training with the hope of saving their jobs.  With local union leadership supportive of 
ESP programs, workers opposed to jointness failed to develop methods and networks necessary 
for organized resistance, resorting most often to non-participation in ESP and shunning its 
adherents. 
ESP intensified the regimentation of work by smoothing the transition to lean production.  
The improvements in parts and materials handling kept workers at their cell stations longer, 
focused on jobs that became increasingly repetitious through automation.  Cross-training and 
reductions in job classifications allowed management to utilize fewer workers for multiple tasks, 
while offering overtime to employees as others remained laid off.  At the same time, the 
company’s newfound latitude on the shop floor allowed them to introduce new machinery that 
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increased the number of tasks workers were expected to perform, calling into question the degree 
to which employee satisfaction came with changes to the job process that developing a “Plant 
With a Future” mandated.   
Management-by-stress fomented tensions between workers on the lean, “team-oriented” 
production floor.  Extensive cross-training and people transferring departments and jobs in the 
hope of avoiding layoffs confronted animosity from others whose friends and relatives were laid 
off instead. Such shop floor shuffling resulted in heated exchanges and even fights between co-
workers. In one instance, Donald Guthrie, a long-time employee in Building LL in East Peoria, 
and Ricky Frye, a transfer from nearby Mapleton, lost their jobs after fighting when Guthrie 
complained to Frye, “…you sons of a bitch come up here from Mapleton and take over our jobs 
and work all the overtime.”93 
Collaboration with management also opened for management avenues into skills and 
knowledge that before jointness had largely been workers’ domain. ESP members worked with 
company engineers to update job process cards, providing management with knowledge of 
shortcuts in assembly and corrections in tooling to the company’s outdated information. To 
accomplish this, ESP groups circulated information sheets to employees, asking them to detail 
their job responsibilities in the event of absence of manpower shortages. When Mike Legel 
refused to fill out the sheets, expressing his concern that management would use the information 
against them someday, the company set up a video camera at his work station in the Technical 
Center the following day to record his work processes.
94
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Perhaps the ultimate indignity for UAW members occurred upon their return to work in 
April 1992, after the first unsuccessful strike.  Returning strikers saw informational booklets near 
machines that detailed job processes for potential replacement workers, whom the company had 
been interviewing to replace strikers.  ESP participants recognized information gleaned from 
their lengthy meetings with management.  It is unclear when Caterpillar realized that the 
information it gathered from workers could be used against them in a strike, but it is reasonable 
to conclude that at some point during its experience with jointness, probably around the time that 
it negotiated the Morton Parts agreement in 1988, Caterpillar determined that workers’ sharing 
information about their jobs would allow the company, in the event of a strike, to operate their 
factories without the UAW. According to 974 President Jerry Brown, the company also utilized 
the information workers shared to facilitate opening new factories, including in North Carolina.
95
 
Not only was workers’ often-exclusive knowledge no longer their own to harbor or dispense as 
they pleased.  Through the veneer of jointness and competition, fueled by nationalism and stoked 
by the tangible fears of losing the best remaining industrial jobs in Peoria, workers saw their 
knowledge used against them as a cudgel for corporate concessions inflicted upon them through 
long, painful, and ultimately losing strikes through the 1990s. 
Conclusion 
Reflecting upon Local 974’s involvement in ESP, Jerry Brown shook his head and said 
bitterly, “We got suckered in by ESP, no doubt about it.”  Caterpillar’s bold antiunion move 
would not have been possible years before, when the UAW and the spirit of unionism solidarity 
among workers were stronger.  These mainstays of unionism decayed over time, and the roots of 
decay lay before the difficult political and economic climate unions and workers faced in the 
1980s, and hastened the defeats of the 1990s. The gains that the UAW and Local 974 earned 
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through contractualism glossed over internal conditions and tensions that became untenable as 
America’s political and economic topography shifted. Unions and unionism lacked more than the 
ability to summon strength to the streets against companies. The solidarity that had built and 
undergirded industrial unionism no longer galvanized many within their own ranks, who were 
increasingly fearful of losing the best-paying jobs in the area.  As a result, contractualism 
between the UAW and Caterpillar died not through the intense strife of the 1990s, but rather 
through jointness programs and the veneer of cooperation in the late 1980s.  As the next chapter 
shows, Caterpillar’s anti-union offensive eventually rolled back much of what the UAW had won 
over the years, inflicting on Local 974 mortal wounds to unionism—a two-tier wage system, 
longer work days with no overtime, a re-disciplined workplace, and a return to at-will 
employment characteristic of pre-NLRA labor relations with the right to hire temporary workers 
with neither the right to union representation nor job security—that other American corporations, 
especially in auto, have since emulated. 
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Chapter 4: ’Peoria Is Still a Company Town:’ Parameters of Class 
Community, and Nation, 1991-1995 
           
 In the period between the two long strikes of the 1990s, labor relations between the UAW 
and Caterpillar generally, and between UAW workers and shop-floor representatives and 
Caterpillar supervisors specifically, deteriorated to an all-time low.  Faced with Cat’s threat to 
permanently replace its members in April 1992, the union returned to work without a contract 
and humbled by the loss in the 163-day strike.  Deeply resentful of the company’s threat and 
determined to roll back Caterpillar’s demands for deep contractual concessions, the UAW shifted 
course, forgoing its militant legacy forged on picket lines and adopting aggressive in-plant and 
broader corporate campaigns against the Peoria-based company.  These produced frequent, 
heated confrontations with management over everything from the pace and rules of work, to 
freedoms of speech and expression in the workplace, all of which reshaped class, gender, and 
national identities for blue-collar industrial workers in the 1990s.   
 One such exchange illustrates how these tensions but also, and more importantly, issues 
of power, rights, and identities permeated the shop floor at Caterpillar.  In the Spring of 1994, 
electrician Jerry Monday opposed what he considered an inappropriate work assignment in the 
Mapleton Foundry.  After failing to resolve the issue to his satisfaction with his supervisor, Ken 
Clark, Monday sought out the plant engineering manager.  After learning about Monday’s 
meeting with the engineering manager, Clark expressed his displeasure with Monday’s going 
over his head.  “This is America,” Monday said.  “You can talk to whoever you want.” Clark 
responded, “This is Caterpillar.  America starts outside the fence.”1 
 This exchange reveals much about the shifting terrain on which workers and 
management, the UAW and Caterpillar, fought for power.  Workers and management fiercely 
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defended what they considered to be their rights and prerogatives on the shop floor, each 
repeatedly contesting the authority of the other.  The argument between Clark and Monday also 
conveys more than dueling interpretations of a job assignment.  It shows that the workplace was 
a crucial site in which ideas of rights, freedom, and nation as well as power were hotly contested.  
Importantly, it reveals a chasm between spaces of work and community—real and constructed—
that were central to not only the lives and identities of working-class Americans, but also the 
outcome of perhaps the most important labor dispute of the 1990s. 
 This chapter strives to widen the analysis that authors have thus far offered on the UAW-
Caterpillar strikes of the 1990s.  While amply illustrating the importance of the dispute, its 
consequences for the UAW and organized labor, and the strategies involved, these have 
primarily confined themselves to examining labor relations and the events of the strikes.  Using 
archival materials such as strike and company publications, and oral histories, this chapter 
locates shop floor events in the ideas and discourses underlying them, as fundamental to 
understanding the re-emergence of intense class consciousness among workers in the 1990s 
immediately following a period of labor-management collaboration in the late 1980s.  
Additionally, it examines how the dispute shaped and was shaped by the local community, and 
how labor internationalism re-emerged in the 1990s, in ways histories of the strikes have 
overlooked.
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“The PATCO of the 1990s:” Cat Instigates the Strike 
 When the UAW struck Caterpillar in November 1991, it was conducting a defensive and, 
initially, limited stoppage against the company.  Negotiations hardly proceeded past the initial 
stage of exchanging proposals, with each side holding fast and refusing to budge.  The company 
was determined to divorce itself from the decades-old practice of pattern bargaining that existed 
between itself, industrial rivals John Deere, Case, and Navistar (formerly International 
Harvester), and the UAW.  It also emphasized localism by arguing that the 1991 negotiations 
should shift from a predominately national agreement for Cat workers, to one that moved more 
contractual provisions into local agreements.  Bargaining locally instead of nationally over issues 
such as wage increases and overtime rules risked drastically reducing the union’s power to use 
its collective strength to pressure Cat on those and other key issues.  The timing of this demand 
was also crucial because, in 1990, Cat had reorganized its factories into seventeen decentralized, 
semi-autonomous divisions along product lines that now faced considerable cost and production 
pressures.
3
  By moving much of what was negotiated nationally—such as wage increases and 
overtime rules—into locally negotiated agreements, the company would be able to pit one 
factory against another for work and new products they developed.  This also threatened to 
whipsaw local workers by taking contractual terms that favored the company, and pushing for 
such terms in other future agreements elsewhere.   
Cat demanded that the UAW agree to increases in wages and pension benefits in 
exchange for widespread and ultimately fatal concessions.  Cat wanted to eliminate contractual 
provisions protecting jobs, insisting on the right to not replace workers who retired, quit, or were 
fired—to let the job die with the vacancy—to reduce the workforce.  It wanted more flexible 
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scheduling to avoid paying overtime for more than eight hours of work per day.  It proposed a 
two-tier wage and benefit structure that would grandfather higher pay and better benefits for 
long-term workers at the expense of new employees, who would begin earning about seventy 
percent of what more senior employees would.  Additionally, these new workers would begin as 
temporary employees whose wages would only escalate if the company made them full-time 
workers.  In effect, these proposals would not only create two-tier wage and benefit structures 
within Cat factories and among unionized workers, but would also undermine traditional 
contractual practices, embedded within union security clauses, by which new hires immediately 
became dues-paying union members.  In essence, new hires could only become union members 
at the company’s discretion.  Such concessions threatened more than the significant gains in 
wages, benefits, and job control that the UAW had earned through negotiations and frequent 
strikes.  It also threatened the union’s long-term existence at Caterpillar, while holding out the 
possibility that other companies—especially those with UAW members—might seek to emulate 
Cat’s bold moves.4 
 Jerry Brown, UAW local 974 president at the time, said he was less surprised by the 
contractual squabble than by the depth of the concessionary demands.  “By around late ’89,” he 
said, “it was clear we were going to have some problems” in the 1991 round of negotiations.  
When meeting with plant managers on union business, Brown recalled some telling him off the 
record that “there is some bad stuff coming down.”5  In the summer of 1991, Cat angered the 
UAW by unilaterally eliminating its 200 unionized janitorial staff, then subcontracting the jobs 
to a nonunion firm paying $7 an hour.  This incensed the union because, according to Brown, “a 
whole lot of those people were people they (Cat) had maimed in industrial accidents, then moved 
                                                          
4
 Franklin, Three Strikes, 8-9; Cohen, “The Caterpillar Labor Dispute and the UAW,” Labor Studies Journal, 83. 
5
 Jerry Brown Interview at his home, Tremont, IL, April 3, 2007. 
155 
 
into janitors jobs.”6  The move appeared to Brown and others an attempt by Cat to shirk any 
responsibility for long-term and injured workers.  More importantly, eliminating jobs by 
subcontracting portended trouble for the union because it suggested the company could do this to 
other, larger bargaining units. 
 The UAW refused these demands, insisting in return that Cat adhere to the system of 
pattern bargaining that had provided wage and benefit gains at Deere without the steep 
concessions Cat demanded.  It was also appalled that Cat had taken out advertisements in local 
papers and, close to the contract’s deadline, directly mailed leaflets to employees touting the 
benefits of its proposals.  Differentiating itself from other companies in the pattern with UAW, 
Cat argued that, as a company that “competes on a global basis from a primarily U.S. 
manufacturing base,” its labor costs “already [we]re at a disadvantage compared to most of our 
primary competitors” such as Japanese manufacturer Komatsu.7 
Cat started running these ads in February, over eight months before the strike began, providing 
the Peoria community with ample information about its side of the story.  Throughout the 
remainder of the struggle, the company advertised heavily in local newspapers and on television. 
Consistent with its approach to community relations from the 1950s onward, Cat connected local 
jobs and the health of the Peoria economy with the need to compete in foreign markets with 
large, bold headlines reading “$3.4 Billion in Exports Means 18,500 U.S. Jobs at Cat.”8  
 As the end of October approached and the UAW’s strike deadline loomed, Cat repeatedly 
attacked the union’s adherence to pattern bargaining, portraying it as archaic, costly, and 
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inapplicable to the realities of global market competition.  Flyers described pattern bargaining as 
a relic of the past when “Caterpillar and its competitors were similar.” New, foreign competitors 
demanded a new, “flexible” approach that, to Cat, required new contractual structures.   The 
company sent employees charts that showed net losses that GM and Ford suffered in 1991, it 
distinguished itself from the auto giants and market, where pattern bargaining had also existed 
for decades, with language that equated pattern bargaining with the death knell of American 
industry.  “Pattern agreements may be fine for car manufacturers who choose to run on empty,” 
an October 28, 1991 ad warned.  “Caterpillar is from a different industry and we want to stay in 
business by being competitive.”  Ads and flyers asserted that its competition was essentially 
foreign, and especially from Komatsu.
9
  
 Peoria braced itself for the first strike at Cat since the 206-day 1982-83 strike, which 
remained fresh in people’s memories.  A lengthy editorial in the Labor Day edition of the 
Journal Star reflected the anxiety pervading the area. “Caterpillar and the entire central Illinois 
economy scuffled along for more than three years after that 1982-83 strike,” the Journal-Star 
opined. “Men, women and children suffered badly. Families broke up. People lost their homes. 
Some lost their lives.” As a reminder to the union and company mired in the stalemate, the paper 
admonished the two sides to consider the impact a strike would have on the surrounding 
community. “What happens at Caterpillar affects every supplier, every central Illinois 
government, every grocer, doctor, builder, retailer. Every individual living or working within a 
50- mile radius of Peoria will feel the effects of a prolonged walkout.”10  Peoria’s collective eyes, 
the paper attested, would be fixed upon the simmering conflict. 
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 Each side had many supporters and detractors, reflecting a chasm in the community that 
only widened with the strike.  Many of those critical of the UAW echoed Cat’s accusations that 
the UAW needed to conform to the more intensely competitive 1990s.  One Peorian penned an 
editorial that left the UAW little choice regarding what was necessary for Peoria, declaring 
“Nobody likes to give up anything they have worked hard over the years to earn. The realities of 
the 1990s, however, with vastly increased foreign competition leave no option. We must earn the 
right to be No. 1 in the world again...”  With a headline “If UAW Wins, Peoria Loses” that cast 
UAW gains as inimical to the local economy, the author invoked the decline of International 
Harvester as a harbinger of what might come if the UAW emerged victorious.  The recent 
announcement of Deere closing the East Moline foundry and the potential loss of 575 jobs is 
indicative of things to come. Caterpillar has made every effort to stay in Peoria but if saddled 
with unrealistic production costs, they will have no choice but to create jobs elsewhere.”11 
Invoking the specter of foreign competition, this and other editorials from Peorians contended 
that the existence of local jobs outweighed their terms, that having jobs at all was better than 
maintaining well-paying ones.  They indicated an acceptance of the logic of capitalism to seek 
out the cheapest labor markets, while also implying that, should Cat win, the same number of 
jobs would remain at local Cat factories. 
 Workers countered that it was Cat that was making unrealistic demands, and framed their 
union’s stance as one asserting a good standard of living as a worker’s right.  "The company 
wants to take away too much from us," said Mike Bannister, a Cat worker of nineteen years the 
first night of the strike. "We have to stand up for our rights. We are fighting for our livelihood."
12
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Others, however, felt stuck in the middle, sympathetic to Cat’s recent losses but equally mindful 
of the insecurities that layoffs brought them.  One Morton worker urged compromise from both 
sides: “This company is not in the best financial condition. The UAW loses membership every 
day. If either are to survive, common sense tells me both must make hard compromises.”13 
 Rather than strike all Cat factories at once, the UAW opted instead for a “selective strike” 
strategy with members going out only at the East Peoria and Decatur plants on November 4.  
Those UAW members still working would contribute an hour of pay per week, in addition to 
their normal union dues deductions, to help offset the strike funds the UAW would pay to those 
on strike.  However, shortly thereafter Cat locked out most other UAW workers but kept its parts 
facility in Morton, IL near Peoria, open through an agreement it made with the UAW in 1989.  
Persuaded by the company’s promise to increase jobs and secure local employment, Jerry Brown 
said that the UAW yielded crucial contractual ground to Cat by voting to allow workers at 
Morton, a vital parts manufacturing and distribution center that serviced Caterpillar plants and 
dealers worldwide, to work 120 days after the expiration of the contract—even if the UAW went 
on strike.
14
 When Cat negotiated the Morton Parts agreement, it is quite reasonable to deduce 
that the company was planning for a future strike. Morton Parts supplied Cat factories and its 
extensive dealer network around the world with parts not just for manufacturing but also for 
replacing defective parts on products already sold and in use.  Thus, the agreement allowing 
Morton employees to work during a strike could—and did—allow the company to produce, 
make money, and serve a wide array of customers.  It represented more than a strategic blunder 
by Local 974.  Fully two years before the 1991-1992 strike, the company—as it touted 
cooperation and a mutuality of long-term interests with the union through ESP—planned and 
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laid the groundwork for dividing the UAW during a strike.  It did so not by finding ways around 
the union, but rather through it, negotiating the agreement with 974’s leadership that espoused 
ESP.
15
 
 The 974 membership on the whole was lukewarm about the selective strike strategy.  
Dave Dearing, a twenty-three year employee at the time of the strike, argued that East Peoria was 
vital to shut down because one of its buildings, SS, assembled parts for tractors.  "If you can't put 
the parts together, you can't have a tractor," Dearing said.  Bill Hyde concurred, contending that 
it would mitigate the effects of a full-scale strike on Peoria while still hurting Cat. "It's smart. For 
one thing,” he said, “it's not going to completely trash out the economy of the cities and it's going 
to slow down Caterpillar.”  Yet some felt that the local selected the wrong factories to close.  Jim 
Hamp, a twenty-four year worker at Cat’s Mossville Engine facility, felt that Mossville should 
have struck, for "All of the engines come out of this place.”  Others believed that a selective 
strike flouted the local’s long-standing tradition of solidarity. Judy Krueger, whose husband 
worked at Building SS in East Peoria, "If one walks, they should all walk.  Union brothers are 
supposed to be union brothers."
16
 
 Because of slow customer demand worldwide, as well as its global manufacturing base, 
Caterpillar had enough machinery on hand to supply customers through most of the strike, 
allowing it to wait out the union.  This only amplified unrest among workers and the community 
as the strike continued through the cold winter months.  The financial strain of the strike took its 
toll on the membership, especially since members on strike or locked out received only $100 in 
strike benefits per week.   
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As the strike and lockout dragged on, the more vocal the criticism focused on the union 
leadership.  Some 974 members reflected an abiding distrust in the International and its interests, 
blaming Bill Casstevens for “caring for himself and Detroit autoworkers” rather than Cat 
workers, and accusing Jerry Brown and 974 bargaining chair Jerry Baker of being “puppets” 
under Casstevens’ control.17  One long editorial by 974 member Richard Owens—who later 
crossed the union’s picket line to work—echoed Cat’s terminology by terming pattern bargaining 
“an antiquated idea that is no longer realistic in the world of multinational corporations.”  
Adherence to it, Owens claimed, would only hasten the “inevitable process” of “losing more of 
its members” as companies like Cat sought cheaper labor elsewhere. Expressing his indifference 
to whether or not “contractual issues are negotiated centrally or locally,” Owens urged the UAW 
to focus on “job security.”  At the same time, Owens blamed Cat for refusing to respect the 
UAW, and for the “adversarial relationship” between the two sides by urging Cat to ‘bargain 
instead of dictate” as a path to “a new partnership” with the union.18  
The UAW also faced ominous new threats from the company. In early February, Cat had 
hired Vance International Protection Services, a security firm from Virginia, to supply the 
company with military-style security guards.  Outfitted in military boots and dark jumpsuits that 
more closely resembled soldiers’ uniforms than the informal appearance of company’ security 
personnel, Vance guards had backgrounds in police and military forces, and had been used in 
other labor disputes, including by mine companies in West Virginia.  Stationed atop and around 
Cat’s factories, Vance personnel conducted surveillance on strikers, gathering evidence of any 
picket-line infractions against strikers.
19
   
                                                          
17
 Joe Rapp, “Enough Is Enough!” editorial, Peoria Journal-Star, January 11, 1992, A4. 
18
 Richard Owens, “Cat, UAW Must Bend,” editorial, Peoria Journal-Star, January 11, 1992, A4. 
19
 Franklin, Three Strikes, 95-101. 
161 
 
Yet their presence as a collection of burly, uniformed, all-male, and militaristic security 
officers was also meant to intimidate strikers, themselves mostly male and unaccustomed to such 
a presence during strikes.
20
  Later, after the first strike had ended, Vance guards appeared inside 
the factories during disciplinary meetings, representing a further militarization of the workplace 
through intimidation.
21
  Strikers and their spouses claimed that Vance guards did more than 
intimidate them, threatening bodily harm by firing random shots near strikers.  Several 974 
members reported bullets whizzing past them in early March, notifying the police and prompting 
a temporary court order that prohibited Vance guards from wearing firearms.  Company 
assertions that Vance guards did not carry firearms did not persuade strikers.  While picketing 
outside Cat’s Mossvile factory, Frank Ronzani swore that a bullet sailed past him. "I am a 
combat veteran of Vietnam,” Ronzani said ". . . I know the sound of bullets."  The following day, 
Delores Knapp, the wife of a UAW member, was driving past the Mossville factory to the store 
when she heard gun shots. "I kept on driving for two or three seconds and then realized that I just 
had been shot at," said Knapp.
22
 
The threats to the livelihood of union members went beyond picket-line harassment. 
When its supplies began to run low in late March 1992, Cat took the unprecedented step of 
mailing letters to workers indicating that they had one week to return—or risk being permanently 
replaced.  When the company advertised for workers, it said it received 40,000 calls from across 
the country.  As it screened applications for employment, the UAW and its members panicked, 
with at least 1,000 UAW members crossing their own picket lines in East Peoria and other 
factories.  This was unheard of among Cat workers, who were historically militant and did not 
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cross their own lines, even during the 206-day strike from 1982-1983, when unemployment rates 
in Peoria hovered around nineteen percent.  Yet the UAW and organized labor had been 
considerably cowed in the interim.  Between 1981 and 1991, the UAW lost fully one-third of its 
members and, by the end of the first strike in April 1992, the percentage of workers in unions 
nationwide was down to about sixteen percent.
23
   The UAW unilaterally agreed to return to 
work, and Cat would stop screening applicants, while the two sides would resume bargaining.
24
 
 The possibility of being replaced permanently was no idle threat for Cat workers.  With 
the average hourly wage at $15-18 per hour, far above most other workers in factory towns and 
more than double what workers often earned in service and retail work, there was no shortage of 
people willing to cross UAW’s picket line and take their jobs.25 With the average age of strikers 
at about forty-eight, many of whom had families, home mortgages, and car payments that their 
good-paying, unionized jobs allowed them to afford, they had much to lose if permanently 
replaced.  Even staunch union supporters thought long and hard about whether or not to stay on 
strike, fearing the loss of the best factory jobs in the area.  John Clayton, a striker with 25 years 
of seniority at the time of the strike, chose to stay on strike but admitted it was a tough decision, 
for “I don't think I can get a job nowhere else, making the money I'm making.”  His wife worked 
full time as a nurse’s assistant and, to supplement his modest strike benefits, Clayton also 
worked as a janitor at a local tavern during the strike.
26
 The lack of other options was not lost on 
Cat.  Drawing upon the lack of other alternatives in Peoria for most workers, Caterpillar 
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increased the threat of imposing its two-tier contract through a regional—indeed national—two-
tier wage disparity between union and non-union workers.  
 Rank-and-file resentment toward the company ran deep and, in many instances, was 
permanent after the 1991-1992 strike.  Mike Legel, a UAW member in the Technical Center, 
severed his psychological ties with Caterpillar years before his actual retirement.  He recalled 
discussing his future at Cat with his wife after the UAW lost the first strike: 
 She said, ‘OK, so you had said that you wouldn’t go back, that you would quit before 
you’d go back.  So what are you going to do?’…And I said…since I’ve been involved with the 
union, what I think I’m going to do is I’m going to go back in, but in my mind, I’ve quit 
Caterpillar and I’ve started my job with the union.  And from that day forward, that’s what I was 
there for.  I had figured that eventually, I was either not going to have a job or they were going to 
fire me or shoot me or whatever they did, but I just was not, and I still will not just lay down and 
let people steal your dignity that way.
27
 
 
 Strikers were as much, if not more, resentful toward fellow union members who crossed 
their own picket lines.  Taunting their co-workers with the epithet “scab,” strikers assembled the 
names of as many line-crossers as possible and circulated them to other strikers.  Steve Frakes, a 
welder at Cat who began working at Cat in 1974, crossed the picket line in part because he was 
concerned about paying for his daughter’s heart condition.  The company stopped paying 
workers’ health insurance during the strike.  After strikers returned to work, Frakes was treated 
rather harshly.   
[W]e had lockers there to store our personal equipment and you could put your lunch pail 
in there…If they weren’t welding the padlock on the locker, they were filling it with lock 
tight.  My equipment, the company equipment would be sabotaged. When I came in…I 
had to spend a half hour checking all the equipment over… I had a noose, a hangman’s 
noose left hanging over my locker. 
 
 Outside work was no better for him or his family: 
We actually had a car that came to the house one night and the guys are hollering, ‘See 
scab, we know where you live’ and this sort of thing, you know, in the driveway at ten or 
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eleven o’clock at night.  Upon turning on some lights and stepping out the door, they 
leave abruptly.  And I thoroughly figured that that would continue…but it was only the 
one time that they ever came to the house.  But I always figured it had something to do 
with the fact that when I did open the door and step onto the porch, there was a 12-gauge 
in my hand.  My kids were accosted at school.  There’s nothing any more painful than to 
have a ten-year-old girl come to you, ‘Dad, what’s a scab?28 
 
Although Cat disciplined strikers who called line-crossers scabs, this failed to stop  
verbal, or even visual, harassment on the shop floor.  Four workers in Pontiac bought the 
baseball caps of the Seattle Mariners (S), Chicago Cubs (C), Atlanta Braves (A), and Boston Red 
Sox (B), sat together, and walked abreast in and out of work spelling “SCAB” for all to see.29 
The UAW International as well as Local 974 members also expressed deep resentment 
against Caterpillar for flouting the principles of joint labor-management programs at Cat in the 
1980s by bargaining for concessions, and using the information gleaned from the Employee 
Satisfaction Process (ESP), the labor-management program at Cat, to scale back the size of the 
workforce.  Soon after instituting the selective-strike strategy in late 1991, UAW representative 
Bill Casstevens criticized the company for its hard bargaining position and concessionary 
demands immediately after a period in which both the UAW and Cat had eschewed their long-
standing adversarial relationship in favor of jointness.  Local 974 publicity and education 
director Wayne Schmidt complained, “We taught them how to work better and smarter and with 
fewer people [through ESP] and now they want to eliminate jobs.”30 
 After the loss of the strike, and the unprecedented picket-line defections and crossings of 
its own members, rank-and-file resentment toward the company for its about-face reversion to 
adversarialism also fueled widespread worker participation in the union’s in-plant strategy 
starting soon after UAW members returned to their jobs in April 1992.  Mike Steagall, a worker 
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and former ESP coordinator at the Mapleton Foundry, engaged in numerous shop-floor protest 
actions after the first strike and was one of 140 Mapleton workers briefly suspended on April 28, 
1993 for wearing “PERMANENTLY REPLACE FITES” T-shirts.  “We had thirty [ESP] teams.  
We had a lot of good ideas for cost savings.  We had one team that saved $150,000 a year,” 
Steagall said. “If they would come back and ask me to do it again, I’d say no.  Not with what 
they’ve done to the union…There’s too many scars…All the things we’d been taught to do in 
ESP, they did just the opposite.  You’re supposed to listen to people.”31 
 The result was that many strikers, even those who had been involved in and led ESP 
programs, readily joined in the UAW’s multi-pronged campaigns against Caterpillar.  This 
entailed an in-plant work-to-rule campaign to disrupt production, and a widespread publicity 
campaign to discredit Caterpillar among long-standing and potential customers, stockholders, 
and the American public.  Rank-and-file workers also complemented these International-directed 
campaigns with myriad and innovative media, shop floor, and community activities.  For the first 
time in years, the corporate campaign tapped into the creativity and militant experiences of 
workers and their families, shifting the battleground from the picket line to multiple fronts—the 
workplace, Illinois’s communities, state and national politics and, to a limited degree, labor 
unions across the nation and world. 
Pressuring Cat from Within: The In-Plant Campaign 
 The most direct pressure tactic the UAW utilized was the work-to-rule strategy, by which 
workers would strictly adhere to the letter of their job classifications and guidelines to perform 
their jobs.  This entailed summoning supervisors to work stations to review and approve work 
procedures, often before any production began.  Rather than performing various job duties that 
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nearly all workers already knew from years of experience, employees who worked-to-rule 
relinquished to management the initiative to produce. This was a clear and essential reversal of 
fundamental day-to-day industrial life for Cat workers that usually entailed either their perusing 
job cards for particular tasks to be performed, or simply beginning to work based on the 
knowledge they accumulated.  Industrial production at Caterpillar—indeed in most factories—
inherently relies upon the knowledge of workers and the tacit presumption that, unless problems 
exist, they will begin to work and complete the required tasks before sending the finished item 
along to begin the process anew.  Working-to-rule ceded the very impetus for production to 
management.   
Workers no longer worked as management long presumed they would, and had.  Instead, 
rank-and-file members bombarded foremen and supervisors with questions about job processes 
to be done, safety concerns to be addressed, and machine and parts problems to be examined and 
remedied.  At other times, workers failed to alert management to low inventory levels, allowing 
parts to run out and thus halting work.  With far more production workers than management 
personnel, assembly often slowed drastically or ground to a halt until management answered 
various production-related questions or summoned skilled mechanics—also UAW members—to 
rectify machinery workers claimed did not operate properly.   
Caterpillar was particularly susceptible to a work-to-rule campaign after it implemented 
lean production strategies in the late 1980s.  Rather than stockpiling large quantities of parts for 
assembly, some of which might sit unused for days or weeks, Caterpillar embraced lean 
production to drastically reduce inventory levels, curtail expenses, and streamline production 
processes and assembly time. The company drastically altered assembly lines by incorporating 
new, specialized and standardized tools and parts to be used on multiple products, thus allowing 
167 
 
multiple assembly lines to be collapsed into one.  It also automated parts delivery systems and 
relocated them closer to assembly areas, reducing the time necessary for workers to retrieve 
them, thus keeping workers closer to their stations for assembly.  Through ESP, employees met 
and worked closely with management to identify and eliminate quality and production problems.  
Essential to the system was “just-in-time” production, in which required parts only arrived to the 
shop floor as needed and in the number required, not in large, superfluous quantities.  That is, 
inventory was pegged as closely as possible to what the company considered to be necessary 
under optimal circumstances, based on the presumptions that heightened quality consciousness 
would greatly reduce waste, and that the parts the company used contained no flaws.  
Additionally, Cat increasingly relied on component production, with workers assembling 
“bundled” parts that had often been individually attached to a product by more workers, thus 
reducing the number of workers required for assembly.  Through “just-in-time” lean production, 
Caterpillar had by 1990 reduced the time required to assemble a tractor from four weeks to four 
days.
32
  
However, lean production was designed to operate as an efficient, streamlined system 
using not only fewer employees, fewer parts, and less space but also and importantly, less time 
for assembly.  Honed and perfected from the 1960s through the 1980s in Japan’s factories, 
particularly in the auto industry, lean production flowed most smoothly when workers were 
convinced they had a say in industrial processes, and a financial and psychological stake in the 
company’s well being.  Working with management, often in employee-involvement programs, 
employees were imbued with the corporate-oriented psychology of saving money and time 
through a more efficient, quality-oriented assembly process in order to enhance the company’s 
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competitiveness and, at least in theory, their own security.
33
  Lean production presumed that its 
various aspects—just-in-time assembly, employee-involvement, the psychology of efficiency 
and corporate competitiveness—would sufficiently and consistently motivate workers.34  As the 
MIT International Motor Vehicle Program group stated, “to make a lean system with no slack—
no safety net—work at all, it is essential that every worker try very hard.”35  
The UAW work-to-rule campaign at Cat struck at the core of lean production’s 
presumptuous principles—that its multi-faceted structure and underlying psychology knitting 
workers to goals of efficiency and profit maximization—management objectives—would so 
thoroughly focus their attention on increasing productivity and improving quality as to erode 
workers’ class consciousness. Fueled by anti-Cat animosity and reinvigorated with class 
consciousness by Cat’s demands for concessions and threats to permanently replace them, 
workers created the very slack that lean production tried to eliminate.  Within the first few 
months of the work-to-rule campaign, production at UAW-represented Cat plants was drastically 
reduced.  Local 974 steward Mike Roth claimed that production in Cat’s East Peoria complex 
had dropped 40% from pre-strike levels because “We’re not doing anything the foreman didn’t 
tell us to do.” Construction equipment industry journal Stark’s Off-Highway Ledger reported that 
Caterpillar “continues to fall considerably short of internally planned production targets,” with 
production levels down 56% in East Peoria, 47% in Aurora, and 27% in Decatur.
36
  In Aurora, 
management circulated a memo on August 6, 1992 to employees describing the previous month 
as “our worst month ever in terms of production.  We missed our build targets by 71 tractors.  
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That’s the poorest performance in this plant’s history…I think it’s the worst month by any plant 
in the entire corporation’s history.”37  
   The union’s in-plant strategy not only disrupted production but also relied on a 
galvanized and confrontational rank-and-file that challenged—and to a degree prompted—
management decisions regarding discipline, job assignments, and free speech and expression at 
work.  UAW members targeted Cat CEO Don Fites, who personified the company’s aggressive 
demands for concessions and willingness to permanently replace strikers, many wore black T-
shirts with bold white letters reading “PERMANENTLY REPLACE FITES.”  When Fites 
visited the York, Pennsylvania factory in August 1992, UAW picketers were waiting outside the 
plant entrance with pro-union signs and anti-Fites shirts.  Workers circulated sketches that 
likened Cat’s policies to South African apartheid.  One such caricature showed Fites sitting 
behind a desk with two heads of workers—one a white woman and the other a black man—in 
chains mounted on the wall behind him, with a caption below Fites’s desk reading, “What 3 
things does [Sic.] America and S. Africa have in common? 1.) No National Health Plan 2.) The 
Right to Replace Strikers 3.) Mr & Mrs Donald Fites [Sic.].”38 
The sketch discussed above is intriguing.  It is impossible to know the race and gender of 
the artist, but whoever drew it used two images of workers—a white woman for America and a 
black man for South Africa—who comprised a distinct minority of the workforce at Cat’s Illinois 
factories.  In this particular sketch, the rendering personifies victimized workers enslaved by 
Cat’s practices as gendered and racialized ‘others,’ not as the white men who were 
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overwhelmingly the face of Cat workers. Its gendered assumptions about workers’ victimization 
echo Local 974 bargaining committee member Jim Lippert’s characterization of Caterpillar’s 
contract proposal as “a rape.”39  
While such gendered and racialized images may have had purchase among many Cat 
workers, it is important not to over-generalize about how prevalent these perspectives were 
among a large, if rather homogeneous, workforce.  While striving to uphold their status and 
dignity as skilled industrial workers, and quite often as the primary income for those with 
families, these mostly white male workers were just as apt to portray themselves with 
dehumanizing yet non-racialized, non-gendered images.  Workers at rallies carried signs 
accusing the company of treating them “like dogs,” depicting themselves as rolled over by Cat 
equipment, and as “casualties” of union-busting, and others.40 This is not to diminish that Cat 
workers utilized gendered and racialized discourses to portray themselves as victims of 
aggressive anti-union behavior, but rather to situate such characterizations within various and 
parallel discourses of victimization workers used.  At the same time, such discourses emerged 
from a workforce that, historically, had not fostered significant ties with community 
organizations such as the NAACP and others in Peoria that advanced the interests of people of 
color, and women. 
Union members rallied in factories during lunch and breaks, and outside the plants before 
and after shifts.  When a group from the Ukraine visited the East Peoria plant in late August 
1992, scores of workers rallied outside, displaying signs in Russian and Ukranian.
41
  During the 
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rally, union steward Bill Wheat was fired for allegedly leaving the factory without authorization, 
prompting a “mass grievance” meeting the next day in East Peoria of between 200 workers and 
company foremen over Wheat’s firing, and solidarity rallies the next two weeks in Memphis and 
East Peoria.  Cat re-hired Wheat September 14, prompting another large workplace rally.
42
 
These confrontations between the UAW rank-and-file and Caterpillar management grew 
more frequent and intense in the year after the first strike ended, with management suspending or 
firing workers for attending rallies, filing grievances, wearing various T-shirts, caps, and buttons, 
and participating in in-plant job actions.  In Aurora, workers wore buttons reaffirming their 
identity as pro-union and, implicitly, anti-line crossers by wearing “Member In Good Standing” 
buttons.  On March 17, 1993, after management circulated a memo prohibiting employees from 
wearing these, at least fifty workers were suspended for refusing to remove the buttons in what 
Local 145 dubbed the “St. Patrick’s Day Massacre.” The company rescinded the policy and 
reinstated all those suspended with back pay.  On April 28, Caterpillar indefinitely suspended 
over 140 workers from its Mapleton foundry for wearing “PERMANENTLY REPLACE FITES” 
T-shirts, more than half of them from the day shift.  According to the UAW, this left several 
departments without workers and threatened the foundry’s ability to operate.  The next day, 
Caterpillar relented, with Fites issuing a company-wide letter “asking our management team to 
no longer take action against employees who wear clothing or buttons that attack me in my role 
as chairman and CEO.”  This culminated three weeks in which UAW members, sympathizers, 
and staff including union vice-president Bill Casstevens were arrested while wearing these anti-
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Fites T-shirts during protests at Cat plants in East Peoria, Pontiac, Mossville, Mapleton, Morton, 
Decatur, and York.
43
  
Within the factories, union officials and shop-floor representatives found themselves the 
targets of company harassment, spurring further workplace protests and, by late 1993 and early 
1994, a series of short wildcat and unfair-labor-practice strikes across the Caterpillar chain.  
After Cat suspended Local 2096 vice-president John Hammill and committeeman Dave Spratt 
for failing to return to work, even though they maintained they had not finished investigating a 
grievance, hundreds of workers in Pontiac and Aurora conducted a one-day unfair-labor-practice 
strike September 9 to protest both the outstanding NLRB charges and the suspensions.  They 
returned only after Hammill was allowed to return to work the next day.  Warehouse workers in 
Denver similarly struck Cat for a day on October 22 after the company indefinitely suspended 
Joe Vasquez, Local 1415’s president, for wearing a union button that read, “Happiness is waking 
up in the morning and finding a Don Fites picture on a milk carton.”  When they returned to 
work the following day, Cat refused to allow them to work unless they forfeited the right to such 
activities.  When the union and workers rejected this, the company relented and allowed them 
back to work.
44
  
Local 974 executive board member George Boze, Jr., who had recently testified before 
the National Labor Relations Board, was indefinitely suspended and later fired for a heated 
exchange with a foreman, who claimed that Boze had verbally threatened him, and jabbed him in 
the chest with his fingers.  This prompted the UAW to file charges with the NLRB, which upheld 
the union’s side and ruled that the company’s actions were ““unlawfully motivated by Boze’s 
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union activity and his assistance and participation as a witness during the current NLRB trial 
against Caterpillar,” and that there was “plenty of evidence to indicate the firing was fabricated 
by the foreman who was involved in the incident.”  According to Glenn Zipp, the Peoria NLRB 
director, Caterpillar’s actions against Boze threatened to “have a chilling effect on employee’s 
willingness to participate in the NLRB trial.”  As in Pontiac, Aurora, and Denver, it precipitated a 
series of protest strikes in East Peoria over three days in mid-November.  Rather than squelching 
workplace protest through repressive discipline, Caterpillar was in fact fanning its flames.45  
These disciplinary measures and the subsequent solidarity actions emboldened workers in 
their confrontations with management. Cat’s refusal to accept grievances over issuing verbal 
warnings to try to suppress chanting on the shop floor led 170 of 175 second-shift workers in 
Denver to walk off the job on March 7.  On the anniversary of the so-called “St. Patrick’s Day 
Massacre,” the entire first shift in Aurora walked out in unison, marching and chanting pro-union 
slogans.
46
  As the company attempted to assuage workers’ resentment with meetings in East 
Peoria, workers in seventeen meetings frequently interrupted, questioned, and shouted down Cat 
vice-president James Despain. 
In the face of consistent company pressure and the prevalent threat of discipline for shop 
floor activism, UAW local officers and rank-and-file activists consistently defied those threats 
with acts of solidarity.  In particular, the use of unfair-labor-practice (ULP) strikes augmented 
the work-to-rule campaign by shutting down, not simply slowing production almost completely 
at factories for a day or longer. Reliant upon unresolved NLRB charges against a company, ULP 
strikes were a crucial tactic because, unlike so-called economic strikes over wages and benefits, 
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companies could not permanently replace workers on ULP strikes—as Cat threatened to do 
during the 163-day economic strike of 1991-1992.  Thus, workers could and did stop work over 
certain company actions that the union considered additional violations of labor law and not lose 
their jobs. 
Although ULP strikes were innovative and typically responses to what workers 
considered egregious company behavior, they were not necessarily spontaneous.
47
  Indeed, while 
some instances of shop floor militancy were spontaneous acts, many actions, protests, and 
walkouts were in fact coordinated, with workers prepared to both act and know the consequences 
of doing so.  Contract Action Teams were organized by departments in each factory, met 
frequently to discuss conditions and the climate in the plant, and planned accordingly.  These 
Teams often met at work, circulating notice by word of mouth or hand-written notes.  One such 
hand-written flier urged third-shift workers in East Peoria to meet before starting work in a 
cafeteria on February 3, 1994—amidst the proliferation of such strikes.  This hand-written flier 
asked, “What is A ULP Strike” [Sic.] and revealed the role that Contract Action Teams played in 
disseminating information about and coordinating ULP strikes, with a Contract Action Team 
stamp at the bottom of the one-page sheet.
48
 
Nationalist themes and patriotic imagery were prevalent in the union’s in-plant and 
corporate campaigns.  Workers’ critiques of Caterpillar’s drive for concessions and shop floor 
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disciplinary actions, as well as photographs in UAW publications and local and national media 
covering the dispute, indicate that union members consistently knitted ideas of freedom, equality, 
and economic stability together with patriotic symbols.  UAW members who wore pro-union, 
anti-Fites and anti-Caterpillar T-shirts, buttons and stickers also wore caps, buttons, pins, and 
patches on their clothing that prominently displayed the American flag.  Workplace rallies and 
public demonstrations in all towns with Cat factories saw workers also parade with patriotic 
paraphernalia such as large American flags and red, white and blue banners.  Picket signs fused 
protesting Caterpillar’s actions with patriotism, containing slogans such as “Solidarity: A Way of 
Life” above intertwined red, white, and blue ribbons.49 
Workers invoked patriotic imagery to reaffirm their American identity, and also their 
importance as American workers in an era when global production and competition in core 
industries such as steel, auto, electronics, and heavy machinery and particularly with Cat’s rival 
Komatsu, hastened corporate America’s quest for cheaper labor costs.  Cat employees conveyed 
not only pride in their work but also the view that they, as skilled and semi-skilled manufacturers 
of heavy machinery which symbolized social and economic improvement, were vital to making 
these products and ensuring the company’s reputation for excellent quality.  During its work-to-
rule strategy, the UAW sought to restrict Cat’s productivity while also illustrating the necessity 
of their members to the company’s success. Bill Casstevens argued that “This proves what we’ve 
been saying.  This company cannot succeed without the active cooperation of skilled UAW 
workers.”  The UAW claimed that when they returned to work after the strike, employees spent 
considerable time correcting myriad assembly problems because managers working during the 
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strike did not know how to perform their jobs. “Remember,” The union reminded workers, “[w]e 
know how to do it right.  They don’t.”50 
More frequently, though, union members employed patriotic symbols and discourse as 
essential elements to criticize Cat’s demands for concessions and its punishment of activist 
workers.  An advertisement the UAW ran in the Labor Day edition of The New York Times, 
showed a photograph of a worker erecting a barbed wire fence around a Cat factory with the 
question appearing below it in bold letters, “What COUNTRY is this anyway?” The text of the 
advertisement, touting “the achievements of labor unions: The eight-hour day, decent wages, fair 
working conditions,” stood in contrast to the photo, whose stark imagery conveyed repression 
and an environment akin to prison.  It characterized Caterpillar’s “non-negotiable demands” of 
“poverty-level, two-tier wages for new hires and twelve-hour workdays for current employees,” 
as well as surrounding “its plants with barbed wire,” and having “illegally suspended or fired” 
employees as acting with “an iron fist.” Combined with the pointed question, in 
disproportionately large print, these accusations cast Caterpillar not only as a corporate villain 
but also contemptuous of labor’s accomplishments in America.  This ad implied that Cat’s 
actions were foreign, dictatorial, not an ‘American’ way of handling the dispute.  In contrast, by 
touting its desire for “collective bargaining, based on mutual respect” as both a real solution to 
the dispute and the way to secure labor’s achievements—the “eight-hour day, decent wages, and 
fair working conditions”—the UAW was framing itself as the defender of standards for working 
Americans, of what it considered the significance of Labor Day.
51
 
In its own publications, the union directly construed Cat’s actions in unpatriotic terms.  
When July Fourth fell on a weekend in 1992 and Caterpillar refused to grant workers a long 
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weekend, as had been the case in previous contracts, the UAW response was vehement.
52
  
Accusing the company of having “turned its back on American values” under the heading 
“Caterpillar—An UnAmerican Company,” the UAW admonished the company to “reflect on the 
Revolution which founded this country.” The “army of an autocratic king was beaten by 
common men and women who believed they had a right to freedom, democracy, and the pursuit 
of happiness.  More than 200 years later, Caterpillar executives are trying to deny us those same 
rights.” Thus, they considered the loss of a paid holiday to celebrate the anniversary of 
America’s independence as nothing less than an affront to their American heritage and identity.53 
While the UAW increased its pressure on Cat from inside the factory walls and local 
Illinois communities and utilized nationalist discourses to denounce the company, it also 
considered forming alliances with international unions representing other Cat workers.  Such 
overtures had largely lain dormant since the late 1970s as a result of America’s deep recession 
and the UAW’s lurch toward protectionism especially in the 1980s, the UAW sought to pressure 
Caterpillar internationally by connecting the struggles of Cat workers in America with others 
around the world.  In April 1992, as the UAW was faced with the threat of permanent 
replacements in America, workers in South Africa and Belgium conducted brief sympathy 
strikes to express their common concern with their American counterparts over issues such as 
outsourcing and job security.  Over a year into its in-plant and corporate campaign, the UAW 
sent vice-president Bill Casstevens and a small group to Europe to rally with French and Belgian 
workers, and to speak before the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF) to mobilize 
support for Cat workers in the US.  Declaring himself impressed with the show of international 
solidarity from French workers, who wore red anti-Fites T-shirts demanding “Remplacons Fites 
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Une Fois Pour Toute!” (“Replace Fites Once and For All!”), Casstevens stated, “Solidarity with 
Cat workers overseas is an important part of our campaign.  We have common problems, and 
we’re going to pursue common solutions.”54 
For the next year, the stated goal of international solidarity presented particular 
possibilities for the UAW’s corporate campaign. By 1966, Cat had established its manufacturing 
sites not as self-sufficient facilities but rather as units dedicated to particular component work 
such as foundry forging, parts manufacturing and distribution, hydraulics, and finishing 
assembly. As a result, Caterpillar ensured that no “single plant anywhere, including the United 
States, makes the complete line of Caterpillar products.” Given the company’s vast international, 
integrated production and distribution systems, the UAW and worldwide unions at Cat could 
have threatened to interrupt Cat’s global production and sales.55 The situation also offered the 
possibility of unifying workers across national boundaries based upon the similar work they 
performed and the similar tactics Cat used against them to relocate work around the world to 
skirt labor strife, and to acquire leverage when bargaining.  In theory, the UAW’s overture 
toward international unionism could have forced the company to reckon with workers and a 
union not in one nation, but rather movements around the world that could disrupt the company’s 
production and sales worldwide. 
In practice, however, this was much more difficult to achieve.  On May 5 and 6, 1994, the 
UAW hosted what it billed as the first ever World Council of Caterpillar Workers through the 
Metalworkers Federation in Peoria.  Cat unionists from around the world met to discuss “global 
solidarity, the strongest weapon workers have against a greedy global company like Cat,” 
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according to the UAW’s Contract Action Times.  The Metalworkers’ Federation pledged to 
“cease its anti-union activities and return to a policy of consultation,” and “return to the 
bargaining table with the UAW and negotiate in good faith.” To this end, Metalworkers’ 
Federation general secretary Marcelo Mallentacchi declared, “We’ll do whatever the UAW 
wants us to do.”  To convey to its members the importance and potential of international 
solidarity, the UAW published several articles in its June 1994 Contract Action Times that 
discussed the similar difficulties that Cat workers in South Africa, Belgium, France, Italy, 
Russia, and Japan faced.
56
 
Yet the UAW’s commitment to international solidarity was ephemeral and, in all 
likelihood, a tactical maneuver to pressure Cat rather than indicative of a philosophical shift 
within the union.  In particular, it reflected a measure of disconnected awareness between the 
International leadership and the rank-and-file on labor internationalism.  While the UAW’s 
statement that the May 1994 convention of the World Council of Caterpillar Workers was 
accurate, it also ignored that through the Metalworkers Federation, the UAW had long met with 
other unionists within IMF World Agricultural Implement Industry Conference, beginning in 
1967 through the 1980s.  It was not as though the UAW and, to a degree, its participating locals 
during this period were completely unaware of what Cat workers around the world experienced.  
Nor were the statements of Casstevens and Mallentacchi the first calls for international union 
solidarity between the UAW and its global counterparts.  Pat Greathouse, UAW vice-president 
for Agricultural Implements and one of the stronger advocates for fostering international union 
ties within the UAW, had pledged at the 1972 World Conference to invite union representatives 
from some of Caterpillar’s global factories to attend UAW negotiations with Caterpillar in 
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Peoria.  Several did attend on July 10, 1973.
57
 Later Metalworkers Federation Ag-Imp 
conferences, such as the one in Chicago in May 1975, expressly sought to “gather workers 
concerned with three, massive…multinationals so as to establish a concrete and viable solidarity 
network, one that we may call upon for help in case of need.”58 
However, the intervening years saw the UAW shift its focus from international unionism 
to primarily trade protectionism as it attempted to address the declining competitive position of 
American auto companies vis-à-vis their Japanese and German counterparts, to cope with factory 
closings, and the relocation of work to non-union areas within the US and to foreign nations.  As 
with Japanese auto and agricultural implement unions, the UAW also embraced collaboration 
with American companies through joint labor-management programs to make these businesses 
more profitable and competitive with foreign global companies in an unsuccessful attempt to 
stanch its eroding membership.
59
  Thus, at the time of intensified business competition resulting 
in job and membership losses, the UAW and some other world unionists refrained from fostering 
closer ties with each other, and coordinating bargaining and strike activity against multinational 
firms. 
Even when the UAW had urged closer ties with global workers in the 1960s and 1970s, it 
did not publicize these efforts to its members.  UAW Local 974 News, the Peoria-based 
semimonthly newsletter for 974’s membership, failed to publish articles informing members of 
working conditions and issues at CAT’s overseas plants, or indicating actions or proposals on 
behalf of their international counterparts.  As the previous chapter discussed, in the 1980s, at the 
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height of intense competition between American and Japanese corporations, most of the articles 
and letters to the editor published in the International’s paper Solidarity and, locally, Local 974 
News did not reflect or urge international unionism but rather nationalism and, in some extreme 
examples, nativism.
60
  Although the UAW devoted significant space to Cat’s international 
workers and the World Council of Caterpillar Workers in the June 1994 edition of Contract 
Action Times, the next month’s paper was dominated by the union’s unfair-labor-practice strike 
that started June 20, and after August 1994 contained no articles about or quotes from their 
foreign co-workers.
61
  Even had it seriously pursued close-knit alliances with Cat workers 
worldwide—and the lack of evidence indicates it did not—the union would have been forced to 
reconcile the class-conscious but primarily nationalist sentiments and local orientation of its 
rank-and-file with broader parameters of class and class conflict than the UAW and its members 
had previously engaged. 
Although the UAW faced conditions at Caterpillar that Jerry Tucker’s expertise in 
generating rank-and-file solidarity may have counted, it instead struck and lost in what New 
Directions termed “The Private Sector’s ‘PATCO,’” adopting work-to-rule tactics only after 
losing the strike.
62
  Even as their in-plant and corporate campaigns gained strength and pressured 
Cat, the UAW and Cat workers still did not work with Tucker, the UAW’s most knowledgeable 
and experienced staff member on in-plant campaigns.  Instead, Tucker worked with Allied 
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Industrial Workers (AIW) Local 837 in nearby Decatur against Staley/Tate and Lyle in the 
1990s.
63
 He was openly critical of the UAW’s embrace of ESP, and its failure to respond to Cat’s 
contention that global competition justified its concessionary demands, arguing, “From the 
beginning, the union should have begun to answer (company) claims (of its need to be globally 
competitive) with valid worker and community consideration."  Tucker had the backing of Local 
751 president Larry Solomon at Cat’s Decatur plant, who echoed his view of ESP. “He's always 
been against this jointness, which has had a devastating effect at our plant," Solomon said. 
"I think his philosophy has been right all along.  Our interests are not the same as Caterpillar's.” 
However, Tucker had little support within 974.  When Tucker ran for UAW’s presidency in 
1992, Jerry Brown claimed that "Ninety-nine percent support the (Owen Bieber) administration," 
and reportedly asked Tucker in a letter not to send along any campaign information to the local.
64
 
It also meant not working with Ray Rogers, an independent consultant whom AIW Local 
837 in Decatur hired in their struggle with corn processor Staley/Tate and Lyle.  With a 
background in the grassroots Miners for Democracy movement that elected Arnold Miller to the 
presidency of the United Mine Workers, Rogers honed corporate campaign strategies when he 
led a successful effort to get a union contract with North Carolina textile company J.P. Stevens in 
the 1970s, and in the failed strikes of packinghouse workers at Hormel in Austin, Minnesota in 
1985-86, and paper workers at International Paper in Jay, Maine in 1988.  During the campaign 
against Tate and Lyle, Rogers and Local 837 targeted major businesses doing business with the 
company, focusing especially on State Farm Insurance and Miller Brewing Company.  While 
targeting State Farm yielded few results, the Miller campaign under Tucker’s direction 
successfully convinced the nation’s second-largest brewer to not buy from Tate and Lyle.  While 
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Rogers had erred in choosing State Farm as a primary target for the AIW corporate campaign, 
his expertise and experience in probing the channels of corporate power may have served Cat 
workers well.  Like Tucker, however, Rogers’ criticism of organized labor and his willingness to 
work outside the traditional corridors of power of the AFL-CIO made him a persona non grata 
with most unions, including the intensely territorial UAW.
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Crucially, the UAW also lacked political support, at both the state and federal level to 
protect workers during strikes and lockouts.  During the early 1990s, Democratic legislators in 
Illinois passed a striker replacement bill that would have barred the state from any doing 
business with firms that permanently replaced workers during a labor dispute, including granting 
that business tax exemptions or credits, or making contracts with the company.  Yet the bill 
lacked sufficient support to override the veto of Republican Governor Jim Edgar the first time it 
was passed, and on the second attempt it met defeat in the state Senate after clearing the House.
66
  
Similar legislation failed on a federal level in 1993 despite Democratic majorities in both houses 
of Congress and a Democratic president, with a Republican filibuster defeating a bill to ban the 
permanent replacement of strikers.
67
 This was but the latest in a long line of political defeats the 
UAW and American unions has suffered, forestalling even modest reforms in labor law in the 
1970s, and minimal protections for workers from plant closings in the 1980s.
68
 The UAW 
limited its allies in the labor movement who could have assisted in its shop floor and community 
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struggles at Cat at the same time that its capacity to advance an effective political agenda, at the 
state and local level, had considerably waned. 
 “Peoria Is Still a Company Town:” Corporate Campaigns and the Community 
 Paralleling its in-plant strategy, the UAW attempted to damage Caterpillar’s business as 
well as its reputation with a corporate campaign.  Expanding the dispute’s battle lines from the 
factories to local communities and across the nation, the UAW targeted industry shows and the 
company’s extensive network of dealers, and spoke and protested at Cat’s annual meetings.  The 
union also utilized innovative protest tactics such as street theater, cultivated vibrant solidarity 
networks within the union, and brought its pickets from the shop floor to the community.  
Despite these extensive efforts, the union’s tactics within the community met with limited 
success.  The intensity of the conflict and some UAW tactics alienated observers in factory 
towns, inviting criticism from local papers that revealed the deep fissures between the union, the 
company, and many Peorians.  Crucially, the dispute in an area hard hit by deindustrialization 
laid bare the chasm between many Peorians on one side, and the UAW, its members and their 
families on the other, over what benefits workers and the town should expect from the 
multinational corporation Caterpillar—by far the area’s largest employer. 
As with its in-plant tactics, the UAW devoted considerable time and energy to publicly 
attacking Cat CEO Don Fites and other company executives.  Branding Fites and Cat executives 
“union busters,” the union attempted to pressure Cat to back down from its demands for union 
concessions.  Cat’s corporate office building in downtown Peoria became a site for large rallies 
as well as periodic picketing, at which union officials and rank-and-file members boisterously 
denounced the company’s rigid positions at the bargaining table, and its disciplining of workers 
during the work-to-rule campaign.  With well over 1,000 members in attendance at one rally, 
185 
 
Local 974 recognized and congratulated workers for acts of solidarity supporting suspended 
workers.  It then conducted a mock trial of Fites and Cat’s lead negotiator Jerry Brust outside 
Cat’s office building for failing to bargain in good faith.  With the crowd chanting, “Guilty, 
guilty,” the “jury” hanged a likeness of Fites in effigy, laid a coffin containing Cat’ final offer to 
rest, and urged the company to return to bargaining.  The size of the rally briefly closed 
Northeast Adams Street, a main downtown thoroughfare where Cat’s office is located.  After the 
rally, a parade of cars drove slowly through the subdivision where Fites and his family lived, 
honking their horns and prompting calls to the police to disperse them.
69
 
Illinois Cat workers linked with members in the West to picket and distribute leaflets at 
MinExpo, a major industry show, in October 1992 in Las Vegas.  With the support of locals from 
California, Nevada, and Arizona as well as other union members from Las Vegas, UAW 
Contract Action Teams assembled about 500 union activists for four days, accusing the company 
of union busting in its factories, and selling defective equipment made by managers while the 
UAW was on strike.  Some protests resulted in heated clashes with police, who arrested thirty 
demonstrators outside the Las Vegas Convention Center.
70
  It also drew upon the union’s historic 
strength in Detroit to turn out activists in February for demonstrations at the Design and 
Construction Expo ’93.  With many wearing anti-Fites T-shirts, UAW members circulated fliers 
calling into question Cat’s ability to meet deadlines and customers’ product demands.  Although 
Cat did not send a delegation to the 1993 ConExpo, the UAW did, speaking with and distributing 
literature to heavy machinery dealers and customers attacking Cat’s labor practices as 
“destroy[ing] employee morale,” according to 974 member Spike McFall.71   
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As stockholders in Cat, the UAW attended and protested in company shareholders 
meetings.  Accusing Fites of mismanaging the company by closing factories, failing to complete 
planned production sites in the Peoria area, and cost overruns from its Plant With a Future 
(PWAF) factory upgrades, the UAW attempted to drive a wedge between Cat’s stock holders 
and chief executives.  Fliers asking “CAN SHAREHOLDERS AFFORD MANY MORE OF 
FITE’S [Sic.] FIASCOS?” identified themselves as “Concerned Cat Employees” as well as 
“Members UAW Locals,” reflecting their efforts to appeal to non-union audiences such as 
shareholders.
72
 
While they branched out in the corporate campaign, workers also expanded their 
solidarity networks within the union and their community in new and innovative ways.  
Returning from the first strike to “start [his] job with the union,” Mike Legel became a union 
steward on the job and an amateur television producer.  Starting with recording picket line 
activities with his wife during the 1991-1992 strike, Legel continued his interest in video by 
making, producing, and airing a show about workers’ experiences and the UAW’s side of the 
dispute.  “The Mountain Climber” aired weekly on two Peoria-area public access channels.  His 
work with “The Mountain Climber” led to his work with other UAW members publishing “The 
Unionite,” a newsletter of union activists that discussed issues and events at Caterpillar while 
connecting them with other union struggles at Staley, Bridgestone/Firestone, and later the fights 
at the Detroit News and Free Press.
73
 Though begun through his own initiative, Legel’s media 
work became advertised in the UAW’s Contract Action Times and, later, he and others regularly 
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spoke at UAW-organized meetings at its Reuther Family Education Center at Black Lake, 
Michigan.
74
  
Spouses of Local 974 members worked with UAW staff to form Families in Solidarity in 
1992 as “a positive alternative to Cat’s attack on working people.” Formed initially by six 
women, Families in Solidarity grew to over fifty people by the end of the year in the Peoria area, 
with groups also forming in other factory towns.  The organization focused much of its work in 
support of union activities, joining rallies outside factories and at Cat’s corporate offices.  It 
coordinated efforts with Cat workers and their spouses across Illinois to rally before Caterpillar’s 
stockholders meeting in April 1993, and held fundraisers to help support the families of fired 
workers.
75
  
Yet Families in Solidarity also played crucial roles organizing social events within the 
union, working with community groups to help people in need, and also developed creative 
protest tactics in the workplace.  The group held, dances, dinners, and what the UAW termed 
“Rallies Under the Sun” that began with morning marches and rallies to support workers, 
followed by breakfast then activities such as horseshoe and volleyball tournaments all day for 
workers’ families. Motivated by their motto “Women on Fire,” it also collected canned food and 
brought presents for children who were victims of abuse and the poor, and mobilized retirees to 
assist the needy and elderly in their communities. They also joined public tours at Caterpillar, 
entering the factories concealing “PERMANENTLY REPLACE FITES” T-shirts that they 
revealed as they discussed union concerns with the general public.   
Families in Solidarity—comprised and run primarily by women—played a pivotal role 
within the male-dominated locals, and on its behalf in communities, during the dispute with 
                                                          
74
 Legel Interview. 
75
 UAW Contract Action Times, Volume 1, No. 6, December 1992, 8; Volume 2, No. 4, May 1993, 10; Families in 
Solidarity, “Fundraiser for Our Discharged Families,” no date, Caterpillar Strike 1991-6, Box 13, Folder 11, UIA. 
188 
 
Caterpillar.  Its representatives were integral members of various Contract Action Team 
committees covering recreation and worksites/picketing, but also joined union training sessions 
to plan ULP strikes. Women as spouses, and not as Cat employees, helped to further break down 
union meetings as primarily male-dominated spaces, with female representatives of the group 
speaking there about its activities.
76
 Although women had long played support roles for strike 
activities, their diverse forms of activism within the union and local communities gave a more 
public face to UAW locals than before.  Families in Solidarity did so in ways not directly 
connected with strikes, with community work creating an alternative public image for the UAW 
other than as the “strike-happy” or “greedy” organization that many Peorians considered it to be. 
Yet these efforts only went so far in a rather conservative community that was devastated 
by deindustrialization and seeking to regain its economic footing and reshape its public image.  
Although the thousands of UAW members ensured and gained some support in and around 
Peoria, tough economic times and fatigue from industrial warfare wore down many observers, 
many of whom simply wished the conflict would end.  Union and non-union workers alike 
weighed in to the ongoing public debate that transpired in papers such as the Peoria Journal-Star 
but, just as often, area residents and the paper’s editorial board frequently framed the dispute as 
one between spoiled children who sullied Peoria’s image.  Crucially, Cat’s statements and 
residents’ opinions about the UAW painted the union as detached from local interests and even 
that of Local 974 itself. In these public exchanges, the union emerged the worse for wear. 
According to many Peorians whose views appeared in the Journal-Star, the UAW 
complained too much about the terms and conditions at Caterpillar.  After witnessing the UAW 
demonstrations at the MinExpo in Las Vegas, retired Cat employee J.E. Curfman upbraided the 
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activists for having “misread how their demonstrations, shouting, and other demeaning acts 
would be viewed.”  Contrasting the higher wages of UAW workers with lower-paid employees 
in the “predominately service-related” Las Vegas economy, Curfman urged UAW members to 
“take a close look at what they have versus most of the labor groups both in Peoria and 
elsewhere.”77  Criticizing union leaders for “throwing a raging tantrum like a little kid who wants 
another ice cream cone (when he’s already had three),” Cat worker and line-crosser Valentin 
Jugovic argued that UAW members “forgot what gratitude means” when they claimed “We 
made Cat what it is today.” Jugovic disagreed, crediting the company for turning “unskilled 
people” into “qualified workers…If Cat hadn’t come and helped us, we would still be detassling 
corn and drinking moonshine on those farms.”78   
Even-handed editorials in the Journal-Star reinforced the impression that the two sides 
were equally responsible for the dispute.  Urging Cat and the UAW to “abandon the war drums,” 
the Journal-Star editorial board criticized both for inflicting a “war between the giants” onto a 
“community…still waiting for honest discussions.”79 Although Peorians expressed their 
displeasure with company and union alike, the UAW tended to receive the more intense 
criticism.   
Two incidents in particular put the union under intense community and media scrutiny.  
In December 1992, the UAW escalated its corporate campaign by posting billboards around 
Peoria.  One read “Fighting for a Fair Contract, Fighting for Peoria’s Future.”  The other, on the 
outskirts of town reading, “You Are Entering A War Zone,” irked many Peorians, including 
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small business people.  Peoria Area Association of Realtors president Norma Horton expressed 
concern that it tarnished the city’s image and would detract newcomers to the area.  “If we run 
our city down with these hurtful terms, how can we expect anybody else to embrace it?” Horton 
asked.  Local 974 publicity and education director Wayne Schmidt intoned that the good jobs Cat 
workers had were central to the economy. “We are in a war.  We’re fighting for our jobs,” 
Schmidt countered.  If we lose our jobs, the Realtors won’t have any houses to sell or anybody to 
buy any houses.”  The billboards stayed up, to the chagrin of the Realtors Association.80  
The Journal-Star opined that declaring Peoria a “war zone” would scare off businesses 
from moving to the area, making the city’s economy even more reliant on Cat.  “Caterpillar 
remains the driving force behind the local economy, as it has been for most of this century,” the 
Journal-Star acknowledged. “Peoria is still a company town... Business and government leaders 
have tried to make central Illinois more economically diverse, and have been somewhat 
successful. They will be less so, if businesses shy away from central Illinois because they 
believe…that this is a war zone.”81 The paper, apparently, preferred that the union relegate its 
“war zone” to local factories and not carry the fight to the community, lest it suffer further. 
Union opposition to the appointment of Cat vice-president James Despain as head of the 
Peoria-area Heart of Illinois fundraising drive, and its threat to boycott the drive, intensified 
media criticism.  Despain said he was "terribly disappointed" about the possibility of a UAW 
boycott. "For someone to use this as a bargaining chip is disappointing," Despain said. 
"Deserving people in the area are being held hostage over something they have nothing to do 
with."  The UAW raised $400,000 in 1992 that helped fund over 35 local services.
82
  The 
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Journal-Star launched a scathing critique of the UAW, referring to it as “out of bounds” and 
appropriating the union’s “War Zone” terminology and connecting it to the possible UAW 
boycott: 
It is not fair, not defensible and not in the interest of Local 974 members to hold sick 
kids, poor people and troubled families hostage to the union's contract battle. Haven't 
there been enough casualties already in this dispute?  How many more can this 
community take?  If we are in a war zone, as the union says, then can't both sides put a 
big red cross on the United Way tent and declare it to be in the business of humanitarian 
relief, free from attack?
83
  
 
The union eventually backed down from the threat. 
 
 While the editorial accurately remarked that there had been no contract negotiations “for 
months” at that point, its “pox-on-both-houses” refrain treated both sides as more than equally 
responsible for the lack of a contract, but in fact as equally powerful parties.  Although the UAW 
exercised considerable leverage on Cat, the union lacked the ability to shut down the company’s 
many overseas factories.  It was forced back to work under the federally sanctioned threat.  
Additionally, while workplace and community activism had forced the company to rescind many 
disciplinary acts, the act-and-respond nature of America’s system of industrial jurisprudence 
automatically placed workers and unions on the defensive.  They were forced to react to Cat’s 
aggressive actions. The slow-moving legal machinery of the NLRB allowed the company to 
appeal legal decisions, buying the company additional time to discipline disaffected workers—all 
the while staving off the threat of meaningful legal or financial penalties. 
 By the 1990s, the union’s own historic reliance on traditionally successful pressure 
tactics such as strikes had long-term consequences that reinforced the public impression that 
workers generally struck over economic issues.  While this was often true, other non-economic 
issues were often crucial to workers, arguably never more so than in the early 1990s.  Opinions 
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in newspapers spotlighting the outstanding financial issues between the two sides elided an 
essential element—that non-economic issues such as workplace rights, equality between current 
and future union members, dignity and respect, and the future of the union itself motivated 
workers and their families to confront Cat and put those jobs on the line. 
 For years, contractualism between the UAW and Cat worked well enough to settle many 
if not all workplace disputes, thus keeping them out of the public’s purview.  Legal decisions 
such as the Steelworkers Trilogy buttressed the NLRB and arbitrators as the arbiters for 
collective bargaining conflicts.
84
 This confined the resolution of most workplace conflicts 
primarily to the workplace, preventing the public from seeing and fully recognizing the details 
and stakes—the complex history of workplace jurisprudence—that were involved.  The result 
was a distancing of the workplace from the scrutiny of communities, relegating the workplace to 
a separate sphere, of sorts, from the rest of society. 
Caterpillar’s disciplinary actions at work not only threatened the union’s representatives 
for using the NLRB legal apparatus, but also threatened to undo a long-standing practice 
between the company and for union settling disputes.  For decades, Cat and the union had a 
contractual clause stating that the company would pay for the time that chairmen of the 
Grievance Committees spent on in-shift union business such as filing grievances and conducting 
meetings.
85
  In late 1992, as the UAW countered Caterpillar’s harsh meting out of industrial 
discipline with numerous NLRB charges, Cat unilaterally ended the practice of paying for UAW 
officials’ time conducting union business at work, threatening to place a large financial burden 
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on the union that the company used to shoulder.  Cat justified this action by saying that it was 
under no obligation to continue this practice since no contractual agreement existed between the 
company and the UAW—which was true.   
However, the NLRB ruled that the company could not unilaterally alter the provisions of 
the expired contract since neither side had negotiated over it during the failed contract 
negotiations before the first strike.
86
  Caterpillar contested this and, until the issue was resolved 
with the 1998 labor agreement, refused in the meantime to pay committeemen to attend second 
and third-step meetings to settle grievances.  In essence, the company countered UAW’s 
strategies of using factories as sites for protest, and the NLRB for legal redress, by disciplining 
workers’ acts of protest, using the appeals process within the NLRB to delay legal settlements 
and escalate the financial costs of legal and contractual remedies for the UAW and its locals as 
the union was still trying to recuperate the steep costs of the 163-day strike.  Even as the NLRB 
charges piled up against Cat—the UAW had filed fifty-eight by January 1994 and a record 441 
by the 1998 contract, making it the most heavily accused violator of labor law in the post-
Wagner Act era—the company had to that point blunted the UAW’s legal strategy by itself using 
the legal process to thwart potential union victories.  This threatened nothing short of effective 
dispute resolution in the workplace itself, a cornerstone of contracutalism on which the UAW so 
heavily relied.
87
 
Returning to Defeat: The UAW Strikes Again 
 Having gathered momentum and confidence during its in-plant and community 
campaigns, the UAW resumed its strike on June 20, 1994.
88
  Believing that its in-plant campaign 
had sufficiently dried up Cat’s inventory, the union felt that it could prevent the company from 
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meeting consumer demand that now was robust.  Unlike the first strike, however, the second 
strike was an unfair labor-practice strike. This meant that, unlike strikes over primarily economic 
issues, the company could not permanently replace strikers, affording them some protection that 
they lacked in 1991.  
Much of the impetus to strike came from the workers themselves.  “They wanted to 
strike.  They were itching to go out again,” Jerry Brown recalled.89  For many workers, tolerating 
harassment from managers as they worked to rule was difficult to bear.  Masculinity framed 
resistance both on the shop floor and during strikes, and many in the union were impatient with 
its slowdown strategy.  Striking was not simply a long-standing tactic, but one that expressed a 
strong stand, at times accompanied by intimidation and violence. 
Union machinist Jack Emmons represented the importance of displaying toughness by 
striking in a news editorial, warning Cat of a future strike even as the work-to-rule campaign 
widened.  Responding to the claim by Cat executive Wayne Zimmerman that workers “didn’t 
have the stomach to strike again,” Emmons retorted, “[D]on't let inactivity be mistaken for 
cowardice….When the time comes, the membership will swarm out of those buildings like angry 
bees.  They will stand together as a union, like men with dignity.”90   
This was a losing strategy, for Cat had already amply illustrated its willingness to break 
the strike by hiring workers and encouraging union members to cross their picket lines.  The first 
day of the second strike saw a wave of workers cross the picket line, with Cat claiming that 
roughly 1,200 of the 4,500 first-shift employees in Peoria-area factories reporting to work.  
Although the union disputed those numbers, it was undeniable that, despite a strong show of 
union strength, the company had more than enough people on hand to continue operations during 
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the strike.
91
  Company memos from the East Peoria factory indicate that Cat had an average of 
just over 1,000 workers there from October to December 1994.
92
  Workers crossed despite the 
fact that the UAW tripled the funds that strikers would receive, from $100 to $300 per week, and 
was paying nearly $600 per month for workers’ health insurance.93 This illustrated more than 
people’s fear of losing their jobs, but that unionism, solidarity, and the UAW itself did not 
invigorate many at Cat any more.   
This amplified frustration among strikers, who endured the longest strike against an 
earthmoving equipment company—eighteen months—that any union had ever conducted.  While 
much of the membership continued to foster ties within the Peoria area and others reached out to 
regional and national unions for support, an atmosphere of hostility and violence permeated the 
picket lines and local communities.  Racial tensions flared among some white strikers and blacks 
who crossed the picket line, were hired during the strike, had already worked in non-union jobs, 
or who worked for Vance.  Jimmy Williams, a security guard at the East Peoria factory, said that 
some strikers hurled racist epithets at line crossers and Vance guards.
94
 Black Peorians 
historically denied opportunities at Cat now had a better chance at good jobs and better pay.  
This led one anonymous black line crosser who was black to urge other blacks to apply.  "Black 
people need to make sure we're getting some of those jobs," he told The Journal-Star, "and if the 
people on strike lose their jobs, there's going to be a lot more job openings."
95
 For some white 
strikers, this likely augmented their fear of not simply losing their jobs, but losing their status as 
white workers. 
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Conclusion 
 The UAW made a fatal mistake when it struck Cat for the second time in June 1994, for 
despite staying out and pressuring Cat for eighteen months, the union was forced to relent and 
return to work in December 1995, still without a contract after more than four years negotiations 
had begun.  While the fight with Cat was not yet over, the chances for victory were precariously 
thin.  Cat held considerable leverage over the union and workers, who were divided among 
themselves and faced concerted community pressure throughout the dispute.  A strong 
resurgence of class consciousness, infused with discourses of workplace rights and nationalism, 
failed to appeal to many in Peoria, where localism and loyalty to Cat remained strong.  
 The globalization of work and market competition had devastating effects on Cat workers 
by heightening company efforts to eliminate jobs, roll back union gains, and reassert an 
individualized relationship between employees. The company sought a return to conditions that 
had not existed since workers unionized in the early 1940s.  Globalization also spiked tensions 
within local communities, fearful of the consequences should the area lose more jobs, especially 
the good-paying ones at Cat.  Those who urged the two sides to settle the dispute regardless of 
the terms, or who crossed picket lines, did not embrace globalization as an avenue to success.  
Rather, they often expressed an acceptance of the pressures globalization placed on their lives, 
and a willingness to endure them as long as possible.  Peoria, in turn, struggled to find viable 
long-term economic alternatives to the area’s historic reliance on Cat for its livelihood, tackling 
deindustrialization with modest degrees of success that the next chapter will address.     
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Chapter 5: ‘Not Gracious Victors:’ Defeat, Deindustrialization, and the 
Declining Fortunes of the American Working Class, 1995-2005 
 As Sunday December 3, 1995 approached, Willie Coates had much on his mind. That 
day, he would cast his vote for or against a proposal for which Caterpillar had fiercely lobbied—
in the press and in communications with the UAW and its members—to have its employees vote. 
With the strike having already lasted for seventeen months, and workers facing a second long 
winter on the picket lines, Caterpillar likely discerned that many, perhaps the majority, would 
ratify it and end over five years of bitter strife that divided the factory floor and the Peoria 
community. Ultimately, the union overwhelmingly rejected the proposal, but the International 
union called off the strike regardless of the final results. The International did not release the 
numbers, for the tally did not affect whether or not the membership would return. Local 751 in 
Decatur indicated that ninety-two percent of its members rejected the contract.
1
  
 In an interview with the Peoria Journal-Star, Coates revealed little beforehand about how 
he would vote, indicating the seriousness with which he weighed his decision. "I'm going to vote 
as though it is my vote that sends us back or my vote that keeps us out," he said quietly. His 
family weighed heavily on his mind. "A man has to do what a man has to do.  My family comes 
first," Coates said, coughing as he became emotional.
2
 However, his reflections on the strike, his 
career at Caterpillar, his union, and his experiences as a middle-aged African American father in 
Peoria, spoke volumes about the identities that shaped his perspectives and guided his choices. 
Coates fused his pro-union beliefs with his identity as a black male, speaking proudly as an 
example for younger black workers that a better life was possible, and the UAW was fighting for 
that. “The young brothers used to look up to me.  I made it out of the ghetto, and I'm struggling 
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here because I want good union jobs to remain so the younger generation can work its way out of 
the ghetto.” His wife was also a union member and shop steward at the telephone company 
Ameritech. Coates made deep sacrifices to maintain his job at Caterpillar, well before the 1990s. 
He lost his car, motorcycle, and nearly his home when he was laid off in 1982. Even though the 
company called him back to work in 1987, he took a second job as a security guard at 
Northwoods Mall in 1991, before the strike. His son, age 21 also worked two jobs, the second 
“just pays for his car insurance.” Sitting on his front porch, Coates reflected on the 
precariousness of his life, linking it to his union and the decline of America’s industrial workers. 
“"We are Americans, and the flag symbolizes the union movement," Coates said with 
resolve.  "At one time I thought I was on the top of the world.  Now I'm just hanging on.”3  
In straightforward, poignant tones, Willie Coates articulated the uncertain terrain that 
strikers, indeed much of the American working class, had to negotiate as the twentieth century 
limped to a close. Layoffs, concessions, declining union power, and diminished prospects for the 
young threatened to undo the gains workers overall made after World War Two.  African 
American workers such as Coates faced particular socioeconomic insecurities such as higher 
unemployment rates than their white counterparts. Having been historically excluded from many 
good jobs, black workers who did attain them faced early layoffs due to workplace seniority 
provisions. This chapter examines the culmination and consequences of the UAW struggles 
against Caterpillar, their impact on a dramatically altered labor-relations landscape locally and 
nationally, and the effects that deindustrialization had on the economy and people in the Peoria 
region, paying particular attention to its African American population. It takes a critical look at 
the union’s fateful decision in June 1994 to shift from its reasonably successful in-plant 
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campaign to resuming its strike, despite the company’s unmistakable threat in April 1992 to 
permanently replace strikers, and discusses alternatives the union may have taken to have more 
forcefully opposed the company’s concessionary demands. 
Assessing the Strike and In-Plant Strategy: The Power of the Strike at Century’s End 
  Some UAW leaders believed that, instead of returning to the picket lines in June 1994, 
they should have stuck with the in-plant campaign that had effectively hampered Caterpillar’s 
production for two years, and goaded the company into an extensive harassment campaign that 
targeted local union leaders and rank-and-file militants on the shop floor. The in-plant strategies 
not only curtailed production, but also brought pressure from the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) and a slew of negative newspapers stories concerning the company’s widespread 
violations of labor law. In an effort to suppress the UAW’s resistance to contract concessions and 
the work-to-rule campaign, Caterpillar responded by firing a total of 160 union members, 
suspending scores more, and routinely violating the union’s right to organize and conduct union 
activity in the workplace, resulting in 441 labor-board charges against Caterpillar by the 1998 
contract settlement—the most ever levied against a single company. Under extreme duress, 
workers were becoming adept at working to rule. Jim O’Connor, who was Local 974’s president 
from 1981 to 1983, when he became a representative for the UAW International, was in charge 
of coordinating the in-plant campaigns. He believed they should have pursued this campaign, 
and not resumed the strike in 1994. “I really think that’s where you win.  You win on that shop-
floor.  You don’t necessarily win out on the street where somebody’s in there doing your job.”4 
Jerry Brown agreed. “If I had to do it again,” Brown reflected, “we should have stayed in the 
                                                          
4
 Jim O’Connor, interview at his home, Marquette Heights, Il, December 18, 2006. 
 
200 
 
plant instead of going on strike again and giving them [the company] the chance to replace us.”5 
Some rank-and-file members disagreed, believing that striking was the right decision and would 
have been more effective were it not for those who crossed the picket line. “If it weren’t for all 
the damn scabs going back in,” insisted David LaHood, a retired 974 member and veteran of the 
1990s battles, “there’s no doubt in my mind we would have won [the strike].”6 
 LaHood is correct that the strikes would have been more effective without the mass 
defections within their own ranks, for those who worked during the strike had years of 
experience and vast knowledge of many jobs that they passed along to hundreds of new 
employees the company hired after 1994. Had the UAW maintained more solid picket lines, the 
union would have made it more difficult for Caterpillar to meet consumer demand. This would 
also have placed additional burdens on the company’s supervisors and non-union staff, many of 
whom were reassigned to perform unfamiliar production jobs, to do these jobs while also 
training any new employees, further impeding production. 
Yet LaHood and others who defended the union’s long, unsuccessful strike in 1994 and 
1995 overestimate the strength the UAW held against the company. By 1994, the UAW 
represented roughly one-quarter of Caterpillar’s US workforce, with the rest dispersed among a 
growing number of non-union factories, especially in the South. Combined with its overseas 
factories, many of which produced similar products and spare parts—if not the same ones—the 
company did not lack the means to continue producing, and did shift some production to its 
factories in Brazil and Europe. However, the company did not need to shift the majority of its 
production during the 1994-1995 strike. By hiring hundreds of new employees, and enticing both 
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current and retired UAW members to cross the picket lines, Caterpillar continued to produce 
enough engines, spare parts, and finished products to supply customers, while recording profits 
that surprised even business analysts.
7
 Its profits for the 1995 fiscal year surpassed $1 billion for 
the first time. With the company thriving despite the long strike, the business press lavished 
praise on Caterpillar and its CEO, Don Fites, whom Financial World magazine named CEO of 
the year.
8
   
The company’s willingness to use replacement labor should have been abundantly clear 
after the first strike in 1992, which ended with Caterpillar’s threat to permanently replace 
strikers. Although few workers in other factory towns returned to work, hundreds of Peoria 
UAW members, the site of the company’s headquarters with a large potential pool of 
replacement workers, crossed their own picket lines to effectively break the strike. Nationwide, 
the UAW strikes against Caterpillar were part of a precious few large labor conflicts of the late 
twentieth century, with the number of strikes involving over 1,000 workers having drastically 
declined between the late 1960s and the early 1990s. The few unionized workforces at the 
remaining large firms were far less willing to take to the picket lines in this period than in years 
past, with the fear of permanent replacement looming overhead like the sword of Damocles. (See 
Table 5.1) Returning to the picket lines in June 1994 proved a fatal mistake. Why then did the 
UAW resort to the strike despite receiving such a painful lesson in its limitations just two years 
before? 
Part of the answer lies, ironically, in the success of the in-plant strategy which slowed 
production enough to exhaust much of the machinery the company had stockpiled. The union, 
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therefore, thought that a strike would further limit production, deprive the company’s dealers of 
equipment, and create a backlog of orders the company could not fulfill, thus forcing Caterpillar 
to relent. “We felt we had them over a barrel,” Jerry Brown said, “and the pressure from the 
rank-and-file to go back out was growing” by 1994. “They were struggling to meet their orders, 
and we knew it.” While the company disputed the degree to which the work-to-rule strategies 
had slowed production, these clearly had an effect, reducing output in the UAW-represented 
factories by roughly half the normal amount just a few months into the in-plant campaign.
9
  
The union did not just overestimate the effectiveness of striking. In the heat of the shop 
floor battles that raged from 1992 to 1994, the UAW failed to adequately assess the effectiveness 
of working to rule in the context of the company’s shift from mass production to lean production 
techniques. As chapter 4 discussed, lean production’s very attractiveness to companies—
reducing costs and production time through smaller stockpiles of parts and streamlined assembly 
lines with just-in-time methods—also exposed its soft underbelly, its susceptibility to disruption 
through work-to-rule campaigns that interfered with production by adding time, and therefore 
inefficiency, back into the process. This is just what the UAW effectively did by working to rule, 
adding considerable time where the company’s industrial planners had not intended.10  
More than the UAW’s rejection of in-plant strategies was to blame for losing the 
struggles of the 1990s. The circumstances under which the UAW returned to the picket lines 
revealed crucial flaws in how its in-plant campaign functioned, and fundamental limitations in 
workers’ willingness to stick with it. Working to rule is not a strategy implemented and executed 
overnight. It takes careful planning, ample time, and endless discussions and meetings to inform 
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and educate workers about how to work to rule, what their rights are, and how to avoid being 
disciplined by management. At Staley and LTV, Jerry Tucker met frequently with workers for 
months to coordinate in-plant efforts, and apprise workers of the potential costs involved.
11
 In 
some ways, the UAW’s successful application of work-to-rule strategies between the strikes is 
all the more impressive, for the union neither planned nor implemented them until the first strike 
failed. The UAW began working to rule within six weeks after the strike ended in early April 
1992, and had already effectively stanched production within several months.
12
  
But it initiated the in-plant phase of resistance amidst heavy repression that exacted a 
heavy toll on workers. Jim O’Connor criticized the UAW’s belated approach to conducting 
work-to-rule, saying “I think we wait until we’re in a protracted strike and then we’re back to 
work without an agreement before we educate and train the members on how to do it.  There’s 
no pre-emptive training going on.  We’re not getting ‘em ready a year or two before the contract 
expires, we’re getting ‘em ready in the middle of a battle.”13  Caterpillar heightened the costs of 
the strategy by inflicting losses on the locals through direct and frequently heated confrontations 
that resulted in widespread and illegal disciplinary actions. For example, foreman James 
Goddard in Decatur was found to have violated the rights of UAW 751 committeeman Rod Hale, 
who was talking to co-workers about union business while on break, which is protected union 
activity. Goddard confronted Hale both physically and verbally, approaching Hale and saying, 
“Hey buddy, I want to see you in the aisle,” to which Hale answered, “I’m not your buddy.” 
Goddard then grabbed Hale by the elbow, to which Hale responded angrily, “Keep your 
goddamned hands off me.” Goddard then became irate and “broke into a hail of curse words” in 
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front of his co-workers.
14
 These were threatening, emotionally and psychologically stressful 
experiences to endure, and part of a corporate barrage with front-line supervisors playing central 
roles in heavy-handed harassment for which UAW members may not have been fully prepared. 
While the NLRB ruled that the company violated Hale’s rights, it was part of a widespread 
pattern of company behavior intended to intimidate workers who stood up to management’s 
aggressiveness. In the past, such heated confrontations were not uncommon and frequently were 
settled through the grievance procedure, with cooler heads prevailing. In the early 1990s, 
however, they were infused with the emotional context of a long and costly strike, and the 
pervasive threat of discipline that included losing one’s job.  
Working to rule required patience in the face of direct, often face-to-face pressure to 
match the perseverance workers had shown in resisting the company’s demands for concessions. 
As Caterpillar’s repression mounted, the urge to return to the strike, to revert a more direct form 
of action, grew stronger. A traditionally successful strategy before 1992, strikes against 
Caterpillar were aggressive, male-dominated actions in which maintaining a strong, unified, 
physical presence, backed by force if necessary, imposed the union’s will over the company. 
Picket lines were spaces in which workers’ masculinity was reinforced through bonding 
experiences—walking for hours together, talking, and verbally and physically harassing anyone 
trying to breach the line. Strikes represented a more effective form of resistance for a largely 
male workforce than working to rule, which relied on the delayed enforcement of the NLRB and 
the mechanisms of jurisprudence. A core component of working to rule as an alternative, 
protracted strategy is the willingness to adhere to it, to believe in the effectiveness of the process 
of slowing down production.  Miners at Pittston in the late 1980s, also mostly male, bristled at 
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the provocations of management and armed guards, finding it difficult not to respond physically 
as they likely would have in past disputes. The UMWA radically altered course in opposing 
concessions in Pittston, utilizing sit-down protests and a combination of non-violent resistance 
and occupying company facilities that tested more than just the patience but the very masculine 
identities of the primarily male miners. Crucially, miners were trained in and convinced over 
time of the efficacy of the new strategies. Conversely, as time progressed at Caterpillar and 
tensions, and labor board charges mounted, the rank-and-file became more willing to walk out, 
for it represented a more direct form of fighting back.
15
  
The rank-and-file at Caterpillar was pushed to a boiling point in the weeks before 
conducting its seventeen-month unfair labor practice strike, fueled by outrage over management 
harassment that left them feeling degraded.  Al Weygand, UAW Local 145 bargaining 
committee chairman in Aurora, Illinois, characterized the mood of the membership as volatile. 
"The people are totally fed up. They are not going to allow Caterpillar to keep violating their 
rights," Weygand said. Workers showed their displeasure with signs reading, “Caterpillar treats 
us like dogs.”16 They felt dehumanized and unwilling to tolerate it, increasingly walking off the 
job in rolling strike actions.  
While the union’s work-to-rule campaign successfully slowed the company’s production 
output, Caterpillar’s aggressive attacks on workplace rights managed to frustrate workers and, to 
a considerable degree, put the UAW on the defensive. As NLRB charges mounted against it, the 
company used to its advantage the built-in delays through multiple appeals for realizing justice 
through the Labor Board. Its subsequent powerlessness to force companies such as Caterpillar 
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that openly flouted its directives at once called the effectiveness of the federal system of 
workplace jurisprudence into question, and inflicted greater harm on workers and the UAW than 
the company bore. While it incurred considerable legal costs, and sharp rebukes from the NLRB 
and its administrative law judges (ALJ), as the UAW compiled hundreds of unfair labor practice 
charges against it, Caterpillar’s vast financial reserves as a profitable multibillion-dollar 
company allowed it to withstand the financial and public-relations blows. Illegally terminated 
and suspended workers, on the other hand, suffered far more as they risked losing their homes, 
their cars, their jobs in which they, as a high-seniority workforce, had invested years, and their 
families for their militancy.  
The company’s unilateral termination of the contractual clause requiring it to pay the 
union’s committee chairpersons for on-shift union time was a potentially serious blow, for it 
challenged the union’s financial capacity to fund union work that it had not been required to in 
the past. During the in-plant campaigns of the 1990s, the committee heads were vital to 
organizing shop-floor resistance to the company, in addition to performing representation duties. 
Forcing the UAW to pay for this work would have made such resistance more difficult by 
reducing the time the committee leaders spent on union business, and requiring more rank-and-
file activists, many of whom lacked the experience in union work, to pick up the slack.
17
  
Its campaign against the NLRB and the decisions it consistently rendered against 
Caterpillar was equally aggressive. Well beyond challenging the Board’s judgments against it, 
the company attacked the integrity and objectivity of the NLRB’s general counsel and claimed 
that the office was, “at best…out of touch with the realities of the factory floor and, at worst,” 
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guilty of “harbor[ing] a strong pro-union bias.” In a scathing testimony before a House hearing 
on overseeing the NLRB in 1995, company human services vice president Wayne Zimmerman 
portrayed the company’s disciplinary actions against union members during the in-plant 
campaign as nothing more than exercising what “we consider a basic right to manage our 
facilities.” It was not the company that was intimidating the union and its members but rather, to 
Zimmerman, the other way around. The company had to take action against the UAW’s in-plant 
activities because “Not only were these rallies disruptive to other workers, they were 
intimidating to plant guests and visitors, most of whom are customers or potential customers.” 
Zimmerman criticized the counsel and the UAW alike, arguing that the “overall willingness on 
the part of the NLRB General Counsel's office in our current labor dispute to be a frequent 
advocate” protected what he dubbed “the most radical and irresponsible elements of the UAW.” 
While claiming not to attack “the National Labor Relations Board as an institution…home to 
many highly-skilled and expert Administrative Law Judges, Board Members, and other 
professionals,” Zimmerman and the company left little doubt concerning the regard it held for 
the Board’s decisions against Caterpillar.18 It continued to appeal all major Board rulings through 
1997, as the NLRB decided in favor of the UAW in cases covering workers fired illegally, and 
the ruling that the 1994-1995 strike was an unfair-labor-practice strike. Even though the UAW 
won with these rulings, it ultimately failed to realize appreciable leverage in forcing Caterpillar 
to back off its demand for concessions. Delaying the resolution of the 441 NLRB charges served 
the company very well. 
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 On a national level, the underwhelming response from the AFL-CIO in the Caterpillar 
strike, and the concurrent Staley lockout, paralleled the federation’s apoplexy in the other great 
fights of the late twentieth century.  After President Reagan permanently replaced the striking air 
traffic controllers of PATCO in August, 1981, the AFL-CIO did little more than to organize a 
large protest rally in Washington, D.C. a month later. Although more than 250,000 union 
members and their supporters joined the rally, the action did little more than provide a public 
forum for union leaders and members to vent their anger at Reagan’s bold maneuver. To some 
degree, the AFL-CIO’s relative indifference can be attributed to the fact that its leadership had 
been annoyed that PATCO was one of three member unions to endorse Reagan, a Republican, 
with the hopes that the endorsement might persuade him to lend a sympathetic ear toward their 
grievances. Yet their response, or lack thereof, in the face of a bold attack was the norm within 
the “house of labor.”  When the United Paperworkers International Union (UPIU) struck 
International Paper’s mill in Jay, Maine, the union received considerably support from state and 
local AFL-CIO councils in the northeast, but no help from the national federation in coordinating 
what became a pivotal, seventeen-month losing struggle in the paper industry.
19
  
 Desperate for help and mired in prolonged disputes, Larry Solomon of UAW local 751 in 
Decatur joined a contingent of Staley Road Warriors, having developed close ties through 
solidarity protests and speaking to unions across the country about their disputes, to travel to Bal 
Harbour, Florida for the 1995 AFL-CIO national convention. Hoping to draw support from the 
federation that had largely shunned their struggles which, by February 1995 had dragged on for 
years, Solomon told the New York Times, “The AFL-CIO has the organization and national 
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standing to raise money better than we can.”20 It might have, but it lacked the gumption to 
muster them on behalf of the activists and their cause. When the organizers wrote collective 
letters to their union presidents explaining the purpose of their upcoming trip, they were flatly 
rebuffed. UAW president Owen Bieber responded that the workers ought to stay home, declaring 
that a trip to the convention “served no purpose.” The group came anyway, and was shocked at 
the class divisions between them and the national leadership. While the rank-and-file contingent 
scraped together just enough money to share tattered rooms in a run-down motel, the AFL-CIO 
leadership enjoyed posh accommodations at the Bal Harbour Sheraton hotel, complete with large 
pools and waterfalls spread over acres of lush landscape, to which leaders traveled in limousines. 
On the convention floor, the AFL-CIO endorsed their cause, pledging to come to Decatur, and 
raise the stakes and financial support for their struggles. In the hallways, however, the contingent 
was treated with disdain and dismay for their breaching the protocol of the organization by 
arriving on their own, and leafleting outside the convention to publicize their disputes. Illinois 
AFL-CIO president Don Johnson scolded the group, “You guys are an embarrassment to the 
labor movement.” Some national union leaders did arrive afterward in Decatur, particularly on 
behalf of the Staley struggle, and donated tens of thousands of dollars to help the families of 
locked-out workers. Yet despite pledges by the new AFL-CIO leadership of John Sweeney and 
Richard Trumka, elected in October 1995, to support the mounting corporate campaign against 
Staley, never materialized. The federation and its member unions were more concerned about 
maintaining protocol and jurisdiction than extending much-needed support to beleaguered local 
unions.
21
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 Nor did the UAW, which widely publicized its flirtations with international solidarity 
with Caterpillar workers abroad in 1994, coordinate or even continue such efforts in conjunction 
with its seventeen-month strike from June 1994 to its demise in December 1995. Activists within 
the UAW developed close ties with other rank-and-file workers and groups around the nation, 
having formed their own group of Road Warriors in 1994. They also spoke regularly to UAW 
leaders and members at the union’s educational center in Black Lake, Michigan. Yet these 
connections existed largely within traditional union channels, and did not branch out to other 
community groups or unions internationally, where Caterpillar and other large multinational 
corporations increasingly operated—and American-based unions rarely did. Among local 974’s 
leaders, there appeared to be little consideration of this avenue for potentially new allies that 
could have pressured Caterpillar on an international front and coordinated, for the first time, 
international solidarity actions against the company. Jerry Brown, who was president of local 
974 during the 1990s, recalled their hosting the 1994 World Council of Caterpillar Workers, but 
no other international initiatives. “There wasn’t much [international solidarity] I was aware of,” 
he said. When asked whether the local union, rather than the International, had discussed 
extending its campaign against Caterpillar to incorporate the company’s foreign workers, Brown 
responded, “No. I would have thought that was the International’s job.”22  
The answer illustrates more than a disregard for fostering international solidarity.  The 
relationship between the local and the International was one framed by rigid boundaries—that 
anything occurring on the international level, as if by definition, must have been the 
International’s responsibility, while the locals handled what was in closer proximity. Yet each 
shared in the failure to cultivate such ties, resulting in a broad-based yet ultimately effort that 
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could effectively pressure the company to settle the strike by significantly impeding its 
production. Nor did the UAW develop a corporate campaign that engaged or threatened 
Caterpillar’s vast international operations, which the United Steelworkers of America had done 
with remarkable success against a strident push for concessions by the Ravenswood Aluminum 
Company of West Virginia.
23
 The union kept its focus on local and national actions and 
solidarity networks, rather than developing new and innovative tactics that elsewhere proved to 
be successful, and applying them on a broader scale to match Caterpillar’s power.  
Once they walked out for the second time on June 20, 1994, the UAW did not re-enter 
the factories until it admitted defeat in early December, 1995, agreeing to return to work without 
a contract. It was a humiliating loss for the UAW, made all the worse by the fact that beginning 
in July 1994, the International union shelled out millions in strike and health benefits, $300 to 
each member per week in strike pay and for some up to $600 per month in medical coverage, in 
an unsuccessful attempt to prevent members from crossing strike lines. Frustration mounted 
among strikers as fellow union members joined roughly 1,800 new hires to allow the company, 
however fitfully, to keep churning out production.
24
 The presence of some African Americans 
among those crossing the line infused the strike with racial tensions, with claims that some 
strikers pelted the strikebreakers with epithets. For many African American workers, this was 
their first opportunity to work at Caterpillar after years of exclusion from some of the best-
paying jobs that remained in the region. This was not lost on one black strikebreaker, who said, 
"Black people need to make sure we're getting some of those jobs, and if the people on strike 
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lose their jobs, there's going to be a lot more job openings."
25
 Jimmy Williams, an African 
American security guard at Caterpillar’s East Peoria factory, said he and others were peppered 
with epithets during the second strike.
26
 Another black strikebreaker told the Peoria Journal-Star 
that she was called racial slurs by picketers who hid under the cover of darkness before and after 
work at the company's Mapleton plant. "They don't do it daily," she said.  "They do it when they 
feel they can get away with it."
27
 
A couple of elements of this are important to consider when evaluating the veracity of the 
accusations of racism. On the one hand, the company went to great lengths to negatively portray 
the UAW, often getting help from the pro-company newspaper the Peoria Journal-Star. Some of 
the charges against strikers for hurling racist epithets, including in one well-publicized case in 
York, Pennsylvania, were dropped due to lack of evidence.
28
 On the other, race deeply divided 
the region, for some sections of Peoria and some of the outlying towns in which many workers 
resided were nearly all-white, and therefore places that created discursive and psychological 
spaces between races that complemented the physical space separating whites from ‘others.’ It is 
in such spaces that racial stereotypes, fears, and anxieties can readily develop. Also, the Peoria 
region has a long history in which racism has percolated to the surface, even if appearing to be 
dormant for some time. Additionally, tensions were running high among strikers, who faced the 
loss of their jobs as well as the failure of their strike, who watched workers cross their picket 
lines on a daily basis and were powerless to prevent it. The common elements of frustration and 
powerlessness spurred some to adopt different and often surreptitious means of striking back, 
namely the use of violence against strikebreakers. Jack rocks, which were bent pieces of metal 
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with sharp ends commonly used to puncture tires, had been used in strikes at Caterpillar for 
years. One striker carried the threat of violence to a greater extreme in 1994 when he was 
arrested for possession of a box of small-scale explosives on his way to the East Peoria plant.
29
  
That some strikers may have resorted to shouting racist epithets during such a contentious strike, 
particularly in an anonymous manner that rendered them difficult to verify, is realistic and 
reasonable to conclude that they likely occurred.  
Peoria at Century’ End: Refashioning an Urban Economy and Identity 
 As the hostilities began in earnest between Caterpillar and the UAW, the Peoria region 
found itself in a struggle to revitalize its economy. Faced with the decline of its industrial base, 
Peoria attempted to wean itself from its reliance upon Caterpillar by revitalizing its flagging 
riverfront area and utilizing the Illinois River as a natural resource with economic potential to 
draw tourists. It cast a wide net in creating job opportunities by becoming the site of a new 
federal prison, and a site for gambling as a potential area for new economic growth.  
First proposed to the Peoria city council by architect Angelos Demetriou in 1981, plans 
for a casino on the Illinois River were received favorably but delayed when Caterpillar’s fortunes 
took a nose dive in the early 1980s. Delayed while the company recovered, East Peoria 
eventually moved forward with plans for a casino on a ship that would dock on the river and also 
take patrons on tours as they gambled. Nearly ten years to the day after Demetriou proposed it, 
the riverboat casino Par-A-Dice opened on September 15, 1991, Part of a broader riverfront 
revitalization campaign, the casino spurred the growth of new service-sector businesses such as 
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restaurants and hotels along both sides of the river to accommodate patrons from across central 
Illinois.
30
  
 Adopting the casino as a potential revenue stream placed the Peoria area squarely within 
a broader acceptance of the gambling industry in the early 1990s, as cash-strapped states and 
communities particularly in deindustrialized urban areas turned to gambling as they came to 
grips with declining industrial bases. By 1990, manufacturing jobs constituted just one-fifth of 
Peoria County’s total employment.31 While just two states had legalized gambling in 1988, by 
1994 there were twenty-three.
32
 The opening of Par-A-Dice followed a similar move by the 
Quad Cities to the west, which tried to boost its sagging economy and complement its own 
fading industrial base. Two years after Par-A-Dice opened, the state of Indiana legalized 
riverboat gambling, resulting in two large casinos dotting the lakefront in Gary, Indiana, where 
steel mills used to dominate the city’s landscape. Its two casinos each earn over $100 million in 
revenue, drawing patrons from throughout the Chicagoland area. While Gary and the state of 
Indiana reaped tens of millions of dollars in fees from the casinos throughout the 1990s, this 
money did not necessarily filter into the inner city area for neighborhood improvements or good-
paying jobs for residents. In Gary, the rise of a gambling-based economy coincided with and 
may have exacerbated the city’s drastic spike in crime rates, which routinely made Gary “the 
murder capital of America.”33  
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 Gambling arrived in the Peoria area at the same time that the region’s industrial decline 
hit with full force, affecting all residents but none harder than its African American community. 
In 1980, 34.5 percent of black Peoria County workers were in manufacturing. By 1990, the share 
had dropped to twenty-one percent.  At the same time, the percentage of blacks in the lower-
wage retail sector, including those in the food-service industry, rose from ten to twenty-one 
percent during this span.
34
 Historically excluded from the best industrial jobs for decades, 
African Americans now faced worse job prospects than the rest of the mostly white region as the 
number of well-paying, unionized industrial jobs declined. 
Gambling revenues and the growth of the waterfront’s service-sector economy did little 
to abate crime rates in the city, where most blacks in the area lived. In 1995, Peoria had the 
second-high violent crime rate among the biggest cities in Illinois, behind only Chicago and 
ahead of Rockford, Springfield, and Aurora.
35
 The region also strove to draw jobs by providing 
the land for a $53 million federal prison in Pekin, which opened in October 1994. Housing over 
1,200 inmates, the medium-security prison employs approximately 300 guards and staff. 
Although the prison provided some jobs, hiring-age restrictions excluded many industrial 
workers in the region, for the Federal Bureau of Prisons capped the age for its new hires at 37.
36
   
 As the region struggled with new economic challenges to reshape its economy, it 
continued to face long-standing issues of racism and spatial segregation. Accusations of racism 
and racist incidents surfaced again in the mid-1990s, illustrating the persistence of deep-seated 
divisions and, for some, resistance to changing race relations in the Peoria area. They also share 
a common thread with the UAW-Caterpillar labor disputes, for the community exhibited an 
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overarching concern with negative perceptions of Peoria, and the desire to move on with life as 
usual without sufficiently addressing or analyzing the implications of the strikes or the 
resurfacing of racism.  
Matthew Hale, a white supremacist student from East Peoria, drew national attention—
and much embarrassment for Peorians—beginning in the 1990s with his racist pronouncements 
and organizing. In April 1995, he ran for East Peoria’s city council, and the results startled and 
angered many in the community. At first glance, he only received 546 votes and finished last. 
However, Hale received the support of roughly sixteen percent of the voters. The most pertinent 
aspect of the election is not the number of votes he garnered, but rather that he received that 
many when it was no secret that he openly espoused racist viewpoints, and was roundly 
criticized in the media for them before the election. He did not receive 546 votes despite his 
views but rather because of them, suggesting that pockets of strident racism similar to those that 
historically supported the Klan remained in the area. He also received them from a city and at a 
time in which deindustrialization had diminished the region’s industrial base, and good jobs 
particularly for young people were scarce. The threat that Hale posed, and the connections 
between the election and deindustrialization were not lost on the Journal-Star, which 
editorialized that if unchecked, Hale might reach the status of David Duke, the former Klan 
member who made a strong push for Louisiana governor in 1991, capturing the majority of the 
state’s white vote.  “If 546 voted for him this time, how about the next time he runs, when 
unemployment might be higher and people angrier? We shouldn't have to remind people that this 
is how David Duke got started in Louisiana. Hale needs to be checked along the way, before he 
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gets that far. He and his message are destructive. People need to be warned. This election is a 
wake-up call.”37 
Hale’s New Church of the Creator in East Peoria, later called the World Church of the 
Creator, became the source of a deadly outburst of violence in 1999, after Hale, who had 
graduated from Southern Illinois University with a law degree, was denied a state license to 
practice. Two days later, World Church follower Benjamin Smith resigned from the church and 
immediately went on a shooting spree in Illinois and Indiana, killing two and wounding eighteen 
more before committing suicide. Hale claimed his organization was not responsible for the 
tragedy by claiming that they did not advocate violence, despite having done so in the 
organization’s literature. In 2005, Hale was sentenced to a forty-year prison term for trying to 
solicit an FBI informant to murder federal judge Joan Lefkow, who had ruled against Hale’s 
Church in a trademark dispute over the group’s name, and whose husband and mother were later 
murdered in their Chicago home.
38
 
While Hale and these events drew considerable media attention and harsh consequences, 
other lesser-known incidents showed that racist undercurrents ran deeper than Hale and his 
organization. Peoria city councilman Gary Sandberg found himself briefly in hot water in 1998 
when, in a confrontation over a parking spot with a young black woman, called her a “nigger” 
and other epithets.  Despite calls for his resignation from the Peoria Journal-Star, the city 
council, and community leaders, Sandberg apologized, attributed his outburst to a bad day, and 
remained. His long history with the council, in addition to considerable public support from 
                                                          
37
 “From Matt Hale, A Wake Up Call,” editorial, Peoria Journal-Star, April 6, 1995, A4. 
38
 Matt O’Connor, “Hale Gets 40 years for Plot to Kill Judge,” Chicago Tribune, April 7, 2005, 1. 
218 
 
many white constituents, enabled his re-election to an at-large seat on the council.
39
 Pekin 
witnessed a brief spate of cross burnings in March 1996 when a local white family with black 
friends breached the city’s racial lines. Brothers Damon and Christopher Nance, and friend 
Timothy Wood, were charged with a hate crime when they erected and burned a cross on the 
front lawn of Pekin resident James Camp, whose fifteen-year-old daughter was dating a black 
boy. Damon Nance told police he did this "to tell black people to stay out of this neighborhood." 
This occurred two days after two other white teenagers also burned a cross in Camp’s yard.40 
 These events fit within Peoria’s history of racial problems, but also occurred within the 
important context of deindustrialization and fewer high-wage jobs, with particularly pernicious 
consequences for the area’s youth. According to the 1990 census, poverty rates in Peoria County 
were 14.5 percent, well above the state average of 11.9 percent. Even though Tazewell County, 
where Pekin and East Peoria are located, had a considerably lower county-wide poverty rate of 
9.1 percent, those two cities comprised the bulk of the county’s poor. While unemployment rates 
were moderate at around 7 percent, most jobs created were in the low-wage service sector. As 
Sharron Matthews, executive director of the Chicago-based Public Welfare Coalition of Illinois, 
succinctly stated, "You can't base a whole economic recovery for a whole class of people on 
[jobs at] Burger King." The dearth of good jobs in the region placed greater burdens on local 
relief programs. Norma Weaver, director of the Peoria's regional Salvation Army post, attested to 
an increase in Peoria’s population of the working poor, adding, "They're not moving up at all.” 
Many new jobs that the region’s economy created demanded college education and greater skills 
development than its working-class population could afford.  Economic stagnation and 
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diminished prospects for the future intersected with a troubled history of racism to feed a 
resurgence of racial tensions.
41
 
 Yet many in the community believed that the solutions for the region’s economic woes 
lay elsewhere. Global trade, with Caterpillar as the engine of revival, was vital for the region’s 
recovery. The Journal-Star at once admitted Peoria’s intertwined fortunes with the company’s, 
and articulated an acceptance of its place within—and reliance upon—a more global economy. 
“The future health of Caterpillar, and of central Illinois, is dependent upon a revival of 
economies around the world. As long as businesses in Brazil, Australia and Europe aren’t doing 
well, neither will Caterpillar.  We here in Peoria—or in the United States—are no longer a self-
sufficient island able to flourish on our own. As long as we’re part of the world community, our 
fate and our future will be tied to others throughout the globe.”42 Although its manufacturing 
base diminished as Caterpillar decentralized its factories, Peoria remained no less reliant upon 
the company for its well-being. Its identification as “part of the world community” was 
paradoxically still shaped by its ties to Caterpillar, even as the company’s had cut some of its 
own ties to Peoria.  
Making “an industrial hellhole:” Working-Class Insecurity in the Era of Globalization 
Upon returning in December 1995, striking workers faced the same dehumanization that 
helped launch the second strike. Forced the first day back to sit through a four-hour orientation 
on the post-strike work rules, which included a ban on using the words “strike” or “scab,” the 
company assigned workers identification numbers for time cards, rather than using their names, 
just as they did after the 1991-1992 strike. This prompted Stephen Mitchell, an employee at the 
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Mossville plant, to say the returning striker was "treated more or less like a convict or a prisoner 
of war” than an employee. A fellow striker maintained the analogy of war but characterized the 
immediate post-strike climate more bluntly, saying "It's an industrial hellhole right now. You've 
really got to toe the line. They [Caterpillar] won, and they're not gracious victors."
43
  
Company repression notwithstanding, the shop-floor battles hardly ended there. Many 
strikers wore strike t-shirts below long-sleeve shirts, plastered their lunch boxes with pro-union 
bumper stickers, and refused to back down from the aggressive tactics and posturing of 
supervisors. This led to more disciplinary actions, most later ruled illegal, swelling the case load 
before the NLRB. Workers’ resistance on the shop floor entailed greater risks than before, with 
management emboldened after twice defeating two UAW strikes in four years. The workplace 
became a more militarized space, according to UAW steward Mike Legel who said that members 
of Vance Security, who were stationed around the factory during the strikes, were often present 
on the factory floor to escort workers to and from disciplinary meetings with management. Even 
for union members attuned to industrial conflict, this proved most unnerving, and was intended 
to have that effect. Legel described being called into meeting with management, after the second 
strike, in which Vance was present. 
Well they brought these storm troopers in to me, they had two of them, one with a big 
flashlight and the other guy with a video camera, and they stayed right behind me with 
the video camera, took me and marched me up to the office and all this.  Of course I was 
the committeeman, so there wasn’t anybody to represent me, so they brought this poor 
steward in and he was shaking like a leaf, you know.  He said, ‘What are we going to do? 
What are we going to do?’ I said, Just go back. And they said, ‘What, you don’t want 
union representation?’ I said, What is this? This is ridiculous. First thing, you’ve got to 
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tell this guy with the camera to back up a step or he’s going to be wearing that thing. 
What they were trying to do was get me to do something stupid on film, you know. 
That’s the level of intimidation. I mean, you’re talking scaring the bedoobie out of 
people.  There were people that were literally scared to death that these Vance guys were 
going to take them out and beat the crap out of them.  That was the level of intimidation 
for many years at Caterpillar.
44
  
Others responded with anger and innovation. During the second strike, a group of rank-and-file 
militants formed the “Blue Shirts” to mock and mirror Vance Security members. After the strike 
ended, they became shop-floor militants who donned plain navy blue t-shirts similar to those that 
Vance Security wore. They followed and monitored Vance members when they saw them in the 
workplace and developed an alternative symbol of union solidarity to skirt the company’s 
policies prohibiting strike-related attire.
45
  
Within this repressive climate, strikers used surreptitious methods to circumvent the rules 
against discussing the strikes or openly mentioning scabs. Those who crossed the picket line 
were often placed right next to returning strikers, increasing the chances for harassment, conflict 
and, if it occurred, disciplinary action.  To avoid trouble, strikers distributed anonymous 
cartoons, leaflets, and poems around work stations and in bathrooms, disgorging their anger on 
paper in a full-throated, often profane fashion that, articulated aloud, carried great risk. Printed 
messages asking “What is a Strikebreaker?” ridiculed “the scab” as “a traitor” who “cares only 
for himself…He is an enemy to himself, to his recent age and to all posterity.” Others were less 
refined, imbued with ribald gendered language clearly intended to humiliate those who crossed 
the picket line as more than cowardly, but the antithesis of upstanding, heterosexual, pro-union 
masculinity. One such letter, written by “the shithouse poet,” contrasted the “men with guts” on 
the picket line with “scabs…the company sluts” whose working during the strike rendered them 
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“lilly livered” [Sic.] laborers whose service for Caterpillar was equated with sexually servicing 
men.
46
  
The struggles at Caterpillar contained key elements in the multifaceted attack on 
American unions, and the purchasing power and overall economic security of working-class 
Americans. Plant closings, the transfer of unionized industrial jobs to non-union states and 
abroad, automation, and a more staunchly anti-union business class resulted in a freefall of union 
membership in the US. In the overall number of union members, the decline began in 1980 but, 
in the percentage of unionized workers, this decline occurred slowly from a postwar high of 
nearly 35% in 1954 and, as the workforce expanded, accelerated particularly from the early 
1970s to the present. (See Table 5.2) This drastically reduced the strength and influence of 
organized labor, reducing if not virtually eliminating the presence of unions in industries in 
which they had a long-established presence.  
It also hastened the trend, paralleling the declining unionization rates and wage 
stagnation among US workers. Adjusted for inflation, real average wages in 1973 were $9 per 
hour. A quarter-century later, they were $8 per hour.
47
 At the same time, through a combination 
of tax cuts and spiraling executive compensation packages, the average pay for CEOs vis-à-vis 
the average American worker mushroomed from 36 times workers’ average pay in 1976 to 131 
times the level in 1993, to an astronomical 369 tiomes the average worker in 2005.
48
 The 
contrasting fortunes between the working and wealthy classes were not lost on multibillionaire 
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Warren Buffett, who noted that over the previous twenty years, “the average American went 
exactly nowhere on the economic scale; he’s been on a treadmill while the superrich have been 
on a spaceship.”49 CEOs benefited handsomely from taking tough positions against organized 
labor, including Caterpillar Don Fites. Amidst the company’s efforts to impose lower wages and 
benefits for new hires, slash overtime pay, and hire temporary workers, Fites’s compensation 
rose 41 percent between 1994, when it was $1.8 million, and 1995 when he was paid $3.1 
million. Reaping the rewards for breaking the back of the UAW put him in the top 100 best-
compensated CEOs.
50
  
For the industrial working class in Peoria and the US, globalization was not a harbinger 
of economic promise, but rather a cudgel wielded against them to exact concessions, to weaken 
their power in the workplace and the political arena. The capacity of companies to operate on an 
international scale had a direct impact on unionization rates in the US, hastening the decline of 
American unions by increasing not only their ability to relocate elsewhere—in the US or 
abroad—but also their threats to do so. This depleted the ranks of unions both by attrition and 
preventing them from replenishing their numbers in organizing drives. In her 2000 study 
analyzing the impact that capital flight has had on union organizing, Kate Bronfenbrenner found 
that under the pretense of maintaining global competitiveness, “a majority of employers use the 
threat of plant closure and capital flight in organizing drives and at the bargaining table,” with 
many in fact following through on those threats. The passage of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 exacerbated this trend, resulting in the loss of an estimated 
440,000 jobs to Mexico and Canada, while foreign direct investment by US firms abroad 
increased threefold in the 1990s, to $122 billion. Far from all jobs lost went overseas, however. 
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The Brandow Company's U.S. Interstate Business Migration Report estimates that from 1996 to 
1999 "16,728 firms representing more than 517,000 jobs relocated between states" and "about 
six times that number probably relocated to new county jurisdictions inside their home states." 
Unions in the manufacturing sector of the economy were especially hard hit, facing threats to 
relocate during the majority of organizing drives. Bronfenbrenner found that the more enmeshed 
in the global economy that companies were, in their customer and manufacturing bases, the more 
likely they were to threaten to relocate the jobs of American workers, reducing the success rates 
of organizing drives.  These threats increased throughout the 1990s, serving as an object lesson 
to industrial workers that, should they attempt to organize, they risked losing their jobs at a time 
when they had already become scarce.
51
 
  While Bronfenbrenner’s detailed study focuses primarily on organizing drives, its 
implications undoubtedly encompass the insecurity that beset Caterpillar’s unionized workers 
and America’s working class overall at the end of the twentieth century. The strikes and 
prolonged strife with the UAW became a convenient pretense for the company to relocate 
production work elsewhere as part of an aggressive “Southern Strategy” that emulated the shift 
to the South and West that auto manufacturers initiated beginning in the 1950s to avoid dealing 
with the then-powerful auto union.
52
 After years of threatening to close it, in 1998 Caterpillar 
finally shuttered its York, Pennsylvania factory, a site of heated conflict throughout the 1990s 
that the company’s looming threats intensified all the more. The production performed at York 
was split between two smaller, non-union factories in the South, with a new facility in 
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Morganton, North Carolina making oil coolers and pistons, and a second plant in Danville, 
Kentucky manufacturing track equipment. Union officials suspected that control over the 
workplace as much as union avoidance, and paying lower wages and benefits, spurred 
Caterpillar’s shift southward. "They're called ‘focus factories,’" said Terry Ordorff, bargaining 
chairman for United Auto Workers Local 786 in York. "They break them down into very small 
plants -- into less than 100 people. It's for total control of your workforce."
53
 Closing York also 
sent the message to the UAW, whose workers still toiled without a contract, that other factories, 
including one in Mossville the company also suggested may close, could be next. Labor relations 
expert Bruce Nissen aptly summarized Caterpillar’s strategy when he said, "It creates fear and 
insecurity all over," he said. "Plant closings are precursors to more demands on the union.”54  
Within a week, the company announced that it would transfer hose line and engine 
production work remaining in York to a new factory it was building in Oxford, Mississippi. 
What proved especially enticing was the package of tax breaks that Oxford offered the company, 
including a ten-year exemption on all local taxes except for schools, in addition to land for the 
factory worth $200,000, and city-installed roads and utilities for the new plant.
55
 In sum, the 
company was willing to decentralize production previously done in one unionized factory, to 
three non-union ones in three different states, with the lower wages and tax breaks from the city 
offsetting shipping costs for this component production. Although not new to American workers, 
Caterpillar displayed a brazen quality in its strategy of union avoidance, for it had still not settled 
its dispute with the UAW, and had moved rapidly after the union’s failed second strike left the 
UAW exhausted, financially strapped, and suing for peace. 
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The Settlement and Its Implications  
 Caterpillar and the UAW reached a tentative agreement in February 1998, with the union 
agreeing to concede ground on work rules, two-tier pay, and temporary workers, and dropping 
the 441 outstanding unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB. As much as that was for 
workers to accept, they most vehemently opposed a non-contractual term of the proposed 
settlement: the UAW was willing to send the cases and fates of 50 terminated workers to an 
arbitrator in exchange for the company agreeing to bring back the other 110 whom it fired. Rank-
and-file militants within the union, especially those in the Blue Shirt brigade (many of whom 
were fired), were outraged and organized an aggressive Vote-No campaign against the tentative 
agreement, distributing thousands of leaflets to members. In a raucous meeting at Bradley 
University’s Robertson Memorial Field House on Sunday, February 22, workers vented their 
displeasure with the bargaining committee and the UAW International, regularly disrupting 
speeches, repeatedly calling local 974 president Jim Clingan a “sellout,” and littering the 
gymnasium floor with flyers and summaries of the agreement. With the uncertain fate of the 
remaining 50 fired workers fueling opposition to the agreement, UAW members resoundingly 
rejected the tentative agreement. The overall vote was fifty-eight percent against, forty-two for, 
with the bulk of the pro-agreement votes coming from Aurora local 145, whose members voted 
overwhelmingly (eighty-two percent) for the agreement. Most other locals, however, from whom 
most of the fired workers came, soundly defeated it, with sixty-one percent of local 974, sixty-
four percent of local 2096 in Pontiac, and over ninety percent of local 751 in Decatur—whose 
membership was perhaps the most militant and the least likely to cross its picket lines—voting 
no.
56
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 Solidarity weighed heavily on the minds of those voting. Steve Spring, an engine 
assembler and thirty-year employee, vowed to keep fighting until all 160 terminated employees 
returned. "If solidarity means anything, it means all of us,” he said. “It'll be generations before all 
this is over. I'd rather have everybody back instead of better pay for myself."
57
 With most of the 
membership refusing to budge on the issue of the fired workers, the press fretted that the 
agreement’s rejection would further brand central Illinois “no happy place to do business,” and 
urged a rapid settlement before Caterpillar decided to “continue to pull jobs out of this 
community.”58 To the editorial board of the Journal-Star, whose coverage was largely favorable 
to Caterpillar during the disputes, maintaining solidarity was a luxury Peoria could ill afford. 
The terms of the contract were harsh and, especially in the areas of work rules, regressive 
for the UAW. In exchange for pay raises, increases in pension benefits for future retirees, and job 
guarantees for all employees at the time of the settlement, the company gained considerable 
latitude to impose two-tier wage structures, flexibility in work rules allowing Caterpillar to 
change work schedules and thus avoid paying overtime, and the ability to hire temporary 
employees to perform union jobs.
59
 The new contract eased restrictions on subcontracting work, 
which the company used creatively to its advantage, according to Dave LaHood, by encouraging 
workers on some specialty assembly lines to quit and form their own independent company, to 
which the company would then contract work they and others had previously done as union 
workers. In some factories, this has created a crazy-quilt pattern of union, temporary, and newly 
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subcontracted workers, fracturing shop-floor cohesion among departments.
60
  Nor did the final 
contract include the contractual provision, which had existed for decades, requiring the company 
to pay the union for the time its committee chairs spent on union business, ending the UAW’s 
pending lawsuit on the matter.
61
  
It was a major blow to the once-proud union and its Caterpillar locals, for although they 
could take pride in having saved their union after being on strike with little hope of returning in 
1995, local 974 bargaining chair Jerry Baker’s post-strike claim that "Union busting doesn't play 
in Peoria” rang hollow.62 The union was not busted, but its power was severely circumscribed. 
Additionally, the company’s strong stand on concessions that pushed the UAW to the brink of 
decimation at Caterpillar did indeed play in Peoria and pay dividends for the company. It not 
only successfully severed itself from the pattern bargaining system with other earthmoving 
companies. Its willingness to take on the UAW and achieve steep, long-term cuts in wages, 
benefits, and job security for its future workforce in turn became the unofficial pattern that other 
companies sought from their employees, including those the UAW represented. Even before the 
UAW settled with Caterpillar, its long fight persuaded UAW members at John Deere to accept a 
contract similar to the one it brokered with Caterpillar. Others such as American Axle in western 
New York, auto parts manufacturers Dana, Visteon, and Delphi, and the Big Three itself, 
followed suit and gained significant cost savings from the UAW.
63
 While two-tier wage systems 
did not originate with the Caterpillar-UAW battles, nor were they entirely new to the UAW in 
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the 1990s, they certainly accelerated afterward, for the union’s defeat revealed that if 
Caterpillar’s UAW members could be forced to accede on the issue, others could as well.64  
The effects of the 1998 contract and the defeat of the UAW are hard to over-estimate. 
Caterpillar’s victory has achieved to a considerable degree a reversal in the psychology of what 
workers ought to reasonably expect in a unionized workplace. Whereas workers before the 
1990s, even during the era of mass layoffs in the 1980s, could anticipate degrees of security and 
at least gradual improvement in wages and benefits through their job and union membership, 
Caterpillar eroded that expectation, certainly for its production workers. The way to a better life 
was not through negotiating a better union contract that provides better wages and benefits, but 
rather through “opportunities for promotion…if not with Caterpillar, then at another employer.” 
As New York Times reporter Louis Uchitelle termed it, “Driving a forklift or working on an 
assembly line for 20 years should not be a career goal.”65 The contrast in the prospects of long-
term security for new workers at Caterpillar, between 1966 and 2006, could not have been 
clearer.  
 The patterns of deindustrialization at Caterpillar—through automation, the elimination of 
union jobs through the decentralization of its factories to nonunion states, the innovative methods 
of in-house subcontracting, and transferring jobs overseas—coalesced to eliminate a key feature 
of the company’s industrial workforce: the passing of jobs from one generation to the next. There 
were far fewer union jobs by the end of the twentieth century, with local 974 representing 
approximately 5,600 of the 9,500 total UAW members at Caterpillar. This in effect 
grandfathered out the familial ties to jobs that factory workers had developed over generations, 
with older workers holding onto their jobs longer, and few new members replenishing their 
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ranks. Diminished job prospects had a particularly adverse effect on working-class Peorians, who 
found it more difficult to afford to pay for college education for their children. Whereas in the 
past, many Caterpillar employees chose factory work over attending college because the pay, 
benefits, and security were good, the end of the twentieth century brought a new, persistent era 
of insecurity.  
 The circumstances of Mike Legel, now retired from Caterpillar, illustrate this new era of 
trans-generational insecurity that workers in Peoria and America face. His son works at ATS, a 
computer services company at Caterpillar, but is not a Caterpillar employee for ATS is 
technically a company to which Caterpillar outsources work. The differences between what his 
job provides him at ATS, and what his father’s job did at Caterpillar, are stark and reveal the 
setbacks and struggles for the new working-class generation.  
I am tickled to death that my son has got a decent-paying job.  He’s making $12/hr. He 
can’t afford to move out of the house. He bought a new car and that’s it.  He can own a 
new car now.  He doesn’t have enough money to pay utilities and rent an apartment and 
own a new car.  Now think about that.  In 1975, at the age of—what was I, 19, 20 years 
old? I had a new car and a new house and was working at Caterpillar and I had money to 
burn.  When I got married, one income could have sent my kids through college.  Two 
incomes can’t do it now.66 
 
 The disparate opportunities between Legel and his son are endemic at Caterpillar. John 
Arnold, a forklift driver at the company’s materials handling plant, earns five dollars per hour 
less than more senior co-workers doing the same work. His father was a union millwright, one of 
the best-paying jobs at Caterpillar that held out the possibility that Arnold might himself make a 
similarly comfortable living. “When I was a kid,” Arnold recalled, “he was making some good 
money. I was hoping that I could eventually get to where my dad’s at.” Instead, he struggles to 
make ends meet. As with Legel’s son, the result has been an inability to realize the security and 
independence through unionized industrial labor—such as home ownership and saving for the 
                                                          
66
 Legel Interview. 
231 
 
future—that their parents attained through Caterpillar, and that the postwar upsurge in union 
membership provided working-class Americans. While Arnold is single, Scott Wilcoxon is 
married at age twenty-six, with three children. Operating five computer-controlled cutting 
machines at Caterpillar, Wilcoxon as a lower-tier worker earns eighty percent of the wages that 
others do. His family’s budget is tight. “We can afford our food and gas,” Wilcoxon says. “But 
we can’t go out and eat at a nice restaurant. We can’t go to a movie…The only way I can afford 
Christmas presents is by working seven days a week to make extra money.”67  Older workers are 
hardly immune from the climate of insecurity permeating working-class life. The decline of good 
industrial jobs has also squeezed middle-aged homeowners who have struggled to maintain their 
modest foothold. Nancy Muse and her husband, Robert, had to eliminate most discretionary 
spending after he was laid off from his machinist job at Northrup Aircraft in Los Angeles.  His 
landing a maintenance job at half his machinist’s salary meant the family lived in fear, closer to 
the poverty line and “day to day. You don’t plan for the future anymore.”68  
Conclusion 
 The UAW’s reliance on a legalistic strategy, using the NLRB to pressure Caterpillar to 
withdraw its demands for concessions as labor board charges mounts, largely proved a failure. 
Caterpillar used this strategy to its own advantage, largely by contesting and summarily ignoring 
the NLRB rulings and any animosity they generated among the general public. Having defeated 
the union for the second time in less than four years, the company resumed its harsh, punitive 
attacks on the returning strikers, abridging their workplace rights, intimidating them with the 
presence of Vance’s paramilitary security contingent, and relocating work from unionized 
factories to non-union ones before making any substantive progress in negotiations with the 
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UAW. These pressure tactics helped the company not just win the labor disputes and deep 
concessions from the union. They unraveled the system of pattern bargaining the UAW had 
constructed and sustained with other earthmoving companies. In the process, Caterpillar 
illustrated to corporate America that a two-tier wage structure could be demanded even from 
strong unions, and attained. The two-tier system challenged a fundamental aspect of the New 
Deal order that had survived until the 1990s—the concept of equal wages for equal work that 
unions and workers often advanced, with notable exceptions especially for women, from the 
1930s onward.
69
  
By failing to cultivate broader solidarity networks particularly on an international level to 
match the far-flung scope of Caterpillar’s operations, by relying too heavily on legalistic 
challenges to Caterpillar’s pattern of abridging basic workplace rights, and by exposing itself 
again to permanent replacement with its ill-fated 1994-1995 strike, the UAW suffered a serious, 
very public loss against Caterpillar. Along with the AFL-CIO, it revealed the moribund, 
stultifying position of organized labor at the end of the twentieth century, beset by ossified, 
outmoded approaches to labor relations and methods of confronting the vast expansion of 
corporate power. Guided by nationalism, which proved to simultaneously be a galvanizing and 
circumscribing force for its members, the UAW failed to develop an effective counter-narrative 
to the logic and structures of capitalism that had allowed it to expand around the globe. In 
particular, the UAW and many AFL-CIO unions have failed to rethink and redefine their 
parameters of class, nation, and race that became more entrenched in the post-World War Two 
period, at the same time that the globalization of capitalism and industry expanded the global 
working class. The borders between American workers and their counterparts abroad had 
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parallels within their own communities, especially along black-white racial lines, that further 
limited the list of potential allies and subdivided the working class, despite mounting economic 
pressures that most of them shared.
70
 Until these groups work to overcome these barriers, until 
they develop new and innovative methods to confront corporate power where it operates 
nationally and internationally and until unions strive to expand their circles of “we” to include, 
work with, and learn from a broadening, more racially heterogeneous, diffuse, and global 
working class, they will continue to risk the type of cataclysmic defeat that the UAW suffered at 
the hands of Caterpillar.     
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Tables 
Table 1.1 City of Peoria Population, Total and African American 
Year Total Population African American 
Population 
1900 56,100 1,402 
1910 66,950 1,569 
1920 76,121 2,130 
1930 104,969 3,037 
1940 105,087 2,826 
Source: Adapted from Romeo B. Garrett, The Negro in Peoria (Peoria, IL: Romeo B. Garrett, 
1973), 78. 
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Table 1.2: Number, Acreage, and Value of Farms, Peoria County—1880-1954 
Year Number of 
Farms 
Total Farm 
Acreage 
Average Size 
of Farm 
(acres) 
Value per 
Farm 
Value per 
Acre 
1880 2,956 333,015 112.7 4,529 40.19 
1890 2,581 339,723 131.6 7,693 58.46 
1900 2,813 357,091 126.9 7,991 62.97 
1910 2,717 353,206 130.0 16,250 125.00 
1920 2,499 348,711 139.5 29,213 209.41 
1930 2,372 332,754 140.3 19,263 137.31 
1940 2,516 339,243 134.8 13,744 101.93 
1945 2,260 339,587 150.3 18,829 125.31 
1950 2,252 334,801 148.7 29,008 183.07 
1954 1,981 318,398 160.7 46,589 273.33 
Source: Adapted from  City Planning and Zoning Commission, Planning Peoria: A Master Plan 
Report (Peoria, IL, 1969), 97.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
236 
 
Table 2.1: Minority Employment by Occupation as of February 1, 1965  
Occupation African Americans (#) Other Nonwhite (#) 
Officials and managers 1 5 
Professionals 2 13 
Technical 4 5 
Office and clerical 42 26 
Craftsmen (skilled) 38 45 
Operatives (semi-skilled) 581 151 
Laborers (unskilled) 285 26 
Service Workers 53 1 
TOTAL 1006 272 
Percentage of Total US 
Workforce 
2.80% 0.76% 
Source:  Adapted from National Industrial Conference Board, Company Experience with Negro 
Employment: Studies in Personnel Policy, No. 201 Volume I—Caterpillar Tractor Co. Case 
Study (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 1966), 104-105. 
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Table 2.2 Comparison in National Terms of Average Hourly Wages, Based on the 
Exchange Rates in US Dollars and as Index  
Caterpillar Hourly 
Wage for 
Unskilled 
Workers 
in US 
Dollars 
Index (US 
Wages = 
100) 
Hourly 
Wage 
Semi-
Skilled 
Workers 
in US 
Dollars 
Index (US 
Wages = 
100) 
Hourly 
Wages 
Skilled 
Workers 
in US 
Dollars 
Index (US 
Wages = 
100) 
U.S. $3.94 100 $4.75 100 $5.58 100 
Belgium 1.31-1.43 33-36 1.24-1.53 26-32 1.48-
1.66/1.57-
1.94 
27-30/28-
35 
France n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.15 21 
Source: “Pay Conditions in the Plants of Multinational Corporations Making Agricultural 
Machinery,” 14, IMF World Agricultural Implement Industry Conference, Brussels, May 15-17, 
1972, UAW President’s Office Leonard Woodcock Collection, Box 202, Folder #5, Archive of 
Labor and Urban Affairs-Wayne State University. 
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Tables 3.1 Employment and Earnings, Peoria Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, 1984 
(Statistics based on March figures) 
Occupation Total Employees Average 
Earnings/Month 
Average Hours 
Worked/Month 
Average Hourly 
Wage 
Machinery (Not 
Electrical) 
22,700 $512.94 42.5 $13.22 
Manufacturing 34,200 $487.91 39.7 $12.39 
Food and 
Kindred Products 
1,500 $435.17 43.3 $10.05 
Durable Goods 28,800 $497.77 39.6 $12.57 
Printing and 
Publishing 
1,900 $411.54 34.7 $11.86 
Nondurable 
Goods 
5,500 $438.46 40.3 $10.88 
 
Table 3.1 Continued: Employment and Earnings, Peoria Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area, 1985 (Statistics based on March figures) 
Occupation Total Employees Average 
Earnings/Month 
Average Hours 
Worked/Month 
Average Hourly 
Wage 
Machinery (Not 
Electrical 
20,400 $572.98 42.0 $13.39 
Manufacturing 31,700 $522.50 41.6 $12.56 
Food and 
Kindred Products 
1,600 $370.02 42.0 $9.56 
Durable Goods 26,300 $539.55 41.6 $12.80 
Printing and 
Publishing 
1,900 $511.52 42.1 $11,71 
Nondurable 
Goods 
5,400 $439.71 41.6 $10.69 
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Table 3.1 Continued: Employment and Earnings, Peoria Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area, 1986 (Statistics based on March figures) 
Occupation Total Employees Average 
Earnings/Month 
Average Hours 
Worked/Month 
Average Hourly 
Wage 
Machinery (Not 
Electrical) 
20,000 $604.46 42.9 $13.61 
Manufacturing 31,400 $540.17 42.3 $12.49 
Food and 
Kindred Products 
1,800 $320.83 37.7 $8.20 
Durable Goods 25,600 $568.76 42.7 $13.02 
Printing and 
Publishing 
1,800 $510.04 41.0 $12.15 
Nondurable 
Goods 
5,800 $422.01 40.5 $10.24 
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Table 3.1 Continued: Employment and Earnings, Peoria Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area, 1987 (Statistics based on March figures) 
Occupation Total Employees Average 
Earnings/Month 
Average Hours 
Worked/Month 
Average Hourly 
Wage 
Machinery (Not 
Electrical) 
19,900 $618.62 43.2 $14.16 
Manufacturing 30,500 $540.56 42.1 $12.95 
Food and 
Kindred Products 
1,700 $284.61 35.8 $8.51 
Durable Goods 24,800 $577.86 42.1 $14.11 
Printing and 
Publishing 
1,900 $482.60 38.0 $12.44 
Nondurable 
Goods 
5,700 $396.87 39.1 $10.51 
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Table 3.1 Continued: Employment and Earnings, Peoria Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area, 1988 (Statistics based on March figures) 
Occupation Total Employees Average 
Earnings/Month 
Average Hours 
Worked/Month 
Average Hourly 
Wage 
Machinery (Not 
Electrical) 
21,200 $669.44 46.2 $14.32 
Manufacturing 33.400 $597.64 44.6 $12.97 
Food and 
Kindred Products 
1,700 $379.47 41.7 $7.95 
Durable Goods 27,300 $635.15 45.4 $13.62 
Printing and 
Publishing 
2,100 $452.66 36.3 $12.70 
Nondurable 
Goods 
6,100 $426.21 41.1 $10.23 
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Table 5.1 Work Stoppages Involving 1,000 Workers or More in the U.S. 1950-1994 
Year Work Stoppages Workers Involved 
(Thousands) 
Days Idle 
(Thousands) 
1950 424 1,698 30,390 
1953 437 1,623 18,130 
1960 222 896 13,260 
1970 381 2,468 57,761 
1980 187 795 20,844 
1990 44 185 5,926 
1993 35 182 3,981 
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Compensation and 
Working Conditions (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, September 
1994), 78. 
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